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The Structure and Interpretation of Imperatives: Mood and Force in Universal
Grammar
Abstract
This dissertation is a cross-linguistic investigation into the structure and interpretation of imperatives and
related constructions. We identify universal morphosyntactic principles of imperatives and explain
variations in the syntax of imperatives as a consequence of the interaction between the universal
principles and the morphosyntactic system of a particular language. Based on these conclusions, we
develop a model for the interpretation of imperatives. We show that the syntax of imperatives across
languages includes an imperative operator, which is a set of morphosyntactic features. The interaction
between a formal universal for the imperative operator and the syntax of a language correctly predicts the
cross-linguistic variation in the availability of negative imperatives. We also account for the apparent
peculiarity in the syntactic evolution of imperatives in the history of English. The results of our analysis
confirm the postulated presence of an imperative operator and provide support for the presence of
particular functional projections in the clausal phrase structure in English. We also propose that the
morphosyntactic features of the imperative operator have interpretational consequences. We argue that
the imperative operator includes a feature that encodes directive force, and another feature that encodes
modality of unrealized interpretation. We also argue that subjunctives and infinitivals have an operator
whose feature content is in a proper subset relation with that of the imperative operator. By defining the
relation of imperatives, subjunctives and infinitivals in this way, we are able to capture the close relation
that exists in many languages between these three types of sentences. We also account for the crosslinguistic variation in the syntactic behavior of the imperative subject by developing the idea that the
imperative operator selects either an infinitive type or subjunctive type INFL, depending on the language.
We define directive illocutionary force as an instruction to the hearer to update a PLAN SET, a set of
propositions that specifies the hearer's intentions. Thus, the directive force of the imperative is not a
result of inference; it is directly encoded in its logical form.
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ABSTRACT

The Structure and Interpretation of Imperatives:
Mood and Force in Universal Grammar
Chung-hye Han
Supervisor: Anthony S. Kroch
This dissertation is a cross-linguistic investigation into the structure and interpretation
of imperatives and related constructions. We identify universal morphosyntactic principles
of imperatives and explain variations in the syntax of imperatives as a consequence of the
interaction between the universal principles and the morphosyntactic system of a particular
language. Based on these conclusions, we develop a model for the interpretation of imperatives. We show that the syntax of imperatives across languages includes an imperative
operator, which is a set of morphosyntactic features. The interaction between a formal
universal for the imperative operator and the syntax of a language correctly predicts the
cross-linguistic variation in the availability of negative imperatives. We also account for
the apparent peculiarity in the syntactic evolution of imperatives in the history of English.
The results of our analysis con rm the postulated presence of an imperative operator and
provide support for the presence of particular functional projections in the clausal phrase
structure in English. We also propose that the morphosyntactic features of the imperative
operator have interpretational consequences. We argue that the imperative operator includes a feature that encodes directive force, and another feature that encodes modality of
unrealized interpretation. We also argue that subjunctives and in nitivals have an operator
whose feature content is in a proper subset relation with that of the imperative operator.
By de ning the relation of imperatives, subjunctives and in nitivals in this way, we are
able to capture the close relation that exists in many languages between these three types
of sentences. We also account for the cross-linguistic variation in the syntactic behavior of
the imperative subject by developing the idea that the imperative operator selects either an
in nitive type or subjunctive type INFL, depending on the language. We de ne directive
illocutionary force as an instruction to the hearer to update a plan set, a set of propositions that speci es the hearer's intentions. Thus, the directive force of the imperative is
not a result of inference; it is directly encoded in its logical form.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
This dissertation is an investigation into the structure and interpretation of imperatives
and related constructions across languages. The dissertation has two main goals. First, we
identify general morphosyntactic principles of the imperative clause type across languages
and endeavor to explain cross-linguistic variation in its realization as a consequence of
interaction between the general principles and particular morphosyntactic systems in each
language. Second, based on our conclusions regarding the morphosyntax of imperatives, we
develop a model for the interpretation of imperatives.
Imperative sentences across languages are formally distinguishable from other sentence
types of the language in which they appear: i.e., they have distinctive morphology on the
main verb and/or distinctive syntax. Canonically, they express the directive illocutionary force associated with commands and requests. Consequently, the term imperative
has often been used to refer to a sentence's function rather than its form. Any construction that expresses directive meaning is then classi ed as an imperative, irrespective of its
form. For example, all of the sentences in (1) would be imperatives because they all have
approximately the same illocutionary force of order or request.
(1) a.

Wash the dishes!

b.

You will wash the dishes!

c.

Will you wash the dishes, please?

d.

You should wash the dishes!
1

However, we use the term imperative to refer exclusively to a sentence's form, and emphatically do not use the term to refer its function. Thus, the only sentence that we classify
as an imperative among the examples in (1) is (1a). Its morphosyntax is distinguishable
from other examples in (1): it has no overt subject, and the verb is in the bare form. In
contrast, the sentences (1b) and (1d) are formally declaratives, and the sentence (1c) is
formally an interrogative. Thus, although the sentences in (1) have similar functions, they
have di erent forms.

1.1 Issues and Sketch of the Proposal
The grammatical status of imperative sentences is puzzling, syntactically and semantically.
Imperative verbs have little or no in ectional morphology in most languages, even in ones
which otherwise exhibit a rich verbal morphology for tense, agreement and mood. They
have many distinctive formal (sometimes apparently idiosyncratic) properties that distinguish them from other sentence types of the language in which they appear. For instance,
in Italian, Modern Greek, and Spanish, pronominal clitics procliticize in indicatives and
subjunctives, but encliticize in imperatives. Also, in these languages, imperatives cannot
be negated. Instead, negative commands { that is, prohibitions { are expressed through the
use of suppletive subjunctives or in nitivals. In English, empty subjects are not normally
allowed in matrix sentences, but are allowed in imperatives. Moreover, while do-support is
required in a negative declarative only if its main verb is a lexical verb, it is required in all
negative imperatives whether the main verb is a lexical verb or an auxiliary verb. The syntactic peculiarities of imperatives are also attested in the historical context. In the history
of English, the development of do-support in imperatives patterns di erently from negative
declaratives and interrogatives, as observed by Ellegard (1953). In addition, imperatives
do not show uniform formal properties across languages. For instance, while imperatives
cannot be negated in some languages, in other languages, English, German, French, and
Bulgarian, they can be. Furthermore, while the imperative subject is optional in English,
Modern Greek, Bulgarian and Korean, it is obligatorily absent in French, Spanish and
Italian.
Semantically, imperative sentences canonically express directives. However, languages
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have forms other than the imperative to express directives. For instance, an interrogative
such as Would you open the window? or a declarative such as I want you to open the
window can function as directives. In some languages (Modern Greek, Spanish, Italian,
Hindi), subjunctives can serve the directive function, and in other languages (German,
Italian and Spanish), in nitivals can do so. This situation might lead to the conclusion that
the imperative re ects a function of language and that its analysis is purely a matter of
pragmatics. But the fact is that most languages have identi able morphosyntactic forms
canonically used to express directives, indicating that the imperative is a grammatical
category.
Our main proposal is that the syntax of imperatives across languages includes an imperative operator, which is a set of morphosyntactic features. We will argue that the
apparently idiosyncratic syntactic properties of the imperatives in a given language, as well
as the cross-linguistic variation in their syntax are consequences of the interaction between
a particular language's morphosyntactic regularities and the universal formal properties of
the morphosyntactic features of the imperative operator. In particular, we will show that
the systematic interactions between a formal universal for the imperative operator and the
syntax of a language correctly predict the availability of negative imperatives. We also account for the apparent peculiarity in the syntactic evolution of imperatives in the history of
English. The results of our analysis of the syntactic development of English imperatives not
only con rm the postulated presence of an imperative operator in English but also provide
support for a method of characterizing functional projections in the phrase structure of a
clause in English. We also propose that the morphosyntactic features of the imperative operator have interpretational consequences. We argue that the imperative operator includes
a [directive] feature that encodes directive illocutionary force, and an [irrealis] feature that
encodes modality that contributes the interpretation that a certain state is not realized. We
also argue that subjunctives and in nitivals across languages has an operator that includes
the feature [irrealis], and so is formally a proper subset of the imperative operator. By
de ning the relation of imperatives, subjunctives and in nitivals in this way, we are able
to capture the close interpretational relation that exists in many languages between the
three types of sentences. Moreover, we account for cross-linguistic variation in the syntactic
behavior of the imperative subject by developing the idea that the [irrealis] feature of the
3

imperative operator selects either an in nitive type or subjunctive type INFL, depending
on the language. Furthermore, by splitting up the feature content of the imperative operator into [directive] and [irrealis], we are led to the conclusion that the logical form of
imperatives includes an operator that encodes directive illocutionary force and a proposition that has the modality of unrealized interpretation. We also suggest a way of de ning
illocutionary force. In particular, we propose that directive force is an instruction to the
hearer to update/change a particular module, which we refer to as plan set. This plan
set is a set of propositions that speci es the hearer's intentions, and represents the state of
a airs that the hearer intends to bring about. According to our analysis, the directive force
of the imperative is not a result of pragmatic inference; it is directly encoded in its logical
form.
Our treatment of the syntax of imperatives is in line with Potsdam (1997b), who assimilates the phrase structure of English imperatives to that of interrogatives and who argues
that the imperative in English has largely regular syntactic behavior within a conventional
conception of English clause structure. On the other hand, our treatment of the syntax
of imperatives contrasts with other analyses within the generative tradition which take for
granted that imperatives have exceptional syntactic properties that are independent of the
morphosyntax of the languages in which they appear (cf. Schmerling (1982), Pollock (1989),
Beukema and Coopmans (1989), Zhang (1991), Platzack and Rosengren (1996)). Moreover,
our treatment of the interpretation of imperatives di ers from the generative semantics
approach in which the syntax and semantics of imperatives are reducible to those of corresponding performative sentences (cf. Ross (1970), Sadock (1974)). Our approach also
di ers from the post-generative semantics treatment in which imperatives denote a certain type of proposition and the directive illocutionary force is generated via pragmatic
inference (cf. Bolinger (1977), Huntley (1982), Huntley (1984), Davies (1986), Wilson
and Sperber (1988)). Our approach is a development of the intuition already laid out in
Frege (1960) and Lewis (1976), according to which a sentence is a complex of two components, one that expresses its truth conditional meaning and another that expresses its
force, and according to which interpreting the force component involves interaction with
the module of language use in discourse. Some of these works will be discussed in more
detail in subsequent chapters.
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1.2 Theoretical Background
In this section, we introduce some theoretical assumptions which are minimally necessary
for understanding the discussion in the following chapters. Our analysis of the imperative
is embedded in a generative model of syntax, developed in works whose basis is in the
Principles and Parameters framework and the Minimalist Program (Chomsky 1993, 1995).
The assumptions we present in this section are especially relevant for the discussions of the
morphosyntax of imperatives in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. The aspects of the theory based on
morphosyntactic features and their role in syntax are particularly useful for the analysis of
imperatives given that imperative verbs in many languages exhibit distinctive morphology.
We will motivate the presence or absence of certain functional projections in the phrase
structure of imperatives and imperative verb movement to a functional head by appealing
to the presence or absence of in ectional morphology on the imperative verb.

1.2.1 Morphosyntactic Features, Functional Projections, Movement
Following the assumptions of the Minimalist program, we assume that the lexicon includes
morphosyntactic features as well as lexical items. Further, morphosyntactic features are
expressed on the lexical item, e.g., as in ections on the verb. In addition, they give rise
to syntactic structure as features on functional heads. That is, both morphosyntactic features and fully in ected lexical items enter into the derivation of a syntactic structure. In
order for the derivation to converge (succeed), the features on a functional head and their
morphological re ections on a lexical item must be brought together within a de ned local
con guration at some point in the derivation so that they can be checked. Checking is
instantiated by the movement of the lexical item. In e ect, then, movement in syntax is
driven by morphology.
Feature checking takes place within the checking domain of the head whose features
are being checked. A checking domain of a head includes the Spec position and anything
adjoined to the head, its maximal projection, or its Spec. For example, in (2) the checking
domain of X includes UP, WP, ZP, and H.
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(2)

XP
UP

XP
ZP

X0

WP ZP

X

YP

H X
Typically, a feature of a functional head can be checked when the checking lexical item is
in the speci er of the functional head or adjoined to the functional head.
Feature checking can in principle occur at any point in the derivation. However, not
all features have the same status regarding when checking must take place. If a feature is
strong, it must be checked overtly, before the derivation branches o to PF (phonological
form) and LF (logical form). The point at which the derivation branches o to PF and
LF is called Spell-Out. If a feature is weak, its checking is delayed by the principle of
Procrastinate until the covert syntax: i.e., until the derivation branches o to LF. All
features must be checked ultimately because they otherwise cause a derivation to crash.
Thus, strong features drive overt movement, and weak features drive covert movement.
In principle, for the purposes of feature checking, it should be enough to move just the
necessary features. The assumption is that this is indeed the case at LF: i.e., at LF only
the necessary features are involved in movement for feature checking. For example, if a
functional head has a weak tense feature which has to be checked against a tense feature
on a verb, then at LF, just the tense feature on the verb moves to the functional head,
leaving the other features behind. This kind of movement is called feature movement.
On the other hand, for movement before Spell-Out, the feature that moves carries along
all the other features on the verb, including the phonetic features, for PF convergence. For
example, if a functional head has a strong tense feature which has to be checked against a
tense feature on a verb, then the tense feature on the verb carries along other features as
well, thereby having the e ect of moving the verb itself. This kind of movement is called
6

category movement.1

1.2.2 Parametric Di erence
In Minimalism, the cognitive system for each particular language consists of a computational
system and a lexicon. The computational system consists of generative procedures (derivations) that construct pairs of representations that are interpreted at PF and LF, respectively.
In e ect, the computational system of a language is a mapping from a set of lexical choices
to a pair of PF and LF representations. The assumption is that the principles involved
in the computation are universal, and that signi cant parametric di erences between languages are limited to lexical di erences, speci cally, di erences in the features that occupy
the functional category nodes. This idea was rst explored by Borer (1984). We illustrate
this point with the basic parametric di erences in word order of tensed clauses between
English and French. As shown by Emonds (1978) and further analyzed by Pollock (1989),
the relative positions of tensed main verbs and VP-adjoined adverbs are di erent in English
and French. In English the main verb occurs to the right of the adverb, whereas in French
the main verb occurs to the left of the adverb. The examples in (3) are from Marantz
(1995:372).
(3) a.
b.

Elmer often washes his cat.
Elmer lave souvent son chat.
Elmer washes often his cat
`Elmer often washes his cat.'

In Minimalism, the word order di erences of tensed clauses between English and French
are attributed to the strength di erence of N-features and V-features in the tense node (T0 ).
The N-features are those that are checked o against a DP that moves to the speci er of
a functional phrase and the V-features are those that are checked o against a verb that
adjoins to a functional head. These features may be either weak or strong in a language. In
In Watanabe (1992) and Brody (1995) feature movements are not restricted to LF. They independently
propose that empty operator movement or feature movement can take place in the overt syntax depending
on the language. For instance, wh in-situ phenomenon in languages like Japanese actually involves empty
operator movement or feature movement in the overt syntax. For us, it does not matter whether feature
movements apply in the overt syntax or at LF, as long as they have applied by LF and before they are
subject to interpretation.
1
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English the N-features of T0 are strong but the V-features are weak. Thus, assuming the
VP-internal subject hypothesis (Fukui (1986), Fukui and Speas (1986), Kitagawa (1986),
Koopman and Sportiche (1991)), the subject DP has to move from [Spec, VP] to [Spec,
TP] before Spell-Out. In contrast, the main verb is permitted to stay in VP before SpellOut. After Spell-Out, the necessary features of the verb move, adjoining to T0 at LF. Since
English leaves the main tensed verb inside the VP before Spell-Out, it is pronounced to
the right of the adverb. In contrast, in French both the N-features and V-features of T0
are strong. As a result, both the subject DP has to move to [Spec, TP] and the main verb
has to move and adjoin to T0 before Spell-Out. Since French raises the verb to T0 before
Spell-Out, it is pronounced to the left of the adverb.

1.2.3 LF Interface
Following Chomsky (1993, 1995), we assume the inverted Y-model of the grammar (see Figure 1.1). According to this model, lexical resources feed syntactic derivation. At Spell-Out,
the syntactic derivation splits and heads toward the two interface levels, PF and LF. The
movements that occur before Spell-Out are overt movements that a ect the pronunciation
of a sentence, whereas the movements that occur after Spell-Out at the LF component are
covert movements that do not.
Lexical Resources

Spell-Out

PF

LF

Figure 1.1: Model of the grammar
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PF is a level that interfaces with the perceptual-articulatory system, and LF is a level
that interfaces with the conceptual-intentional system. All syntactic well-formedness conditions are stated over the output representation of the LF component, which maps onto
interpretation. It is the LF component of the grammar that is most relevant for the discussions in this dissertation. In particular, the conclusions we reach with respect to the interpretation of imperatives in Chapter 5 and a related issue of the interpretation of rhetorical
questions in Chapter 6 have implications for the nature of the LF interface and for how the
representation is derived to which various well-formedness conditions apply.

1.3 Outline of the Dissertation
In Chapter 2, we provide an analysis of cross-linguistic variation in the compatibility between negation and imperatives. One peculiar property of imperatives is that many languages do not allow negative imperatives, expressing prohibition instead by using negative subjunctives or negative in nitivals. However, in other languages, imperatives can be
negated. In the literature, this phenomena has been considered to be purely syntactic (cf.
Zanuttini 1991, Rivero 1994, Rivero and Terzi 1995, Zanuttini 1997). In contrast to these
approaches, we provide an account that appeals to the interpretational aspect of imperatives, which overcomes certain problems in existing approaches while correctly predicting
the facts in a larger set of languages. The approach we pursue relies on the proposal that
imperatives include an imperative operator in the syntax that encodes directive force and
the assumption that the directive force cannot be negated by a negative marker. The proposal is that negative imperatives are not available in some languages because the syntax
of the language derives a structure in which the imperative operator encoding the directive
force ends up in the scope of negation. We argue that such a structure is ruled out because it maps onto an uninterpretable semantic representation in which the directive force is
negated. We also extend the proposed analysis to the domain of interrogatives and explain
the availability of negative interrogatives across languages.
Chapter 3 is devoted to an analysis of the syntactic evolution of English imperatives from
late Middle English to the Early Modern period, speci cally of the increasing frequency of
9

do-support in negative imperatives. In present day English, do-support is required in negative declaratives (John didn't nish), questions (Did John nish?) and negative imperatives
(Don't talk!). According to the quantitative data in Ellegard (1953), the rise in the relative
frequency of auxiliary do in negative imperatives shows di erent patterns from negative
declaratives and questions. In this study, we propose an analysis that accounts for these
di erences. We show that the rise of do in negative imperatives cannot be explained with a
phrase structure that has only one INFL projection and one NegP projection, as assumed in
Roberts (1985) and Kroch (1989b). We therefore adopt a more articulated phrase structure,
along with the assumption that imperatives are not tensed, which is independently motivated by the syntax of Middle English in nitivals. The conclusions reached in this chapter
provide evidence for the presence of the imperative operator in the syntax of imperatives and
the inventory of functional projections and their relative positioning in the phrase structure
of English. We also show that the apparent syntactic peculiarities of English imperatives
fall out from the syntactic regularities of the language as a whole, provided we adopt the
articulated phrase structure proposed here.
In Chapter 4, we explore the feature content of the imperative operator and how it
relates to the operators in subjunctives and in nitivals. We propose that the imperative
operator includes [directive] and [irrealis] features, whereas the operators in in nitivals and
subjunctives only include an [irrealis] feature. The feature [directive] encodes directive illocutionary force, and is responsible for driving verb movement to C0 . The feature [irrealis]
contributes the modality of unrealized interpretation, and selects/requires either subjunctive or in nitive INFL. This proposal accounts for why languages select subjunctives or
in nitivals in linguistic contexts where the imperative form is not available. We argue that
when the imperative operator which includes [directive] and [irrealis] features is ruled out
for some reason, the language selects an operator characterized by a subset of the features
de ning the imperative operator. This turns out to be either the subjunctive or the in nitive operator (depending on the language), both of which contain the feature [irrealis]. We
also show that the syntactic behavior of imperative subjects depends on the type of INFL
selected by the imperative operator's [irrealis] feature. If the subjunctive INFL is selected,
the subject in imperatives behaves just like the subjects in subjunctives in the language. If
the in nitive INFL is selected, it behaves just like subjects in in nitivals in the language.
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In Chapter 5, we present a proposal for the interpretation of imperatives. Based on
the conclusions we have reached for the syntax of imperatives and the assumption that the
meaning of a sentence is a function of the meaning of its parts, we propose that the logical
form of imperatives includes two components: one that encodes directive illocutionary force
and another that encodes the modality of unrealized interpretation. We de ne the component that encodes directive force as a function that takes a proposition denoting a set of
hypothetical possible worlds and turns it into a directive action. We de ne a directive action in turn as an instruction to the hearer to change/update a particular module in his/her
conceptual space: i.e., to update his/her plan set with a proposition. We also examine the
interpretational behavior of imperatives in imp(p) and will(q) sequences (e.g., Move and
I'll shoot) and imp(p) or will(q) sequences (e.g., Don't move or I'll shoot) in English and
other languages. In particular, we explore how the modality contributed by imperatives
allows the modal subordination of subsequent modal sentences. According to our analysis,
the directive force of imperatives is not the result of some pragmatic Gricean inference, but
is directly encoded in their logical forms.
In Chapter 6, we conclude this dissertation with a case study on how the pragmatics and
the output of syntax interact to generate a non-canonical illocutionary force in the domain of
rhetorical questions. While an ordinary question seeks information or an answer from
the hearer, a rhetorical question does not expect to elicit an answer. In general, a rhetorical
question has the illocutionary force of an assertion of the opposite polarity from what is
apparently asked. Under the rhetorical question reading, the yes-no questions Did I tell
you that writing a dissertation was easy? and Didn't I tell you that writing a dissertation
was easy? respectively assert I didn't tell you that writing a dissertation was easy and
I told you that writing a dissertation was easy. We show that rhetorical questions and
ordinary questions do not pattern alike with respect to various well-formedness conditions.
We propose a way of deriving the interpretation of rhetorical questions and address why
rhetorical questions have the interpretation of an assertion of the opposite polarity. We also
argue that the representation over which various well-formedness conditions are stated is the
output of a post-LF derivation which is determined via interaction with the interpretational
component. We show that a compositional semantics for rhetorical questions is possible by
directly mapping this post-LF representation onto the semantic interpretation.
11

Chapter 2

Cross-linguistic Variation in the
Compatibility between Imperatives
and Negation
2.1 Introduction
Much work on the syntax of imperatives in Romance and Slavic languages notes that
while some languages have negative imperatives, others do not, instead expressing prohibition through the use of suppletive subjunctives or in nitives (Joseph and PhilippakiWarburton (1987), Zanuttini (1991), Zanuttini (1994), Rivero (1994a), Rivero (1994c),
Rivero and Terzi (1995), Zanuttini (1997)). The purpose of this chapter is to provide
a novel account for the cross-linguistic variation in the compatibility of imperatives and
negation. We argue that some languages rule out negative imperatives because the syntax
derives a structure which maps onto an incoherent interpretation. This chapter mainly
considers data from Italian, Spanish, French, Modern Greek, Bulgarian, Serbo-Croatian,
German and English.
In x2.2, we discuss the data and the issues they raise. In x2.3, we discuss previous
studies that provide syntactic accounts of the relation between negation and imperatives.
In x2.4, we present a puzzle concerning the non-availability of negative imperatives, which
previous studies have failed to take into account. In x2.5, we establish that C0 is the locus
12

of an imperative operator which attracts the imperative verb. In x2.6, we propose that
negative imperatives are ruled out because they have a syntactic con guration which maps
onto an uninterpretable representation. Under the proposed analysis, negative imperatives
are ruled out not for syntactic reasons but for interpretational reasons. In x2.7, we discuss
and account for a potential counterexample to the proposed analysis posed by the existence
of negative imperatives in Bulgarian and Serbo-Croatian. In x2.8, we address the issue
of why languages that do not allow negative imperatives choose suppletive in nitives or
subjunctives to express prohibition. In x2.9, we extend the proposed analysis to negative
interrogatives.

2.2 Data and Issues
In Modern Greek and Spanish, imperatives are not compatible with negation. Prohibition
must instead be expressed by subjunctives in Modern Greek and subjunctives or in nitives
in Spanish.1


Modern Greek

(4) a. * Mi grapse
to!
Neg write-2sg.Imp it
`Don't write it!'
b.

(Na) mi to grapsis!
NA Neg it write-2sg.Subj
`Don't write it!'

(5) a. * Mi grapsete
to!
Neg write-2pl.Imp it
`Don't write it!'
b.

(Na) mi to grapsete!
NA Neg it write-2pl.Subj
`Don't write it!'

In Modern Greek, many imperative verbs in the 2nd person plural have the same forms as corresponding
subjunctive verbs. One way to distinguish the two forms is through the use of pronominal clitics. In
imperatives, clitics encliticize onto the verb, whereas in subjunctives, they procliticize.
1
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Spanish

(6) a. * <No lee
lo!
Neg read-2sg.Imp it
`Don't read it!'
b.

<No lo leas!
Neg it read-2sg.Subj
`Don't read it!'

c.

<No leer
lo!
Neg read-Inf it
`Don't read it!'

(7) a. * <No hablad
le!
Neg talk-2pl.Imp her
`Don't talk to her!
b.

<No le hableis!
Neg her talk-2pl.Subj
`Don't talk to her!

c.

<No hablar le!
Neg talk-Inf her
`Don't talk to her!'

In Italian, imperatives in the 2nd person singular cannot be negated, though imperatives
in the 2nd person plural can be. The prohibition in the 2nd person singular is expressed
through the use of suppletive in nitives.


Italian

(8) a. * Non telefona
le!
Neg call-2sg.Imp her
`Don't call her!'
b.

(9)

Non telefonare le!
Neg call-Inf
`Don't call her!'
Non telefonate le!
Neg call-2pl.Imp her
`Don't call her!'
14

Imperatives in the 2nd person singular have verbal forms unique to the imperative paradigm,
whereas imperatives in the 2nd person plural have verbal forms morphologically identical
to the corresponding indicative form. For this reason, Zanuttini (1991) refers to 2nd person
singular imperatives as true imperatives and 2nd person plural imperatives as suppletive imperatives.2
In French, German, Bulgarian, Serbo-Croatian and English, imperatives are compatible
with negation.


French

(11) a. Ne chante
pas!
NE sing-2sg.Imp Neg
`Don't sing!'
b. Ne chantez
pas!
NE sing-2pl.Imp Neg
`Don't sing!'


German

(12) a. Schreib
nicht!
write-2sg.Imp Neg
`Don't write!'
b. Schreibt
nicht!
write-2pl.Imp Neg
`Don't write!'

2
In Italian, although imperatives in the 2nd person plural have verbal forms morphologically identical
to the corresponding indicative form, they do not have the syntax of indicatives. For instance, pronominal
clitics procliticize onto verbs in indicative sentences, but they encliticize in both armative and negative
imperative sentences. French is like Italian in that many verbs in the 2nd person plural imperative have
verbal forms morphologically identical to the 2nd person plural indicative and in that clitics procliticize in
indicative sentences, but encliticize in armative imperatives. However, French di ers from Italian in that
clitics procliticize in negative imperatives. Clitic placement is discussed further in x2.5.2.

(10) French
a. Finissez-le!
nish-2pl.Imp-it
`Finish it!
b. Ne le nissez
pas!
NE it nish-2pl.Imp Neg
`Don't nish it!'

15



Bulgarian

(13) a.

Ne ceti!
Neg read-2sg.Imp
`Don't read!'

b.

Ne cetete!
Neg read-2pl.Imp
`Don't read!'



Serbo-Croatian

(14) a.

Ne citaj!
Neg read-2sg.Imp
`Don't read!'

b.

Ne citajte!
Neg read-2pl.Imp
`Don't read!'

The data considered here raise the following issues.


Why are imperatives compatible with negation in some languages but not in others?



In languages like Italian, in which the imperative verbal paradigm has both true and
suppletive imperative verbal forms, why are suppletive imperatives compatible with
negation, whereas true imperatives are not?



Why do languages that do not allow negative imperatives choose in nitives or subjunctives as suppletive forms?

2.3 Previous Studies
2.3.1 Zanuttini 1991, 1994, 1997
Zanuttini (1991, 1994, 1997) provides an account for Romance of the incompatibility of
negation and true imperatives. Her basic claim is that imperatives are defective in that
they lack a certain functional category required by a certain type of negation. Hence,
languages with this type of negation do not have negative imperatives.
16

2.3.1.1 Zanuttini 1991
Zanuttini (1991) distinguishes between preverbal negation and postverbal negation in Romance, which di er in their structural position and in their selectional properties. Based
on this distinction, she provides an account for (a) why true imperatives are incompatible
with preverbal negation in Italian, Spanish and Catalan (among others), (b) why true imperatives are compatible with postverbal negation in Piedmontese, Valdotain and Standard
French (among others), and (c) why suppletive imperatives are compatible with preverbal
negation in Italian and Catalan.
Zanuttini (1991) proposes that there are two NegP projections in Romance: NegP1 and
NegP2. The head of NegP1 hosts the preverbal negation and the head of NegP2 hosts
the postverbal negation. Clauses containing both of the NegP projections have the phrase
structure in (15).
(15)

NegP1
Neg10
Neg1

TP
T0
T

...
NegP2
Neg20
Neg2 ...

According to Zanuttini (1991), Neg10 , which hosts preverbal negation, must take TP
as its complement. That is, preverbal negation must co-occur with a tense projection.
But Neg20 , which hosts postverbal negation, is not parasitic on the presence of a tense
projection. That is, its occurrence within a clause is insensitive to the presence of TP.
Furthermore, TP is absent in the syntactic representation of true imperatives, whereas it is
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present in the syntactic representation of suppletive imperatives.
Zanuttini (1991) argues that true imperatives are incompatible with preverbal negation
in Italian and Catalan because preverbal negation requires TP but true imperatives lack
TP. In contrast, true imperatives are compatible with postverbal negation in Piedmontese,
Valdotain and Standard French (as in (16)) because postverbal negation can occur without
tense.
(16)

Piedmontese
Parla
nen!
talk-2sg.Imp Neg
`Don't talk!' (Zanuttini 1991, 98)

Zanuttini further argues that suppletive imperatives are compatible with preverbal negation
in Italian, Spanish and Catalan because TP is present in the syntactic representation of
suppletive imperatives, thus meeting the requirement of preverbal negation.
As pointed out by Rivero (1994c), the analysis given in Zanuttini (1991) does not easily
extend to Balkan languages such as Modern Greek, Bulgarian, and Serbo-Croatian. These
languages all have preverbal negation but they di er in that Modern Greek does not allow
negative true imperatives, whereas Bulgarian and Serbo-Croatian do. One would have
to claim that TP is absent in the syntactic representation of true imperatives in Modern
Greek but present in the syntactic representation of true imperatives in Bulgarian and
Serbo-Croatian. Another way out is to claim that the selectional property of Modern Greek
preverbal negation on the one hand and Bulgarian and Serbo-Croatian preverbal negation
on the other are di erent, although they have similar morphosyntactic properties. Thus,
the preverbal negation of Modern Greek requires TP, while that of Bulgarian and SerboCroatian does not. However, this claim cannot be correct. Jespersen (1917) rst observed
the generalization that if a language expresses sentential negation by means of a preverbal
negative marker, it has negative concord: i.e., it allows the co-occurrence of the negative
marker with a negative quanti er within VP with the semantic result of one instance of
negation. On the other hand, if a language employs a postverbal negative marker, it does
not have negative concord.3 Zanuttini (1991) has shown that this generalization is valid for
There are a few exceptions to Jespersen's generalizations such as Yiddish and Bavarian, whose proper
analysis is still uncertain.
3
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Romance languages. It turns out that this generalization is also valid for Modern Greek,
Bulgarian and Serbo-Croatian: negative concord is attested in these languages as well. This
suggests not only that the properties of preverbal negation in the three languages are alike,
but also that they are identical to those of Romance.

2.3.1.2 Zanuttini 1994

Zanuttini (1994) points out that while suppletive imperatives in most languages show cliticverb order, those in Italian show the verb-clitic order characteristic of non- nite clauses and
true imperatives. She takes the verb-clitic order in the three clause types to suggest that
the verb has moved to a functional head higher than the one onto which the clitics have
adjoined (in the spirit of Kayne (1991, 1994)). Since Italian shows the same verb-clitic
order in suppletive and true imperatives, the verb has moved to a position higher than the
clitics in both types of imperatives. However, suppletive imperatives are compatible with
preverbal negative marker, whereas true imperatives are not.
Zanuttini (1994) proposes that while the clausal structure containing in nitive, gerundive and suppletive imperative verbs has a full range of functional projections, the clausal
structure containing true imperative verbs lacks some of the functional heads because true
imperative verbs are morphologically de cient. Speci cally, she proposes that clauses with
the full range of functional projections have the phrase structure in (17).
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(17)

CP
C0
C

PolP
Pol0
Pol

FP1
F10
F1

FP2
F20
F2

FP3
F30
F3 ...

PolP (Polarity Phrase) is a functional projection whose head contains features that can
be positive or negative . If it contains a negative feature, the preverbal negative marker
moves to it. If it contains a positive feature, the verb moves to it (at LF). The pronominal
clitic left-adjoins to the head of FP2. Italian suppletive imperatives exhibit verb-clitic order
because the verb left-adjoins to the head of FP1 and the clitic to the head of FP2.
As for the true imperatives, Zanuttini (1994) proposes that they lack the functional
projection FP1, as in (18).
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(18)

CP
C0
C

PolP
Pol0
Pol

FP2
F20
F2

FP3
F30
F3 ...

As in suppletive imperatives, the clitic left-adjoins to F20 . But since true imperatives lack
FP1, the option for the verb to left-adjoin to F10 is not available. According to Zanuttini,
the verb-clitic word order comes about in this case because the verb has left-adjoined to
Pol0 .
Zanuttini (1994) argues that negative suppletive imperatives are available because the
preverbal negative marker adjoins to Pol0 and the verb adjoins to F10 . But negative true
imperatives are not available because the preverbal negative marker adjoins to Pol0 , leaving
no place for the verb to adjoin to.
Again, the system proposed by Zanuttini (1994) does not easily extend to Balkan languages. It does not explain why Modern Greek true imperatives are not compatible with
negation, whereas Bulgarian and Serbo-Croatian true imperatives are. One would have to
say that Bulgarian and Serbo-Croatian true imperatives (unlike Modern Greek true imperatives) have an extra functional projection below PolP whose head can host the verb.
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2.3.1.3 Zanuttini 1997
Zanuttini (1997) adopts Cinque's (1998) view that di erent classes of adverbs occur in a
xed position in the speci er of a di erent functional head. These functional heads are
hierarchically structured. This means that a class of adverbs occurs in a xed position in
a phrase structure of the language, and that the placement of the verb with respect to an
adverb is an indication of which functional head the verb occupies.
Following Cinque (1998), Zanuttini (1997) assumes the presence of MoodP as well as
TP in the phrase structure of a sentence in Italian, with TP higher than MoodP. Temporal
adverbs occupy the speci er of TP, and adverbs such as forse (`perhaps') occupy the speci er
of MoodP. Moreover, based on the position of the negative marker with respect to temporal
adverbs (as in (19a)) and ones assumed to be in the speci er of MoodP (as in (19b)),
Zanuttini (1997) assumes that preverbal negation is lower than TP, but higher than MoodP.

(19) Italian
a.

Gianni oggi non si sente bene.
Gianni today Neg self feels well
`Gianni isn't feeling well today.'

b.

Gianni non ha forse voluto restare.
Gianni Neg has perhaps wanted to-stay
`Gianni didn't perhaps want to stay.'

Further, Zanuttini (1997) revises the analysis of preverbal negation in Zanuttini (1991) and
proposes that the preverbal negation non subcategorizes for a Mood Phrase, rather than
for a Tense Phrase. This yields the following structure for negative sentences in Italian:
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(20)

CP
C0
C

...
TP
T0
T

...
NegP
Neg0
Neg

MP

non

M0
M

...

Mood VP
Zanuttini (1997) argues that the verbs in both true and suppletive imperatives in Italian
move higher than Mood0 , presumably up to C0 . As supporting evidence, she shows that in
both types of imperative, the verb precedes the adverbial di sicuro (`de nitely'), which is
assumed to occupy the speci er of MoodP.
(21) Italian
a.

Fallo
di sicuro!
do-2sg.Imp-it of sure
`De nitely do it!'

b. * Di sicuro fallo!
of sure do-it
`De nitely do it!'
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c.

Fatelo
di sicuro!
do-2pl.Imp-it of sure
`De nitely do it!'

d. ?* Di sicuro fatelo!
of sure do-2pl.Imp-it
`De nitely do it!'
Furthermore, following Kayne (1992), Zanuttini (1997) observes that when Italian expresses prohibition with the preverbal negative marker followed by an in nitive verb, the
verb can either precede or follow the clitic. This variability in the word order is surprising
because only verb-clitic order is possible in in nitive clauses in other linguistic contexts.
According to Kayne (1992), some northern Italian dialects have an overtly realized verbal
form speci c to the negative in nitives that express prohibition. In Paduan, for example, prohibition is expressed with the auxiliary verb sta followed by the in nitive. In the
non-negative form, the presence of this verb is impossible.
(22) Paduan
a.

No sta parlare!
Neg aux to-talk
`Don't talk!' (Kayne 1992, 17)

b. * Sta parlare!
aux to-talk
`Talk!' (Kayne 1992, 18)
Based on such data, Kayne (1992) concludes that the negative marker licenses an overt
or a covert modal which in turn licenses the in nitive. That is, in standard Italian, the
negative marker licenses an empty modal, which in turn licenses the in nitive. In Paduan,
the negative marker licenses the auxiliary verb sta, which in turn licenses the in nitive. The
clitic-verb order in Italian in nitives that express the prohibition can then be seen as an
instance of clitic climbing, where the clitic is adjoined to the phonetically unrealized modal.
Zanuttini (1997) proposes that both true imperatives and suppletive imperatives in C0
hosts an imperative feature which has to be checked: it is checked by the verb in positive
imperatives and by non in negative imperatives. Zanuttini (1997) also argues that the
morphological make-up of verbs in true imperatives is defective: true imperative verbs lack
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a mood feature, whereas suppletive imperative verbs have such a feature. The requirement
that the preverbal negation subcategorizes for MoodP is implemented by either checking the
[Mood] feature in Mood0 with a verb that has a mood feature in its morphological make-up
or by lexically realizing the [Mood] feature with an (empty or overt) auxiliary verb. In
suppletive imperatives with negation, and the verb in the indicative form, [Imp], which is
in C0 , is checked by negation, and [Mood] is checked by the verb. In suppletive imperatives
with negation and an in nitive verb, [Imp] is checked by negation and [Mood] is checked by
an empty modal or an overt modal. Negative true imperatives are ruled out because [Mood]
cannot be checked due to the morphologically defective nature of true imperative verbs. In
armative true imperatives, MoodP is not subcategorized because Neg0 is absent. This
means that MoodP can be absent (as before, the imperative verb can move up to C0 and
check the [Imp] feature).
The analysis in Zanuttini (1997) depends on many stipulations. Given the proposal that
Neg0 subcategorizes for a Mood Phrase, a stipulation is required that all in nitive verbs
have a mood feature in their morphological make-up that can check [Mood] and thereby
allow embedded negative in nitives. But if in nitive verbs can have a mood feature in their
morphological make-up, it is unclear what prevents imperative verbs from having a mood
feature as well. In fact, many languages require distinct morphology for imperative verbs,
suggesting that this is the lexical manifestation of some sort of mood feature associated with
imperative verbs. Moreover, it is not clear why Neg0 should ever subcategorize for MoodP.
Finally, Zanuttini's (1997) analysis does not easily extend to Balkan languages. One would
have to argue that while Bulgarian and Serbo-Croatian imperative verbs can check [Mood],
Modern Greek imperative verbs cannot.

2.3.2 Rivero 1994c, Rivero and Terzi 1995
The accounts given in Rivero (1994c) and Rivero and Terzi (1995) start from the assumption
that Neg0 projects to NegP in Modern Greek, Spanish, Bulgarian and Serbo-Croatian and
that these languages share a phrase structure in which CP dominates NegP, which in turn
dominates IP.
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(23)

CP
C0
C

NegP
Neg0
Neg

IP
I0
I VP
V

According to Rivero (1994c) and Rivero and Terzi (1995), the cross-linguistic variation in
the availability of negative imperatives is due to the properties of the root C0 . In imperative
constructions in Modern Greek and Spanish, the root C0 hosts a strong imperative mood
feature that must be checked by the verb before Spell-out. Hence, the imperative verb has
to move up to C0 in overt syntax.
Rivero (1994c) and Rivero and Terzi (1995) take the fact that the object clitic must
follow the verb in imperatives to support the claim that imperative verbs move to C0 in
Modern Greek and Spanish. Assuming that clitics adjoin onto an empty functional head
(in the spirit of Kayne (1991, 1994)), they argue that imperative verbs bypass this empty
head when moving to C0 .
(24) Modern Greek
a.

Diavase
to!
read-2sg.Imp it
`Read it!' (Rivero and Terzi 1995, 4a)

b. * To diavase!
it read-2sg.Imp
`Read it!'
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(25) Spanish
a.

<Lee
lo!
read-2sg.Imp it
`Read it!' (Rivero and Terzi 1995, 4b)
b. * <Lo lee!
it read-2sg.Imp
`Read it!'
Rivero (1994c) and Rivero and Terzi (1995) propose that negative imperatives are unavailable in Modern Greek and Spanish because Neg0 blocks imperative verb movement to
C0 . This is because (a) if the verb skipped the intervening head Neg0 , the negative marker
in Neg0 would count as the closest governor for the trace left by the verb, leading to a
minimality violation of the ECP, and (b) by assumption, the verb cannot incorporate into
Neg0 .
This analysis can be easily extended to explain why negation is incompatible with 2nd
person singular imperatives in Italian. As argued by Zanuttini (1991), negative sentences
in Italian have a phrase structure in which CP dominates NegP and NegP dominates IP.
Moreover, Italian also shows verb-clitic order in imperatives, suggesting that imperative
verbs move to C0 .
(26) Italian
a.

Telefona le!
call
her
`Call her!'

b. * Le telefona!
her call
`Call her!'
Under the analysis proposed by Rivero (1994c) and Rivero and Terzi (1995), negative imperatives (in the 2nd person singular) are not available in Italian because the imperative
verb cannot move across Neg0 .
As for the imperative constructions in Bulgarian and Serbo-Croatian, Rivero and Terzi
propose that the strong imperative mood feature is located in I0 , rather than in C0 . This
means that the imperative verb moves only up to I0 . As supporting evidence, they appeal
to the fact that clitics can appear preverbally in imperatives.
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(27) a.

Serbo-Croatian
Knjige im
citajte!
books to-them read-2pl.Imp
`Read books to them!' (Rivero and Terzi 1995, 17a)

b.

Bulgarian
Ela
i mi kazi!
come-2sg.Imp and me tell-2sg.Imp
`Come and tell me!' (Hauge 1976, 5 cf. Rivero 1994c, 35)

Rivero and Terzi argue that negative imperatives are available in these languages because
imperative verbs do not cross Neg0 , only moving up to I0 .
According to Rivero and Terzi, C0 cannot be the position associated with directive force
of imperatives in Bulgarian and Serbo-Croatian (or any other illocutionary force for that
matter) because C0 serves as the last-resort position to rescue clause-initial clitics. These
languages have a phonological constraint against clause-initial clitics. And so, although
clitics usually precede the verb, they must occur postverbally when they would otherwise
be in a clause-initial position. Thus, clause-initial imperatives show verb-clitic word order.
(28) a. Bulgarian
C eti
ja!
read-2sg.Imp it
`Read it!'
b. Serbo-Croatian
C itaj
je!
read-2sg.Imp it
`Read it!'
Rivero and Terzi claim that when there are no other constituents preceding clitics, the verb
moves to C0 as a last-resort device to prevent the clitics from appearing in a sentence-initial
position.
Bulgarian and Serbo-Croatian do not behave in the exact same way in avoiding clauseinitial clitic pronouns. In Bulgarian, clitic pronouns can occur between Neg0 and the verb,
and are not restricted to second position. On the other hand, in Serbo-Croatian, clitic
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pronouns cannot occur between Neg0 and the verb, and must occupy second position. Thus,
Rivero (1994c) classi es Bulgarian as a Tobler-Mussa a language and Serbo-Croatian as a
Wackernagel language. No matter what the di erences may be, what is important here is
that the two languages both have a phonological constraint that rules out clitic pronouns
from occurring in a clause-initial position.
The question arises at this point as to whether we can think of verb-clitic order in
Romance imperatives as a re ex of the constraint against clause-initial clitics. This question
arises because Old Romance had the Tobler-Mussa a law, which rules out sentences with
clause-initial clitics. Thus, couldn't we just say that the imperative verb in Romance also
move up to I0 , and verb-clitic order in imperatives is a re ex of the Tobler-Mussa a law?
We cannot o er such an explanation because Romance languages lost the constraint against
clause-initial clitics sometime after the 17th century (see Fontana (1993), Rivero (1997), and
references therein). For instance, in present-day Italian and Spanish, declarative sentences
with a pro subject and a pronominal object clitic show clitic-verb order and not verb-clitic
order. Moreover, sentences with a postverbal subject and a pronominal object clitic also
show clitic-verb order.
(29) Italian
a.
b.

Ti vedo.
you see-1sg.Pres
`I see you.'
Lo vede
Gianni.
him see-3sg.Pres Gianni
`Gianni sees him.'

(30) Spanish
a.

Lo leste.
it read-2sg
`You are reading it.'

b.

Lo vio
Juan.
him see-3sg.Past Juan
`Juan saw him.'

The clitic-verb order in (29) and (30) would be impossible if the Tobler-Mussa a law were
still in e ect.
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Returning to the discussion of Rivero and Terzi, their analysis is problematic in that it
does not take into account the fact that in both Spanish and Modern Greek, negation has
the morphosyntactic properties of clitics, which we discuss in more detail in x2.4. Although
negation in Bulgarian and Serbo-Croatian also exhibit clitic properties, the issue does not
arise in these languages, for reasons which will become clear in x2.7.

2.4 A Puzzle Posed by the Clitic-like Nature of Negation
In negative sentences in Modern Greek, Spanish and Italian, negation always precedes the
verb, and nothing (except for clitics) can intervene between them. That is, negation has the
morphosyntactic properties of clitics and is treated as a unit with the verb in overt syntax.
Hence, it is not surprising that the verb cannot move across Neg0 in negative imperatives,
under a system that assumes imperative verb movement to C0 as in Rivero and Terzi's
analysis.4
But it is puzzling that negative imperatives are not available in Modern Greek, Spanish
and Italian, since the verb and negation move as a unit to C0 in other types of sentences.
For instance, in Italian Aux-to-Comp constructions, a participial or in nitival auxiliary (or,
more marginally, a subjunctive form) inverts around a subject, as in (31a) (Rizzi (1982)).
In a negative Aux-to-Comp construction, the negation and the verb move to C0 as a unit,
as in (31b).
(31) Italian
a.

Avendo Gianni fatto questo, ...
having Gianni done this, ...

b.

Non avendo Gianni fatto questo, ...
Neg having Gianni done this, ...

In Spanish and Modern Greek, questions can be formed by moving the verb to C0 , resulting
in subject-verb inversion. In negative questions, negation and the verb move to C0 as a unit
as well, as in (32).5
We assume that clitic negation attaches to the verb in the overt syntax. That is, we are not assuming
that cliticization of negation is a pure PF phenomenon.
5
We assume that Spanish allows verb movement to C0 in some wh-questions (see Torrego (1984)). For
4
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(32) a.

Modern Greek
Ti den edose o Yannis stin Meri?
what Neg gave the Yannis to-the Meri
`What didn't Yannis give to Meri?'

b.

Spanish
>Que no le
dio Juan a Mara?
What Neg to-her gave Juan to Maria
`What didn't Juan give to Maria?'

Given Rivero and Terzi's analysis, the examples in (31b) and (32) are incorrectly expected to be ungrammatical. Moreover, given the behavior of negation and the verb in
Aux-to-Comp constructions in Italian and in questions in Spanish and Modern Greek, we
expect Neg0 and the verb to move to C0 as a unit in negative imperatives as well. But
this expectation is not borne out. The puzzle then (under the assumption that imperative
verb moves to C0 ) is that negative imperatives are ruled out in languages that allow verb
movement to C0 along with negation in other constructions.

2.5 The Locus of Imperative Operator: C0
In this section, we establish that imperatives have CP structures and that C0 is the locus of
the imperative operator. We establish this indirectly by presenting various arguments from
the literature that imperative verbs move to C0 because C0 hosts an imperative operator.
The analysis that we will propose in x2.6 concerning the (non)-availability of negative imperatives relies on the result established here, which is based mainly on data from English,
German, French, Spanish, Italian and Modern Greek.

2.5.1 Subject Position
In German, when an imperative has an overt subject, the verb precedes the subject.

Modern Greek, there is some controversy as to whether verb-movement to C0 in questions exists at all (see
Anagnostopoulou (1994)).
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(33) German
a.

Schreib
du den Aufsatz!
write2sg.Imp you the paper
`You write the paper!'

b. * Du schreib
den Aufsatz!
you write-2sg.Imp the paper
`You write the paper!'
In yes-no questions, the verb also precedes the subject.
(34) German
a.

Schreibst du den Aufsatz?
write you the paper
`Are you writing the paper?'

b. * Du schreibst den Aufsatz?
you write the paper
`Are you writing the paper?'
The fact that the verb must precede the subject in both imperatives and yes-no questions
suggests that the verb in imperatives is located wherever the verb in yes-no questions is.6
The question then arises about the location of the verb in yes-no questions in German.
Den Besten (1989) observes that in German, weak object pronouns preferably occur immediately to the right of the complementizer, but that they can also occur immediately after
the subject.
(35) German
a.

..., da ihm Karl ein Buch geschenkt hat.
..., that to-him Karl a book given
has
`... that Karl has given a book to him.' (den Besten 1989, Ch.1, 71a)

b.

..., da Karl ihm ein Buch geschenkt hat.
..., that Karl to-him a book given
has
`..., that Karl has given a book to him.' (den Besten 1989, Ch.1, 71b)

Den Besten (1989) goes on to show that in yes-no questions, weak object pronouns occur
either immediately after the verb or immediately after the subject.
(33b) is acceptable if du (`you') is considered to be a vocative pronoun. In this case, the sentence is
pronounced with a pause after du. (34b) is acceptable as an echo question.
6
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(36) German
a.

Werden sich
diese Leute verteidigen?
will
themselves these people defend
`Will these people defend themselves?'

b.

Werden diese Leute sich
verteidigen?
will
these people themselves defend
`Will these people defend themselves?'

Assuming that the complementizer da is in C0 , and that the possible positions for weak
object pronouns are constant across all clause types, den Besten concludes that the preposed
verb in yes-no questions is in C0 .
It turns out that weak object pronouns in imperatives pattern just like those in yes-no
questions: i.e., they can occur either immediately after the verb or immediately after the
subject.
(37) German
a.

Schreib
es du!
write-2sg.Imp it you
`You write it!'

b.

Schreib
du es!
write-2sg.Imp you it
`You write it!'

Thus, we can conclude that the verb in imperatives is located wherever the verb in yes-no
questions is located, namely C0 .
In English, imperative verbs follow the subject in positive imperatives. But in imperatives with do-support, namely, negative imperatives and emphatic imperatives, do precedes
the subject.7
According to Henry (1995), imperatives with an overt subject in Belfast English can have verb-subject
order.
7

(38) a.
b.

Go you away. (Henry 1995, Ch.3, 47a)
Run somebody to the telephone. (Henry 1995, Ch.3, 48b)

Henry takes such sentences as instances of generalized imperative verb movement to C0 . As we will see in
Chapter 3, imperatives in the history of English also show verb-subject order until Early Modern English.
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(39) a.

You open the door!

b.

Don't you talk back to me!

c.

Do at least some of you have a try! (Davies 1986, Ch.3, 88)

If the imperative subject occupies [Spec, IP] in the syntax, then the fact that do precedes
the subject allows us to conclude that do is located in a functional head which projects higher
than IP. However, if the subject is in [Spec, VP] in the surface syntax, then we cannot make
such a conclusion. Potsdam (1997b) provides evidence that the subject in imperatives is
indeed in [Spec, IP] and not in [Spec, VP]. We review his evidence, which is based on the
behavior of subject-oriented oating quanti ers and on adverb placement in imperatives.
Potsdam (1997b) shows that subject-oriented oating quanti ers are allowed in imperatives.
(40) a.

The twins both be here for the pictures! (Potsdam 1997b, Ch.5, 19a)

b.

Rhett, Scarlet, and Lassie all get ready for their next scene! (Potsdam 1997b,
Ch.5, 19b)

c.

My children all come right here, I won't tolerate such misbehavior! (Potsdam
1997b, Ch.5, 19c)

d.

You be both waiting for me promptly at 3! (Potsdam 1997b, Ch.5, 21b)

Sportiche (1988) uses subject-oriented oating quanti ers to argue that a sentential subject
starts out lower in the clause before ending up in [Spec, IP]. For instance, in the sentences in
(41), the subject all the rebels starts out together lower in the clause, presumably in [Spec,
VP], and the rebel moves up to [Spec, IP], stranding all.
(41) a.
b.

The rebels might all have ed. (Potsdam 1997b, Ch.1, 144)
The rebels all ed. (Potsdam 1997b, Ch.1, 145)

The fact that oating quanti ers are allowed in imperatives suggests that subjects of imperatives undergo a similar derivation. They start out together with the quanti er lower in
the clause, and then the quanti er is stranded as the subject moves up to [Spec, IP].
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Following Jackendo (1972), Potsdam (1997b) observes that adverbs such as simply
and just occur between the subject and the main verb, and proposes that these adverbs
left-adjoin to I0 , or to VP or V0 .
(42) a.

He simply/just is incapable of it. (Potsdam 1997b, Ch.1, 49a)

b.

He is simply/just incapable of it. (Potsdam 1997b, Ch.1, 50a)

c. * Simply/just he is incapable of it. (Potsdam 1997b, Ch.1, 51a)
In imperatives, these adverbs cannot occur before the subject either.
(43) There's plenty of room.
a.

Everyone simply move to his right a little! (Potsdam 1997b, Ch.5, 32a)

b. * Simply everyone move to his right a little! (Potsdam 1997b, Ch.5, 32b)
(44) a.

Don't you just stand there like a bump on a log! (Potsdam 1997b, Ch.5, 33a)

b. * Don't just you stand there like a bump on a log! (Potsdam 1997b, Ch.5, 33b)
If the subject in imperatives occupies [Spec, VP], then the examples in (43b) and (44b)
should be grammatical, contrary to the fact. Potsdam (1997b) therefore concludes that
imperative subjects occupy [Spec, IP], just like the subjects in other clause types.
Given that imperative subjects occupy [Spec, IP], we can conclude that at least do and
don't in imperatives are in C0 , since they precede the subject, as shown in (39b) and (39c).8
But lexical verbs are lower in the clause, indicated by the fact that they must follow the
imperative subject, as in (39a). We assume that lexical verbs in imperatives move to C0 at
LF. Verb movement and do-support in English imperatives will be discussed in more detail
in Chapter 3.

2.5.2 Clitic Placement
In French, Italian, Spanish and Modern Greek, a direct object clitic must follow the verb
in imperatives, whereas it must precede the verb in other types of constructions, such as
indicatives and subjunctives.
See Potsdam (1997a, 1997b) for further evidence for the proposal that do and don't in imperatives are
in C0 .
8
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(45) French
a.

Faites
le!
do-2sg.Imp it
`Do it!'
b. * Le faites!
it do-2sg.Imp
`Do it!'
(46) Modern Greek
a.

Diavase
to!
read-2sg.Imp it
`Read it!' (Rivero and Terzi 1995, 4a)
b. * To diavase!
it read-2sg.Imp
`Read it!'
(47) Spanish
a.

<Lee
lo!
read-2sg.Imp it
`Read it!' (Rivero and Terzi 1995, 4b)
b. * <Lo lee!
it read-2sg.Imp
`Read it!'
(48) Italian
a.

Telefona le!
call
her
`Call her!'
b. * Le telefona!
her call
`Call her!'
According to Kayne (1991, 1994), a clitic adjoins to the empty head of a functional projection which projects above I0 . In subjunctives or indicatives, the verb moves to I0 , resulting
in clitic-verb order. Adopting Kayne's analysis of the syntax of clitics, Rivero (1994c)
and Rivero and Terzi (1995) take the verb-clitic order in imperatives to indicate that the
imperative verb moves to C0 , bypassing the empty functional head to which the clitic is
adjoined.
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2.5.3 Adverbial Placement
Zanuttini (1997) shows that imperative verbs in Italian obligatorily precede the adverbs
pure and ben, which are particles of emphatic armation.
(49) Italian
a.

Dagli
ben una risposta!
give-2sg.Imp-him indeed an answer
`Do give him an answer!' (Zanuttini 1997, Ch.4, 80a)

b. * Ben dagli una risposta! (Zanuttini 1997, Ch.4, 80b)
(50) Italian
a.

Fallo
pure!
do-2sg.Imp-it indeed
`Go ahead and do it!' (Zanuttini 1997, Ch.4, 81a)

b. * Pure fallo! (Zanuttini 1997, Ch.4, 81b)
In declaratives, main verbs also precede these adverbs. Thus, the fact that the imperative verb obligatorily precedes ben and pure shows that it moves at least as high as the verb
in declaratives does.
(51) Italian
a.

Gianni ha ben/pur risposto a Maria.
Gianni has indeed answered to Maria
`Gianni indeed answered Maria.'

b.

Gianni lavora ben/pur tutto il giorno.
Gianni works indeed all the day
`Gianni does indeed work all day long.'

Further evidence concerning the position of the verb comes from the placement of den
and pure in Aux-to-Comp constructions. The fact that the imperative verb must precede
these adverbs is consistent with the assumption that it is located higher than the verb
in declaratives. In Aux-to-Comp constructions, the adverbs under discussion can occur
either between the subject and the participle (as in (52a)), or between the auxiliary and
the subject (as in (52b)).
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(52) Italian
a. ? Avesse Gianni pur/ben capito
il problema, ...
had Gianni pur/ben understood the problem, ...
`Even if Gianni had understood the problem, ...'
b. Avesse pur/ben Gianni capito
il problema, ...
had indeed Gianni understood the problem, ...
`Even if Gianni had understood the problem, ...'
Crucially, the adverbs can precede the subject, as in (52b). Given that in Aux-to-Comp
constructions, the subject is in [Spec, IP] and the auxiliary is in C0 (Rizzi (1982)), (52b)
shows that the adverbs can occur at the left periphery of IP. Thus, the fact that the
imperative verb obligatorily precedes these adverbs is consistent with the assumption that
the imperative verb is located higher than I0 , where the verb in declaratives is located, and
presumably ends up as high as the auxiliary in Aux-to-Comp constructions.

2.5.4 Emphatic Commands
If imperative verbs move to C0 , this movement should be blocked if C0 is already occupied
by some other lexical element. Rivero (1994c) discusses such constructions in Spanish. In
Spanish, emphatic commands are expressed with que and the subjunctive. Tellingly, the
imperative is ruled out in this construction.
(53) Spanish
a.

<Que escribais!
that write-2pl.Pres.Subj
`You just write!' (Rivero 1994c, 11a)
b. * <Que escribid!
that write-2pl.Imp
`You just write!' (Rivero 1994c, 11b)
The marker que is a complementizer in C0 , and it is being used with emphatic force. Since
C0 is already occupied by que, imperative verbs cannot be used in emphatic commands.

2.5.5 No Embedded Imperatives
As noted by Sadock and Zwicky (1985) and Palmer (1986), imperatives cannot occur in
embedded clauses.
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(54) Modern Greek
a. * O Yannis se dietakse grapse.
the Yannis you ordered-2sg write-2sg.Imp
`Yannis ordered you to write.'
b.

O Yannis se dietakse
na grapsis.
the Yannis you ordered-2nd.sg NA write-2sg.Subj
`Yannis ordered you to write.'

(55) Spanish
a. * Pido que dad-me
el libro.
ask that give-2sg.Imp-me the book
`I ask that you give me the book.'
b.

Pido que me deis
el libro.
ask that me give-2sg.Subj the book
`I ask that you give me the book.'

(56) Italian
a. * Ti ordino che fallo
subito.
you order that do-2sg.Imp-it immediately
`I order you to do it immediately.'
b.

Ti ordino che lo faccia
subito.
you order that it do-2sg.Subj immediately
`I order you to do it immediately.'

(57) French
a. * J'exige que tu nis.
I-require that you nish-2sg.Imp
`I require that you nish.'
b.

J'exige que tu nisses.
I-require that you nish-2sg.Subj
`I require that you nish.'

(58) German
a. * Hans schlagt vor, da du den Aufsatz schreib(e).
Hans suggests
that you the paper write-2sg.Imp
`Hans suggests that you write the paper.'
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b.

Hans schlagt vor, da du den Aufsatz schreibst.
Hans suggests
that you the paper write-2sg.Pres.Ind
`Hans suggests that you write the paper.'

Embedded clauses cannot express illocutionary forces. If imperatives have an operator in
C0 that encodes directive force, it follows that imperatives cannot be embedded. This fact
is not conclusive evidence that imperative verbs move to C0 , but it is consistent with the
claim that the locus of imperative operator that encodes directive force is in C0 .

2.6 Proposal
Before we present our analysis of the cross-linguistic variation in the compatibility of negation and imperatives, we note that the directive force contributed by the imperative mood
cannot be negated by a negative marker. That is, negative imperatives only have a reading
in which the directive force has scope over negation, never one in which negation has scope
over the directive force. This fact is not speci c to imperatives, but holds of interrogatives
and declaratives as well. Just as the directive force of an imperative cannot be negated, neither can the question force of an interrogative nor the assertive force of a declarative. That
is, a negative interrogative cannot be a non-question, and a negative declarative cannot be
a non-assertion.
Indeed, it is dicult to imagine what it would mean to negate directive force. In (59),
we simplify the matters a bit and give the closest possible paraphrases we could think of for
the reading in which negation takes scope over the directive force as well as for the reading
in which the directive force takes scope over negation.
(59) a.

b.

Don't call!
 It is required that you not call.
6 It is not required that you call.
Nobody leave!
 It is required that not anybody leave.
6 It is not required that anybody leave.

We propose an account of the cross-linguistic variation in the availability of negative
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imperatives based on the fact that the directive force cannot be negated and on the assumption that the imperative operator encoding the directive force is located in C0 . The
proposal is that negative imperatives are unavailable in some languages because they derive
a syntactic con guration in which negation would take scope over the imperative operator
in C0 . These constructions are ruled out because they map onto an inappropriate representation in which the directive force is negated. Under the proposed analysis, negative
imperatives are ruled out for interpretational rather than syntactic reasons. In x5.3.4, we
provide an account of why the representation in which the directive force is negated by a
negative marker maps onto an incoherent interpretation.

2.6.1 Languages without Negative Imperatives
Recall that negative imperatives are not available in Modern Greek, Spanish and Italian
(in the 2nd person singular). As shown in x2.5, in all these languages, the imperative
verb moves to C0 . We take this to mean that the imperative operator in C0 attracts the
imperative verb. We further assume that when the imperative verb adjoins to C0 , it inherits
all the features of the imperative operator in C0 . In e ect, the imperative verb assumes the
role of the imperative operator as it adjoins onto C0 .
In all three languages, sentential negation is expressed by a preverbal element with the
status of a clitic on the verb. This means that the negative marker is treated as a unit with
the verb in the overt syntax. Thus, in negative imperatives, we expect the negative marker
and the verb to move to C0 as a unit. However, if it did, the imperative verb, which assumes
the role of imperative operator when it adjoins to C0 , would end up within the scope of
negation. We illustrate this point using the de nition of c-command in Kayne (1994).
(60)

De nition of c-command (Kayne 1994:16)
X c-commands Y i X and Y are categories and X excludes Y (i.e., no segment
of X dominates Y) and every category that dominates X dominates Y.

Under the de nition of c-command in (60), when negation and the verb adjoin to C0 ,
negation c-commands the verb because every category that dominates Neg0 dominates I0
and no segment of Neg0 dominates I0 , as shown in (61). The categories that dominate
Neg0 include C0 and CP. These categories also dominate I0 . But C0 and I0 do not count
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because only a segment of I0 and C0 dominate Neg0 . On the other hand, the verb does
not c-command negation because I0 does not exclude Neg0 : i.e., a segment of I0 dominates
Neg0 .
(61)

CP
C0
C
I

IP
C

Neg I Imp
Thus, negation asymmetrically takes scope over the imperative verb, which assumes the
function of imperative operator as it adjoins to C0 . The other scope possibility, where the
imperative verb takes scope over negation, is ruled out by the syntax. Consequently, the
directive force would end up being negated, resulting in an incoherent interpretation.

2.6.2 Languages with Negative Imperatives
Languages with negative imperatives include English, French and German. In German, the
verb in imperatives adjoins to C0 , but since negation never forms a unit with the verb, it
never ends up in C0 . Since Neg0 stays low in the clause, it does not take scope over the
imperative verb, which assumes the role of imperative operator as it is adjoined onto C0 .
In French, the imperative verb and the negative marker ne form a unit, and so when
the imperative verb moves to C0 , ne ends up there as well. Thus, the proposed analysis
seems to predict incorrectly that imperatives should not be compatible with negation in
French. A closer look reveals why imperatives and negation are compatible in French after
all. French forms sentential negation with ne ... pas, where ne is a proclitic on the verb. In
informal registers, the negative clitic ne is not obligatory, indicating that ne is pleonastic
and that sentential negation is expressed by pas. This, then, is why negative imperatives
are available in French: the imperative verb moves to C0 with the pleonastic ne, but the
true negation pas stays low in the clause, as in German. Hence, negation does not take
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scope over the imperative verb that assumes the role of the imperative operator as it is
adjoined to C0 .
Further, our analysis predicts that ne can never be a true negation in imperatives. In
French, some verbs can be negated without pas in declaratives: they include oser (`dare'),
savoir (`know'), pouvoir (`be able to') and cesser (`stop'). A negative sentence with these
verbs can be formed with ne ... pas or ne alone, as shown in (62).
(62) French
a.

Il ne cesse de parler.
He NE stop to speak
`He does not stop speaking.'

b.

Il ne cesse pas de parler.
He NE stop Neg to speak
`He does not stop speaking.'

This means that in negative sentences without pas, as in (62a), ne is forced to be the true
negation. Our prediction is that negative imperatives with these verbs can only be formed
with ne ... pas, and it is borne out by the facts, as in (63).
(63) French
a. * Ne cessez
de parler.
NE stop-2pl.Imp to speak
`Don't stop speaking.'
b.

Ne cessez
pas de parler.
NE stop-2pl.Imp Neg to speak
`Don't stop speaking.'

One might want to argue that in French, the imperative verb does not move to C0
in negative imperatives, given that direct object pronominal clitics procliticize in negative
imperatives, as pointed out by Schmerling (1975).
(64) French
a.

Ne le faites
pas!
NE it do-2sg.Imp Neg
`Don't do it!'
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b. * Ne faites
le pas!
NE do-2sg.Imp it Neg
`Don't do it!'
However, the reason that clitics are proclitics rather than enclitics in negative imperatives
may have to do with the clitic-like nature of ne, which forces ne and the verb to function
as a unit in the syntax. Assuming that ne precedes the pronominal clitic, which in turn
precedes the verb at some point in the derivation, and that there is no intervening landing
site for the verb between ne and the clitic, when ne and the verb move to C0 as a unit,
the clitic is pied-piped along with them, preserving the string order `ne-clitic-verb'. But in
armative imperatives, the verb alone moves to C0 , skipping over the pronominal clitic,
resulting in `verb-clitic' order. The question arises why the verb cannot skip over the
clitic and ne in negative imperatives. The reason is that the order that would result,
`verb-ne-clitic,' is ruled out by an independent constraint of the language that ne must
precede the verb. This account is supported by the facts of Quebec French, where sentential
negation is formed only with pas, and where negative imperatives are available. In negative
imperatives, the pronominal object clitic follows the verb, just as in armative imperatives
(see Auger (1994)). This shows that the imperative verb in negative imperatives occupies
C0 , just as in armative imperatives.
(65) Quebec French
a.

Faites
le pas!
do-2sg.Imp it Neg
`Don't do it.'

b. * Le faites
pas!
it do-2sg.Imp Neg
`Don't do it.'
Given our proposed analysis, negative imperatives are available in Quebec French because
pas is low in the clause and so does not take scope over the imperative operator.
English has two types of negative imperatives: do not imperatives, as in Do not call,
and don't imperatives, as in Don't call. The explanation for why do not imperatives are
available is simple: do alone moves and adjoins to C0 , and not stays low in the clause. As
a result, negation does not take scope over the imperative operator of C0 .
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In the case of don't imperatives, negation forms a unit with do. Moreover, as is evident
from the order of don't and the subject in imperatives (e.g., Don't you cry), don't occupies
C0 . Just as in Spanish, Italian and Modern Greek, in don't imperatives, negation and the
imperative verb form a unit and adjoin to C0 , the locus of imperative operator. However,
unlike Spanish, Italian and Modern Greek, don't imperatives are ruled in. Our account of
the possibility of don't imperatives depends on the assumption that syntactic adjunction is
always left-adjunction, following Kayne (1994). This means that the head of the complex
don't is negation n't. Thus, the structure of don't imperatives is as in (66).
(66)

CP
C0
C
Neg
I

IP
C

Neg Imp

do n't
In (66), do c-commands Neg0 because every category that dominates I0 dominates Neg0 ,
and no segment of I0 dominates Neg0 . Further, Neg0 does not c-command do because Neg0
does not exclude I0 (i.e., a segment of Neg0 dominates I0 ). That is, do asymmetrically
c-commands Neg0 . Given that do assumes the function of the imperative operator as it is
adjoined onto C0 , negation does not take scope over the imperative operator, and so the
directive force encoded in the imperative operator is not negated. Thus, don't imperatives
are not ruled out.

2.7 Apparent Counterexamples
In languages like Bulgarian and Serbo-Croatian, clitics encliticize onto the imperative verb,
and yet negative imperatives are possible, as shown in (67) and (68).
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(67) Bulgarian
a. C eti
ja!
read-2sg.Imp it
`Read it!'
b. Ne ja ceti!
Neg it read-2sg.Imp
`Don't read it!'
(68) Serbo-Croatian
a. C itaj
je!
read-2sg.Imp it
`Read it!'
b. Ne citaj
je!
Neg read-2sg.Imp it.
`Don't read it!'
These facts appear to be counterexamples to the analysis proposed here because they suggest
that although the imperative verb moves to C0 , imperatives are compatible with negation.
But they are only apparent counterexamples because the imperative verb is not in C0
in the overt syntax. Following Rivero and Terzi (1995), we take the fact that clitics can
appear preverbally in imperatives when they are not in a clause-initial position as evidence
that the imperative verb is low in the clause. This is shown in (27), repeated here as (69).
(69) a.

Serbo-Croatian
Knjige im
citajte!
books to-them read-2pl.Imp
`Read books to them!' (Rivero and Terzi 1995, 17a)

b.

Bulgarian
Ela
i mi kazi!
come-2sg.Imp and me tell-2sg.Imp
`Come and tell me!' (Hauge 1976, 5 cf. Rivero 1994c, 35)

If imperative verbs do not move to C0 , then how can we explain the fact that clitics encliticize
in some imperatives? An answer will be given in x2.7.2.
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2.7.1 Imperative Verb Movement to C0 at LF
Like all other languages, neither Bulgarian nor Serbo-Croatian allow imperatives to occur
in embedded clauses. This is consistent with the proposal that C0 is occupied with an
imperative operator.
(70) Bulgarian
a.

Ivan nastojava (ti) da govoris.
Ivan insists (you) da speak-2sg.Subj
`Ivan insists that you speak.'

b. * Ivan nastojava (ti) govor.
Ivan insists (you) speak-2sg.Imp
`Ivan insists that you speak.'
(71) Serbo-Croatian
a.

Ivan insistira da to citas.
Ivan insists that it read-2sg.Ind
`Ivan insists that you read it.'

b. * Ivan insistira da to citaj.
Ivan insists that it read-2sg.Imp
`Ivan insists that you read it.'
We therefore assume that Bulgarian and Serbo-Croatian imperatives also have an imperative
operator in C0 and propose that the imperative verb moves and adjoins to C0 at LF. But
since morphological/phonological constraints do not apply at LF, the imperative verb can
move alone, stranding the clitic-like preverbal negation. Consequently, Neg0 does not take
scope over the imperative operator, and so negative imperatives are not ruled out.9

2.7.2 Is C0 the Locus of Illocutionary Force Operators?
Recall that Rivero (1994c) and Rivero and Terzi (1995) argue that C0 cannot host an
operator which encodes directive or question force in Bulgarian and Serbo-Croatian. Their
claim is that C0 is the locus for last-resort verb movement to prevent clitics from occupying
rst position. This claim can be contradicted on two grounds: (i) it can be shown that
As in Chomsky (1995), we assume that LF movement involves feature movement, where only necessary
features are attracted by the target. Thus, the imperative operator in C0 attracts the verbal feature, leaving
behind other features.
9
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verbs do not move to C0 to prevent clitics from occurring in the rst position, and (ii) it
can be shown that C0 does indeed have a role in the encoding of illocutionary forces.
If we adopt the account of participle-aux orders in Slavic given by Embick and Izvorski
(1997), which extends to verb-clitic orders, we avoid the stipulation that C0 is reserved for
verb movement to prevent clitics from appearing in the rst position.
In Slavic, some sentences show participle-aux orders, as in (72).
(72)

Slovak
Napsal som list.
written am letter
`I have written a letter.' (Embick and Izvorski 1997, 1)

In addressing the issue of participle-aux word order in Slavic, Embick and Izvorski (1997) argue against a long head movement-based analysis (Lema and Rivero (1989), Rivero (1991),
Roberts (1994) and Rivero (1994b)) in which the participle is argued to move to C0 , skipping over the position occupied by the auxiliary, as a last resort operation. For instance,
Roberts (1994) motivates participle movement by the need of the clitic auxiliary for a host,
and Rivero (1994b) claims that certain auxiliaries in Slavic must be governed, and that
this need for government triggers movement of the participle when no other governor is
available. According to Embick and Izvorski (1997), such a long head movement-based
analysis makes three predictions: (a) as a last resort operation, long head movement, and
thus participle-aux order, should only appear in cases in which it is absolutely obligatory,
(b) long head movement should show locality e ects and satisfy some version of the ECP,
just like other cases of head movement, and (c) long head movement, as movement to C0 ,
should only occur in matrix clauses, because the driving factors for the movement would
not be present in embedded clauses, due to the presence of the complementizer. None of
these predictions are borne out.
In Serbo-Croatian, participle-aux orders is optional in sentences with non-clitic auxiliaries.
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(73) Serbo-Croatian
a.

Bejase sreo Petra.
was met Peter
`He had met Peter.' (Embick and Izvorski 1995, 4a)

b.

Sreo bejase Petra. (Embick and Izvorski 1995, 4b)

In sentences with an auxiliary and two participles, it is possible to have either participle
before the auxiliary, as shown by the examples from the past conditional in Czech below:
(74) Czech
a.

Byl bych
koupil knihy.
been would-1sg bought books
`I would have bought books.' (Embick and Izvorski 1995, 6a)

b.

Koupil bych byl knihy. (Embick and Izvorski 1995, 6b)

As seen in (74b), Czech exhibits what would appear on the long head movement account to
be non-local head movement: movement of the lower participle over two intervening heads
(the auxiliary and the rst participle).
In Serbo-Croatian embedded clauses with non-clitic auxiliaries, participle-aux orders are
possible.
(75)

Serbo-Croatian
On tvrdi da istukao bejase Jovan Petrovog prijatelja.
he claims that beaten was Jovan Peter's friend
`He claims that Jovan had beaten Peter's friend.' (Embick and Izvorski 1995, 8)

In Bulgarian, participle-aux orders are possible in embedded clauses with clitic-auxiliaries.
(76)

Bulgarian
Razbrah ce procel e knigata.
understood that read had book-the
`I understood that he had read the book.' (Embick and Izvorski 1995, 9)

Embick and Izvorski (1997) propose an alternative to the long head movement-based
analysis, based on the assumption that Slavic auxiliaries belongs to two groups: clitic
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auxiliaries and non-clitic auxiliaries. Clitic auxiliaries have a phonological requirement that
an element must occur to their left for support. It is this requirement on clitic auxiliaries
that leads to participle-aux orders.10 The proposal is that participle-aux order can be
handled by mechanisms such as the Morphological Merger of Marantz (1988, 1989) (or
the Prosodic Inversion of Halpern (1992)) and need not involve syntactic movement. That
is, when clitic auxiliaries are stranded by the syntax in a sentence-initial position, Merger
operates at a post-syntactic level to invert the stranded clitic auxiliary with an adjacent
element, namely the participle, thus satisfying the clitic's need for a host. Extending the
account to verb-clitic orders, Embick and Izvorski (1997) argue that clause-initial clitics
encliticize onto the adjacent verb at a post-syntactic level, eliminating the motivation for
last-resort verb movement to C0 .
Given Embick and Izvorski (1997), we immediately have an explanation for imperatives
in which clitics have encliticized onto the imperative verb, as in (67a) and (68a): the clitics
have axed onto the verb in I0 at a post-syntactic level. Also, clitics procliticize in negative
imperatives in Bulgarian, as in (67b), because the presence of ne renders Morphological
Merger unnecessary.
We still need to explain why clitics encliticize in Serbo-Croatian negative imperatives, as
shown in (68b). As pointed out by Rivero and Terzi (1995), in Serbo-Croatian, pronominal
clitics cannot intervene between negation ne and the verb. This is exempli ed by the
indicative sentences in (77).
(77) Serbo-Croatian
a.

Ne citate
je.
Neg read-2pl.Pres.Ind it
`You are not reading it.'

b. * Ne je citate.
Neg it read-2pl.Pres.Ind
`You are not reading it.'
Thus, the fact that clitics encliticize in negative imperatives in Serbo-Croatian is simply
due to an independent constraint of the language.11
Sentences with non-clitic auxiliaries optionally allow participle-aux orders. See Embick and
Izvorski (1997) for their analysis of why participle-aux orders are possible with non-clitic auxiliaries.
11
Macedonian imperatives potentially pose a problem. In Macedonian, clitics procliticize in nite clauses,
10
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The facts from questions in Bulgarian and Serbo-Croatian establish that C0 does indeed
have something to do with encoding illocutionary force. In wh-questions, all wh-phrases
undergo fronting.
(80) a.

Bulgarian
Koj kak udari Ivan?
who how hit Ivan
`Who hit Ivan how?'

b.

Serbo-Croatian
Ko gdje spava?
who where sleeps
`Who sleeps where?'

The structural position to which the wh-phrases move in wh-questions is generally argued
to be [Spec, CP]. The question relevant here, then, is why the wh-phrases move to [Spec,
CP] even when there is no clitic (either pronominal or auxiliary) to support. It has been
argued that the wh-phrases move to [Spec, CP] to be in Spec-head con guration with the
question operator in C0 . In Minimalist terms, wh-phrases move to [Spec, CP] because they
but encliticize in non- nite clauses, where non- nite clauses include imperatives and gerunds (Tomic (1996),
Legendre (to appear)).
(78) Macedonian
a. Ivan ja vikna.
Ivan her call-3sg.Aor
`Ivan called her.'
b. Vikni
ja!
call-2sg.Imp her
`Call her!'
The clitic placement in imperatives suggests that the imperative verb is somewhere high in the clause.
However, negative imperatives are available and pronominal clitics encliticize in negative imperatives just as
in armative imperatives. This suggests that negation and the verb in negative imperatives are also located
somewhere high in the clause.
(79)

Macedonian
Ne vikaj
ja!
Neg call-2sg.Imperf.Imp her
`Don't call her!'

One possible explanation may be that non- nite verbs (including imperative verbs) are located in a functional
head below Neg0 but above I0 on the surface, deriving (neg)-verb-clitic order. And then the imperative verb
moves further to C0 at LF.
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are attracted by Q feature in C0 . Whatever the right answer may be, the obligatoriness of
wh-movement in wh-questions suggests that C0 is associated with an operator that encodes
the illocutionary force of questions.
The Bulgarian li particle which occurs in yes-no questions is argued to be a complementizer in C0 (Rivero (1993), Rudin (1993), Izvorski et al. (1997)). Further, it is a clitic,
requiring a host to their left, just like any other clitic in Bulgarian. Izvorski et al. (1997)
argue that in yes-no questions the material in I0 , i.e., the main verb or auxiliary, always
raises to C0 , via the intervening functional heads, i.e., M0 and Neg0 , picking up the material in these heads. The resulting complex verbal head then right-adjoins to C0 , where li
is. When there is no maximal projection in [Spec, CP], unlike (81a), li still needs a host.
Under such conditions, prosodic inversion (of the type proposed in Halpern (1992)) occurs
at PF as a last resort mechanism. Prosodic inversion allows the clitic li to encliticize to the
right-edge of the following phonological word, i.e., the rst stressed element in the verbal
complex adjoined to C0 . Usually, this will be the nite verb, as in (81b). But it could be
another clitic. For instance, in Bulgarian, a clitic that immediately follows the negative
particle ne is stressed. In this case, li encliticizes to the stressed clitic, as in (81c).
(81) Bulgarian
a.

kustata li namerixte (vie)?
house-the Q found-2pl you
`Was it the house that you found?' (Rudin 1985, 64)

b.

Izparatix li mu kniga?
send-1sg Q him book
`Did I send him a book?' (Rivero 1993, 569)

c.

Ne mu li go dadoxte?
Neg him Q it gave-2pl
`Didn't you give it to him?' (Izvorski, King and Rudin 1997, 11)

Given such an account, the behavior of Bulgarian li is another case that suggests that C0
is associated with an operator that encodes the illocutionary force of questions.
Under the simplest theory, if C0 is the locus of operator that encodes question illocutionary force in a language, it should also be the locus of the operator that encodes directive
illocutionary force in that language. Within such a simple theory, the fact that a sentence
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cannot be both an imperative and an interrogative follows without any stipulation. Moreover, type theory would be simpli ed since operators with the same semantic type associate
with the same syntactic category.

2.8 Suppletion and Prohibition
In Spanish, in nitive or subjunctive forms are used to express prohibition. In Modern
Greek, which has no in nitives, subjunctive forms are used to express prohibition. In Italian,
in nitives are used to express 2nd person singular prohibition and indicative forms are used
to express 2nd person plural prohibition. The question is why subjunctives, in nitives and
indicatives, which are used to express prohibition, are compatible with negation in these
languages and why they can be so used.

2.8.1 Spanish and Modern Greek
In Modern Greek, the syntax of matrix subjunctives that express prohibition is similar to
that of embedded subjunctives: in both, clitics precede the verb.
(82) Modern Greek
a.

O Yannis se dietakse na to grapsis.
the Yannis you ordered-2sg NA it write-2sg.Subj
`Yannis ordered you to write it.'

b. * O Yannis se dietakse na grapsis
to.
the Yannis you ordered-2sg NA write-2sg.Subj to
`Yannis ordered you to write it.'
(83) Modern Greek
a.

Na min to grapsis.
NA Neg it write-2sg.Subj
`Don't write it.'

b. * Na min grapsis
to.
NA Neg write-2sg.Subj it
`Don't write it.'
The facts of Spanish are parallel, as shown below.
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(84) Spanish
a.

Ordeno que me deis
el libro.
order that me give-2pl.Subj the book
`I order you to give me the book.'

b. * Ordeno que deis
me el libro.
order that give-2pl.Subj me the book
`I order you to give me the book.'
(85) Spanish
a.

<No me deis
el libro!
Neg me give-2pl.Subj the book
`Don't give me the book!'

b. * <No deis
me el libro!
Neg give-2pl.Subj me the book
`Don't give me the book!'
We take the fact that subjunctives exhibit clitic-verb order to suggest that the subjunctive
verb does not move higher than the functional head to which clitics adjoin. Under this
analysis, the subjunctive verb does not move as high as the imperative verb does.
In Spanish, in addition to subjunctives, in nitives can express prohibition. In embedded
in nitives as well as in matrix in nitives that express prohibition, the verb precedes the
clitic.
(86) Spanish
a.

Mando no dar
le el libro.
order Neg give-Inf him the book
`I order that the book not be given to him.'

b. * Mando no le dar
el libro.
order Neg him give-Inf the book
`I order that the book not be given to him.'
(87) Spanish
a.

<No dar
le el libro!
Neg give-Inf him the book
`Don't give him the book!'
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b. * <No le dar
el libro!
Neg him give-Inf the book
`Don't give him the book!'
In order to derive the correct ordering between clitics and the in nitive verb, Kayne (1991)
proposes that in nitive verbs adjoin to I0 in languages like Spanish and Italian. In a phrase
structure with extended functional projections, this amounts to saying that in nitive verbs
move to a functional head that is lower than Neg0 but higher than the one to which clitics
adjoin. It then follows that an in nitive verb must precede clitics. Under such an analysis
of in nitives in Spanish, the in nitive verb does not move as high as the imperative verb
does.
We adopt the proposals in Kempchinsky (1987) and Zanuttini (1991) for the syntax of
subjunctives and extend them to the syntax of in nitivals. Kempchinsky (1987) proposes
that in Romance, a volitional verb subcategorizes for a subjunctive complement clause with
a subjunctive operator, in the same way that a verb subcategorizes for a wh-complement
with a wh-operator. According to Zanuttini (1991), the subjunctive clause selected by a
volitional verb contains in C0 the subjunctive modality feature. The complementizer that
in English subjunctives is a manifestation of this feature. Along the same lines, we assume
that subjunctives/in nitivals have a subjunctive/in nitival operator in C0 that selects subjunctive or in nitive INFL. We assume that the selection of subjunctive/in nitive INFL by
the subjunctive/in nitival operator is instantiated through chain formation. Speci cally, in
embedded contexts, the volitional verb selects a C0 which hosts the subjunctive/in nitival
operator and this C0 forms a chain with the subjunctive/in nitive verb in the embedded
clause. In matrix contexts, the subjunctive/in nitival operator in C0 simply forms a chain
with the subjunctive/in nitive verb. We take this operator to encode irrealis interpretation. More discussion of the interpretation of subjunctives and in nitivals will be given in
Chapter 4.
We represent the chain between the subjunctive/in nitive operator and the subjunctive/in nitive verb by coindexation, as in (88) and (89). Let us refer to the functional head
to which in nitive verbs move as Inf0 for simplicity.
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(88) Subjunctives
CP
C0
NegP

C
Subj-Op

Neg0

i

Neg

FP
F0
F

IP

Clitic

I0
I

VP

V

i
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...t ...
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(89) In nitives
CP
C0
C

NegP

Inf-Op

Neg0

i

Neg

InfP
Inf0
Inf

FP

V

F0

i

F

IP

Clitic

...t ...
i

The subjunctive/in nitival operator does not encode illocutionary force. But it does encode
irrealis interpretation. The question then is why negative subjunctives and negative in nitivals can express directive force. The approach we will pursue depends on the fact that
all matrix sentences express a certain illocutionary force, thereby performing a certain illocutionary act (Austin (1962), Searle (1969)). When subjunctives and in nitivals are used
in matrix contexts, the subjunctive/in nitival operator can generate directive force via inference because directive force is compatible with irrealis interpretation. A more detailed
analysis will be given in Chapter 4.
Given the syntax of subjunctives and in nitivals proposed here, subjunctive/in nitive
verbs do not move to C0 , and so negation never ends up taking scope over the subjunctive/in nitival operator. This means that the sentence will never end up with an interpretation in which the directive force contributed by the subjunctive/in nitival operator is
negated.
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2.8.2 Italian
In Italian, 2nd person plural imperatives are suppletive in the sense that they are formally
identical to the 2nd person plural indicative form. They do not, however, share the syntax
of indicatives. Rather, they behave more like true imperatives. While 2nd person plural
imperatives show verb-clitic order, indicatives show clitic-verb order. This is shown in (90)
and (91).
(90) Italian
a.

Fate
lo!
do-2pl.Imp it
`Do it!'

b.

Lo fate.
it do-2pl.Ind
`You are doing it.'

(91) Italian
a.

Non fate
lo!
Neg do-2pl.Imp it
`Don't do it!'

b.

Non lo fate.
Neg it do-2pl.Ind
`You are not doing it.'

Further, indicatives can be embedded, but 2nd person plural imperatives cannot.
What is puzzling is that although 2nd person plural armative imperatives are just like
true imperatives in that they exhibit verb-clitic order and in that they cannot be embedded,
they di er from true imperatives in that they can be negated.
We propose that 2nd person plural imperatives have an imperative operator in C0 and
that they have the syntax of in nitivals in that the verb moves up to Inf0 in the overt
syntax, as represented in (92). Then at LF, the verb moves to C0 . If this is correct, it
follows that 2nd person plural imperatives have verb-clitic order and that they cannot be
embedded.
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(92)

CP
C0
C

NegP
Neg0

Imp
Neg

InfP
Inf0
Inf

FP
F0

V

i

F

IP

Clitic

...t ...
i

However, we need to point out a complication. In 2nd person plural negative imperatives,
some speakers allow clitic-verb order as well as verb-clitic order, as in (93).
(93) Italian
a.

Non fate
lo!
Neg do-2pl.Imp it
`Don't do it!'

b.

Non lo fate!
Neg it do-2pl.Imp
`Don't do it!'

Our syntactic analysis of 2nd person plural imperatives cannot derive the word order in
(93b). We believe that the availability of (93b) cannot be given a syntactic explanation.
The syntax derives the word order in (93a). But the word order attested in (93b) is a
remnant of the Tobler-Mussa a law, which prohibits sentence-initial clitics. Old Italian
was subject to the Tobler-Mussa a law, but Italian lost this law some time after the 17th
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century. That is why in present-day Italian, clitics can occur in the beginning of sentences.
We suggest that a remnant of this law is attested in 2nd person plural negative imperatives.
Thus, the word order clitic-verb in (93b) is derived by a post-syntactic process that displaces
the clitic and places it immediately after the rst element of the sentence, which is negation
non, deriving clitic-verb order.
Under our analysis of the syntax of 2nd person plural imperatives, negation does not
take scope over the illocutionary force operator in C0 . The question remains as to why
the verb in 2nd person plural imperatives moves only up to Inf0 , whereas the verb in 2nd
person singular imperatives moves up to C0 in the overt syntax. We do not have an answer
for this question at this point.
Italian negative in nitivals which express 2nd person singular prohibition constitute
another puzzle. In Italian, in nitivals in embedded contexts always show verb-clitic order.
However, as pointed out by Kayne (1992) and discussed in detail by Zanuttini (1997), in
matrix negative in nitivals which express 2nd person singular prohibition, both verb-clitic
order and clitic-verb order are possible, as in (94).
(94) Italian
a.

Non far lo!
Neg do-Inf it
`Don't do it!' (Kayne 1992, 4)

b.

Non lo fare!
Neg it do-Inf
`Don't do it!' (Kayne 1992, 5)

In Italian dialects like Paduan, an auxiliary verb sta occurs in matrix negative in nitivals
that express prohibition. Crucially, this auxiliary verb is in the 2nd person singular imperative form, and it cannot occur in in nitives used in any other linguistic contexts, as shown
in (95).
(95) Paduan
a.

No sta parlare!
Neg aux talk-Inf
`Don't talk!' (Kayne 1992, 17)
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b. * Sta parlare!
aux talk-Inf
`Talk!' (Kayne 1992, 18)
Kayne's (1992) explanation is that in matrix negative in nitivals that express 2nd person
singular prohibition, the negative marker licenses an empty modal (in Italian) or an overt
modal (sta in Paduan) in the imperative form, and that this modal in turn takes an in nitive.
The unusual clitic-in nitive order displayed in Italian matrix negative in nitivals can be seen
as an instance of clitic climbing, where the clitic is not adjoined to the in nitive but to the
phonetically unrealized imperative modal.
If negative in nitivals that express 2nd person singular prohibition contain an empty
modal or an overt modal sta in the imperative form, then these negative in nitivals must
have an imperative operator in C0 , which attracts the imperative modal in the overt syntax.
However, the analysis proposed here for the (in)compatibility of negation and imperatives
appears to predict incorrectly that such constructions should not be available, since the
imperative operator would be in the scope of negation if the imperative modal and the
negation move as a unit to C0 . A solution to this problem can be provided if the imperative
modal behaves similarly to the deontic modal verb devere.
In Italian, negative sentences with the deontic modal verb devere are ambiguous between
the reading in which negation takes scope over the modal verb and the reading in which
the modal verb takes scope over negation, although negation c-commands the modal verb
on the surface.
(96)

Italian
Non devo parlare con te.
Neg must speak-Inf to you
`I must not speak to you.' (2:)
`I don't have to speak to you.' (:2)

In contrast, in English, the reading in which the deontic modal takes scope over negation is
expressed with mustn't or shouldn't, and the reading in which negation takes scope over the
modal is expressed with don't have to. Thus, the surface order of negation and the deontic
modal verb directly re ects the scope information in English: i.e., when the deontic modal
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c-commands negation, deontic modality takes scope over negation, and when negation ccommands the deontic modal verb, negation takes scope over deontic modality. The fact
that negative deontic modal sentences in English have two di erent forms with distinctive
scope information suggests that in languages like Italian, where one form can express two
di erent scopal interpretations, the distinctive scope information is represented at the level
of LF or in semantics. This means that in Italian, at LF or in the semantics, there is a
representation in which the deontic modal verb scopes over the negation, even though in
the overt syntax, negation takes scope over the modal verb. In such a representation, the
negation is passed down through the deontic modal verb.
Negative in nitivals with the empty modal or the overt modal sta (in the imperative
form) are expected to be available if this modal is like devere. The negation and the modal
move and adjoin to C0 in the overt syntax, just as in any other imperative. However, if
the modal is like devere, then at LF or in semantics, two representations are available for
this string: (i) the representation in which the modal takes scope over the negation and (ii)
the representation in which the negation takes scope over the modal. The representation
in which the negation takes scope over the modal will be ruled out because this is the
one in which the negation takes scope over the imperative operator. The representation in
which the modal takes scope over the negation is ruled in: the negation does not take scope
over the imperative operator in this representation. Since a legitimate LF or a semantic
representation is available, negative in nitivals with the empty imperative modal or the
overt modal sta are not ruled out.

2.9 Extension to Negative Interrogatives
We have proposed that the imperative operator, which encodes directive force, cannot be in
the scope of negation. If imperatives involve an operator that encodes illocutionary forces,
other sentence types, most obviously interrogatives, must contain a relevant operator as
well, namely an interrogative operator. Moreover, it must be the case that an interrogative
operator that encodes question illocutionary force cannot be under the scope of negation
either. As suggested in x2.7, we assume that all illocutionary force operators are located
in C0 . This assumption and the proposed analysis as to why some languages do not allow
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negative imperatives predict that languages with verb movement to C0 in questions and
clitic-like sentential negation should not have negative yes-no questions. But this prediction
is not borne out, as (97) shows.
(97)

Spanish
>No bebio Juan cafe?
Neg drank Juan co ee
`Didn't Juan drink co ee?'

We explain why negative yes-no questions are available by appealing to the interpretational
properties of questions.

2.9.1 Negation in Yes-no-questions
In a negative yes-no question formed with the clitic-like negation n't in English (e.g., Didn't
John drink co ee?), negation n't is in C0 , along with an auxiliary verb. In this section,
we show that n't in negative yes-no questions does not behave like true negation. That is,
n't in yes-no questions does not behave as in n't in declarative sentences. For instance, in
declarative sentences with can't, negation has scope over can, and in declarative sentences
with shouldn't, should has scope over negation.
(98) a.
b.

John can't swim.
It is not the case that John is able to swim. (not > can)
John shouldn't swim.
It is obligatory for John to not swim. (should > not)

But if we form yes-no questions with the sentences in (98), the di erence in the scope
possibilities between can't and shouldn't is lost. As can be seen in (99), both the yes-no
questions formed with can't and shouldn't only allow the interpretation in which negation
takes scope over the modal.
(99) a.

Can't John swim?
Isn't it the case that John can swim? (not > can)
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b.

Shouldn't John swim?
Isn't it the case that John should swim? (not > should)

Moreover, the intuition is that a negative yes-no question :p? formed with n't asks whether
p holds. For instance, the question in (100) asks whether John is intelligent.
(100)

Isn't John intelligent?

On the other hand, not in yes-no questions behaves like true negation. In negative questions formed with a modal auxiliary and not, the modal always takes scope over negation.
This is as we would expect because the modal c-commands the negation.
(101) a.
b.

Can John not swim?
Is it possible for John to not swim? (can > not)
Should John not swim?
Is it obligatory for John to not swim? (should > not)

Further, the intuition is that a negative yes-no question :p? formed with not asks whether
:p holds. For instance, the question in (102) asks whether John is not intelligent.
(102)

Is John not intelligent?

To summarize, n't in yes-no questions does not behave as true negation in that it behaves
di erently from n't in other linguistic contexts. In contrast, not in yes-no questions behaves
just as in other linguistic contexts. If negation in yes-no questions in other languages
behaves as in English, then we can explain why negative yes-no questions are possible in
other languages where verb and negation have moved to C0 as a unit. We can say that
since negation in C0 in yes-no questions does not behave as true negation, it cannot negate
the interrogative operator in C0 .
A possible explanation for why negation in C0 in questions does not behave like true
negation can be given by appealing to the semantics of questions. Following Groenendijk
and Stokhof (1985), we assume that a yes-no question denotes a partition that represents the
set of possible answers: namely, the positive and the negative answer. An armative yes-no
question and the corresponding negative yes-no question both denote the same partition
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because they both have the same set of possible answers. For instance, the questions Does
John drink? and Doesn't John drink? have the same set of possible answers: John drinks
and John doesn't drink. They both denote the same partition in (103).
(103) [ Does John drink?]]  [ Doesn0 t John drink?]]
John drinks
John doesn't drink
The reason that n't in yes-no questions does not behave as true negation may be because it
does not make a denotationally relevant contribution. But this cannot be the whole story:
even negative yes-no questions with not and the corresponding armative question denote
the same partition. For instance, Does John drink? and Does John not drink? have the
same set of possible answers, namely John drinks and John does not drink, and so both
questions denote the same partition in (103). At this point, we are only prepared to say that
when negation ends up in C0 in negative yes-no questions, it interacts with the interrogative
operator in C0 in such a way as to generate the interpretational e ects described above.
We leave open the issue of how to characterize the exact nature of the interaction between
negation and the interrogative operator.12

2.9.2 A Prediction with respect to Alternative Questions
The analysis presented here makes a prediction with respect to alternative questions. The
possible answers to an alternative question, such as Does John drink co ee or tea?, are John
drinks co ee and John drinks tea. That is, an alternative question denotes a partition as in
(104).
(104) [ Does John drink co ee or tea?]
John drinks co ee
John drinks tea
The negation in alternative questions must be true negation because it a ects the denotation. For instance, an alternative question Does John not drink co ee or tea? can be
We will see in Chapter 6 that although negation in yes-no questions does not make a denotationally
relevant contribution, it does have discourse e ects with respect to the speaker's expectation towards the
answer.
12
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answered either John does not drink co ee or John does not drink tea. It denotes a partition
as in (105).
(105) [ Does John not drink co ee or tea?]
John does not drink co ee
John does not drink tea
We can see that the partitions in (104) and (105) are di erent: the propositions in the cells
of the partition in (104) are di erent from those in (105). Thus, negation in alternative
questions makes a denotationally relevant contribution.
The prediction then is that alternative questions with negation in C0 should not be
available because such negation does not behave as a real negation, whereas alternative
questions with negation low in the clause should be. This prediction is borne out in English.
(106) a.
b.

Didn't John drink co ee or tea?
Did John not drink co ee or tea?

The question in (106a) cannot have the alternative question reading in which the possible
answers are John didn't drink co ee and John didn't drink tea. It can only be interpreted as
a yes-no question in which the possible answers are John drank co ee or tea and John didn't
drink co ee or tea. In contrast, the question in (106b) has both the alternative question
reading and the yes-no question reading, as expected.
The prediction with respect to alternative questions holds in other languages as well.
In German, yes-no questions have subject-verb inversion and negation can stay low in the
clause or it can occur immediately after the verb. Negative yes-no questions with lower
negation allow the alternative question reading, but those with higher negation allow only
the yes-no question reading.13
13
The adjacency of negation and the verb in (107b) is not conclusive evidence that negation is in C0 . It
may just mean that other constituents have failed to scramble out of VP. If so, then (107b) is a case in which
the alternative question reading is not available even though negation is low in the clause, contradicting our
prediction. In (107b), the subject NP Hans receives focal stress due to the presence of the immediately preceding negation (Beatrice Santorini, p.c.). The focal stress on Hans has a direct e ect on the interpretation:
the question is asking whether Hans as opposed to somebody else did not drink co ee or tea. The answer
is armative if it is Hans that did not drink co ee or tea, and the answer is negative if it is somebody else
that did not drink co ee or tea. Thus, it may be that alternative question reading is ruled out in (107b)
due to focus e ects.
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(107) German
a.

Trank Hans den Tee oder den Ka ee nicht?
drank Hans the tea or the co ee Neg
`Did John not drink the co ee or the tea?' (yes-no, alternative Q)

b.

Trank nicht Hans den Tee oder den Ka ee?
drank Neg Hans the tea or the co ee
`Didn't John drink the co ee or the tea?' (yes-no Q)

In Spanish and Modern Greek, subject-verb inversion is optional in yes-no questions.
While the inverted form with negation has only the yes-no question reading available, the
non-inverted form with negation allows both the yes-no question reading and the alternative
question reading.
(108) Modern Greek
a.

Den ipie o Yannis kafe i tsai?
Neg drank the Yannis co ee or tea
`Didn't Yannis drink co ee or tea?' (yes-no Q)

b.

O Yannis den ipie kafe i tsai?
the Yannis Neg drank co ee or tea
`Did Yannis not drink co ee or tea?' (yes-no, alternative Q)

(109) Spanish
a.

>No bebio Juan cafe o te?
Neg drank Juan co ee or tea
`Didn't Juan drink co ee or tea?' (yes-no Q)

b.

>Juan no bebio cafe o te?
Juan Neg drank co ee or tea
`Did John not drink co ee or tea?' (yes-no, alternative Q)

In Bulgarian, a yes-no question can be formed with the question particle dali and a noninverted sentence, or with the question particle li and subject-verb inversion. The noninverted form with negation has both the yes-no and the alternative question reading,
whereas the inverted form with negation has only the yes-no question reading.
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(110) Bulgarian
a.

Dali Ivan ne pie kafe ili caj?
Dali Ivan Neg drink co ee or tea
`Is Ivan not drinking co ee or tea?' (yes-no, alternative Q)

b.

Ne pie li Ivan kafe ili caj?
Neg drink li Ivan co ee or tea
`Isn't Ivan drinking co ee or tea?' (yes-no Q)

In Serbo-Croatian, an armative yes-no question can be formed with the question particle
da li and a non-inverted sentence, or with the question particle li and subject-verb inversion.
A negative yes-no question is formed with the question particle da li and a non-inverted
sentence. It allows both the yes-no question reading and an alternative question reading.
(111)

Serbo-Croatian
Da li Ivan ne pije kafu ili caj?
Da li Ivan Neg drink co ee or tea
`Is Ivan not drinking co ee or tea?' (yes-no, alternative Q)

In Italian, subject-verb inversion is not allowed in yes-no questions, and the negative form
allows the alternative question reading.14
(112)

Italian
Non ha bevuto te o ca e Gianni?
Neg has drunk tea or co ee Gianni
`Did Gianni not drink co ee or tea?' (yes-no, alternative Q)

In French, we have argued that ne is pleonastic and pas is the true negation (see x2.6.2).
We therefore expect negative alternative questions to be possible in French, since pas is low
in the clause. However, an alternative question reading is not available with negative yes-no
questions, regardless of subject-verb inversion (although the alternative question reading is
possible with armative yes-no questions, regardless of inversion).
In (112), the subject NP Gianni is in the postverbal position, indicating that the verb-initial word order
is not the result of subject-verb inversion.
14
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(113) French
a.

N'as
tu pas bu du cafe ou du the?
NE-have you Neg drunk some co ee or some tea
`Have you not drunk co ee or tea?' (yes-no Q)

b.

Tu n'as
pas bu du cafe ou du the?
you NE-have Neg drunk some co ee or some tea
`Have you not drunk co ee or tea?' (yes-no Q)

The unavailability of the alternative question reading in negative yes-no questions, despite
its availability in armative ones, suggests that in French some other factor is responsible
for ruling out alternative question reading in the context of negation.

2.10 Conclusion
We have proposed that a language does not allow negative imperatives if the syntax derives
a structure in which the imperative operator ends up in the scope of negation. This is
because such a syntactic structure maps onto an interpretive representation in which the
directive force is negated. But this representation maps onto an incoherent interpretation.
We have also proposed that languages choose chain formation mechanisms to avoid deriving the structure in which negation takes scope over the imperative operator. We have
extended the proposed analysis to account for the availability of negative interrogatives
across languages. The conclusions reached in this chapter have implications for the syntax to semantics mapping in imperatives. Given the proposed analysis, the cross-linguistic
variation in the compatibility of negation and imperatives shows that the set of available
syntactic structures in a language is restricted by the semantics.
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Chapter 3

The Syntactic Evolution of the
English Imperative
3.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to present an analysis of the syntactic evolution of English
imperatives from late Middle English to the Early Modern period, speci cally of the increasing frequency of do-support in negative imperatives. We show that the development of
do forms in negative imperatives cannot be explained with a phrase structure that has only
one INFL projection and one NegP, as assumed in Roberts (1985) and Kroch (1989b). We
therefore propose a more articulated phrase structure, which we argue is already necessary
to explain the syntax of Middle English in nitivals. The proposed analysis also accounts
for both the di erences and the similarities attested in the patterns of the development of
do forms between imperatives and declaratives on the one hand and between imperatives
and questions on the other.
In x3.2, we brie y discuss the syntactic evolution of imperatives from Old English to
Modern English. We also present the patterns of the development of do forms in di erent
linguistic contexts, such as negative and armative questions, and negative and armative
declaratives, and provide an analysis of them as a re ex of the loss of verb movement, as
presented in Roberts (1985) and Kroch (1989b). We point out that both analyses as stated
fails to account for the statistical patterns in the development of do forms in negative
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imperatives. In x3.3, we argue that the syntax of negative in nitivals in Middle English
can be accounted for if we assume two possible syntactic positions for sentential negation
(where one negation is structurally lower than the other) and an intermediate functional
projection (FP for convenience) between the two negation projections. The claim is that in
Middle English the in nitive verb moves to F0 , bypassing the lower negation. In x3.4, based
on the assumption that imperatives do not project a tense phrase (TP), which we assume to
be the highest functional projection for tensed sentences, and that English has two possible
syntactic positions for sentential negation, we provide an analysis of the development of
do-support in negative imperatives as a re ex of the loss of V-F movement. In x3.5, we
argue that the more articulated phrase structure assumed here enables us to distinguish
two types of verb movement: movement over the lower negation and movement over the
higher negation. We explore some consequences of the hypothesis that the loss of higher
verb movement precedes the loss of lower verb movement in the history of English. In x3.6,
we address the question why in nitivals and subjunctives in Modern English do not have
do-support.
For data relating to the development of do forms in various linguistic contexts, we use
the online version of the collection of sentences in Ellegard (1953) maintained by Anthony
Kroch. The source for the data relating to Middle English in nitivals is the Penn-Helsinki
Parsed Corpus of Middle English (PPCME) (Kroch and Taylor (1995)).

3.2 Data and Issues
3.2.1 Development of Imperatives in English: A Short Survey
In Old English (850{1150), imperatives pattern with questions: the verb precedes the
pronominal subject in both types of sentences. This is shown in (114) and (115).1
(114)

1

Beo gu on ofeste.
be you in haste
`Be quick.' (Beo 386)

The full references for the abbreviated text titles in the citations are given in Appendix A.
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(115)

Hwi sciole we otres mannes niman?
why should we another man's take
`Why should we take those of another man?' (AELS 24.188)

Following Pintzuk (1991), we assume that pronouns in Old English occur at the CP/IP
boundary, so that the fact that the verb precedes the pronominal subject implies that the
verb is located in C0 .
In Middle English (1150{1500), the imperative verb also precedes the subject, as shown
in (116).
(116) a.

Naske ge of cunseil.
not-ask you of counsel
(ANCRIWII 58.569)

b.

Helpe tou me.
help you me
(EARLPS 150.2290)

c.

Seke thou scripturis
seek you scriptures
(NTEST,VII,40.648)

d.

Goo ge ... ynto te payne of helle
go you ... into the pain of hell
(MIRK,4.80)

In the case of negative imperatives with the negative adverbial not, the subject precedes
not, and the verb precedes the subject. This is illustrated in (117).
(117) a.

Ne hide tou nogt fram me tyn comaundement.
Ne hide you not from me your commandment
(EARLPS 146.2169)

b.

Depart tou nougt fro me.
depart you not from me
(EARLPS 24.594)

c.

Weppe ge not for me, but for yovr chyldorne and for yovrselfe
weep you not for me, but for your children and for yourself
(SIEGE,87.521)

d.

medyl ge not wyth hym
meddle you not with him
(KEMPE,I,56.218)
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The word order in Middle English imperatives also shows that the imperative verb occupies
C0 .
In Early Modern English (1500{1710), imperatives show the same word order as in
Middle English. But imperatives with do-support are also attested. In imperatives with an
overt subject and with do-support, auxiliary do precedes the subject, as shown in (118). In
imperatives with an overt subject but without do-support, the verb precedes the subject,
as shown in (119).
(118) a.

Rather, O God! do thou have mercy on us (323 355-8-34)

b.

but I will be your good lord, do you not doubt. (361 O:4-2-39)

c.

Do you and your fellows attend them in. (361 M:5-1-106)

d.

Good brother, do not you envy my fortunate achievement. (361 W:3-1-86)

(119) a.

Love ye youre enemys (310 Luke 6-35)

b.

And feare ye nott them which kyll the body (310 mt10-28)

c.

Forbid ye hym not (310 lk9-50)

d.

doubte thou not all thinges rightly orderd be. (356 90-25)

The fact that the imperative auxiliary or main verb precedes the subject suggests that do
or the verb occupies C0 .
In Modern English (after 1710), negative imperatives require do-support. In negative
imperatives with an overt subject, auxiliary verb do and negation n't must precede the
subject, as in (120).
(120) a.
b.

Don't you worry.
Don't anybody move.

An armative imperative does not allow do-support unless it is an emphatic imperative.
In an armative imperative with an overt subject, the subject must precede the verb, as
in (121).
(121) a.
b.

You come here!
Nobody move!
73

In emphatic armative imperatives with auxiliary do and an overt subject, do must precede
the subject. This is shown in (122).
(122) a.
b.

Do somebody open the window!
Do at least some of you show up for the party!

In Modern English imperatives, the data suggest that while auxiliary do is located in C0 ,
the lexical verb is located low in the clause.2
We take the fact that either auxiliary do or the lexical verb occupies C0 in imperatives
in the history of English as an indication of the presence of an imperative operator in C0
which drives movement of the verb.

3.2.2 Do-support
In Modern English, auxiliary do is required in yes-no questions, non-subject wh-questions
and negative declaratives (and of course, negative imperatives).

2
The distribution of auxiliary do and 2nd person subject you in Modern English constitutes a puzzle. To
state it simply, do cannot cooccur with you in imperatives, as in (123).

(123) a. * Do you open the window.
b. * Do you not open the window.
This is a puzzle given that such constructions were possible in Early Modern English, as was shown in (118).
Although we do not have a complete solution to this puzzle at this point, we believe that a proper solution
cannot be a syntactic constraint against the cooccurrence of do and you in imperatives. We speculate that a
solution for the ungrammaticality of the examples in (123) may be due to an incompatibility of the pragmatic
functions of do and you. As was shown in (122), auxiliary do in armative imperatives contributes emphasis.
Do is also emphatic in negative declaratives in which do and not are separated by an adverb, as in (124).
(124) a.
b.

John did always not eat well.
John did sometimes not bring lunch.

Given this, we conclude that do is emphatic in both imperatives in (123). Moreover, the presence of an
overt 2nd person subject in imperatives also contributes a certain pragmatic function. Having said this, we
speculate that in Modern English the cooccurrence of do and you in imperatives results in an incoherent
interpretation because the pragmatic functions contributed by do and you in imperatives are incompatible
with each other. But imperatives such as those in (123) were possible in Early Modern English because
the pragmatic function of do in imperatives in Early Modern English di ered from that in Modern English.
However, further study remains to be done on the exact nature of pragmatic functions contributed by do
and an overt 2nd person subject you in imperatives to substantiate our speculation. See Davies (1986) for
a similar approach to the puzzle.
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(125) a.

Did you nish?

b.

What did you nish?

c.

I did not nish.

According to Ellegard (1953), auxiliary verb do develops out of an earlier causative use.
He provides a quantitative study of the development of do forms in various constructions
using a collection of sentences extracted from texts ranging in time from Old English to
the 18th century. Ellegard (1953) shows that as causative do is replaced by make at the
end of the 14th century, the relative frequency of auxiliary do starts to increase gradually
in various linguistic environments. Figure 3.1 is from Ellegard (1953:162). It plots the
relative frequency of do forms in armative and negative declaratives, armative and
negative questions, and negative imperatives. After the middle of the 16th century, the
frequency of do in armative declaratives declines steadily until, by 1700, the use of do
in this environment is prohibited. The frequency of do in negative declaratives and both
armative and negative questions rises continuously and by 1700, do is obligatory in these
environments.
According to a widespread analysis of Middle English clause structure, questions have
V-I-C movement and declaratives have V-I movement. Supporting evidence for this analysis
comes from word order facts: in questions the verb precedes the subject, as in (126), and
in declaratives the verb precedes not, as in (127).
(126) Questions
a.

Desyreste thou to come to heuen by pleasure & Ioye? (302 193-7)

b.

Herdest thou what they commened of bytwene them? (308 104-13)

c.

why ferest thou to take the crosse of shorte penaunce (302 191-36)

d.

But what auayleth science without the drede of god? (302 154-23)

(127) Declaratives
a.

but he found her not (304 36-4)

b.

yet he shewed not the semblaunt (304 110-1)
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c.

& he gyueth nat hede ne place to the deceyt full persuasions of the enemye
(302 201-42)

d.

I loke nat for it here (302 211-22)

According to Roberts (1985) and Kroch (1989b), English lost V-I movement for lexical
verbs in the middle of the 16th century. When V-I movement was lost, only be, auxiliary
have and modal verbs, such as can, may, must, etc. could appear in I0 . Based on the
behavior of indicative sentences, Roberts (1985) argues that the rise of do forms is a re ex
of the loss of V-I movement. As V-I movement was lost, INFL lowering replaced it (or
verb movement to I0 at LF, as in Chomsky (1991, 1993) and so the verb remains in situ.
In questions, the requirement that the material in I0 overtly move to C0 persists; thus,
auxiliary do is inserted in I0 as a last resort device and then moves to C0 . Examples of
questions with do-support are given in (128).
(128) Questions
a.

and wherfore doth the earth sustaine me? (304 25-24)

b.

Dyd ye wryte this with your owne hande? (308 96-25)

c.

doeste thou enuy to him the monarchye of the thing mortal? (326 109-30)

d.

Why doth God erect his throne amongst vs? (347 33-24)

In negative declaratives, negation blocks INFL lowering (or verb movement to I0 at LF),
stranding the material in I0 . Again, auxiliary verb do is inserted in I0 to support the stranded
material as a last resort device. Examples of negative declaratives with do-support are given
in (129).
(129) Negative declaratives
a.

They dyde not set theyr mynde on golde or rychesse. (305 35-23)

b.

Christ dyd not praye for Iames and Iohan & for the other. (305 319-11)

c.

but the shepe did not heare them. (310 jn10-8)

d.

He did nott consent to their counsell and dede (310 lk23-51)
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Kroch (1989b) provides empirical support for the proposal that the rise of do forms is a
re ex of the loss of V-I movement by showing that the rate of the rise of do forms in various
contexts, such as questions, negative declaratives and armative declaratives, is the same
up to the middle of the 16th century. He also relates the rise of do forms to the shift in
the position of weak adverbs such as always and never. In Middle English, weak adverbs
usually follow the tensed main verb, whereas in Modern English they occur before it. A
widely accepted analysis is that verb-adverb order re ects the verb movement to I0 , whereas
adverb-verb order re ects the failure of such movement. Kroch (1989b) shows that the rate
of the replacement of verb-adverb order by adverb-verb order is the same as the rate of
the rise of do forms, indicating that a single grammatical change, namely the loss of V-I
movement, is at work.
Comparing the development of do forms in negative declaratives and negative imperatives raises an interesting puzzle. The development of do forms in the two contexts does not
show the same pattern. As can be seen in Figure 3.1, up to the end of the 16th century the
relative frequency of do in negative imperatives was as low as that in armative declaratives.
Then after 1600, there was a big change in the development of negative imperatives. The
relative frequency of do in negative imperatives jumped to the much higher rate found in
negative declaratives, and subsequently the two negative environments evolved identically.
If do-support is triggered when negation intervenes between V0 and I0 , it is mysterious why
the development of do forms in negative imperatives pattern with negative declaratives only
after 1600.
Moreover, comparing the development of do forms in questions and imperatives raises
another puzzle. In Middle English, subject-verb inversion is attested in both questions and
imperatives, indicating verb movement to C0 for both types of sentences, as shown in (116)
and (126). More supporting examples are given in (130) and (131).
(130) Questions
a.

trowyst thou that the Apostle shall delyuer the from myne handys?
trust you that your Apostle shall deliver you from my hands
(190 50-24)
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b.

how dwelleth the charite of God in hym?
how dwells the charity of God in him
(161 1Jn3-17)

c.

Why dudest thou thus?
why dress you thus
(161 3-22)

d.

Who schewed the that thou were naked?
who showed you that you were naked
(161 3-17)

(131) Imperatives
a.

Ne touche ghe noght
ne touch you not
(161 Col2-21)

b.

ryde ye nat aftir that knyght
ride you not after that knight
(243 555-18)

c.

helpe tou me.
help you me
(EARLPS,150.2290)

d.

Or ellus take tou te woluy ste
or else take you the lycoperdon-bovista
(HORSES,91.44)

If do support is triggered in questions as a re ex of the loss of V-I movement, as proposed in
Roberts (1985) and Kroch (1989b), then we expect to see imperatives pattern with questions
with respect to the development of the corresponding do forms. However, as can be seen
in Figure 3.1, the rate of use of do forms in negative imperatives is much lower than the
rate of use of do forms in questions at all periods prior to the completion of the change. It
is only after 1700 that the rate of use of do forms in negative imperatives catches up with
the rate in questions. As for armative imperatives with do forms, the relative frequency
is extremely low. The relative frequency of do in armative imperatives never exceeds 1%
according to Ellegard (1953), who therefore does not plot them in Figure 3.1. Here are
some examples of negative imperatives and armative imperatives with do-support:
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(132) Negative imperatives
a.

Sir, do not marvel if I do bless your coming hither (344 21-17)

b.

Alas syr kinge Pepyn doo not moue your selfe in Ire (304 46-13)

c.

doe not wrong the gentleman, and thy selfe too. (360 I:435)

d.

& doe not think I speak this of any a ection proceeding from my self to any
other (358 G:192-30)

(133) Armative Imperatives
a.

Rather, O God! do thou have mercy on us (323 355-8-34)

b.

Do you let it alone. (350 7-24)

c.

Do you and your fellows attend them in. (361 M:5-1-106)

d.

Do you study Aristotles Politiques, and write, if you please, Comments upon
them (373 O:373-16)

In Modern English, although do-support is required in negative imperatives, it is not allowed
in (non-emphatic) armative imperatives. If both questions and imperatives had verb
movement to C0 , then it is mysterious why there should be this asymmetry in the rate of
development of do forms in questions and negative imperatives. Moreover, if both questions
and imperatives had verb movement to C0 , it is even more mysterious why do in armative
imperatives is not categorical, whereas it is in questions.

3.2.3 Issues
We summarize below the issues raised by the data considered so far:


Why does the development of do forms in negative imperatives statistically pattern
with negative declaratives only after 1600?



Why don't armative imperatives pattern with questions in Modern English? That
is, why don't armative imperatives require do-support in Modern English?



Why does the development of do forms in negative imperatives statistically pattern
with negative declaratives and not with negative questions after 1600?
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3.3 In nitivals in Middle English
Before addressing the issues raised in x3.2, we discuss a new set of data from Middle English negative in nitivals. We will see that the word order attested in negative in nitivals
in Middle English provides evidence for the inventory of functional projections and their
relative positioning in English phrase structure. We will also see that the questions raised
in x3.2 can be given an elegant account if we adopt the phrase structure proposed here.

3.3.1 In nitive Verb and Negation
In PPCME, we found some negative in nitivals with the order `not-(to)-verb' (as in (134))
and others with the order `(to)-verb-not' (as in (135)).
(134) not-(to)-verb
a.

Swyche tynges let brynge to tyn myende te ornamentes of tyn oratorye,
such things let bring to your mind the ornaments of your chapel
and not fulfylle tyn egen wit vnlyfsum iaperyes a[n]d vanites.
and not ful ll your eyes with ridiculous frippery and vanities
(AELR3,35.63)

b.

... tat sche wuld vwche-save nowth to labowre agens gw jn tis
... that she would promise not to labour against you in this
matere tyl ge kom hom
matter until you come home
(CMPRIV,MPASTON,221.310)

c.

... that they that ben sike of hir body ben worthy to ben hated but
... that they that are sick of their body are worthy to be hated but
rather worthy of pite wel more worthy nat to ben hated
rather worthy of pity even more worthy not to be hated
(BOETH,449.C2.379)

(135) (to)-verb-not
a.

to do noght all tat he doos for Goddes lufe

b.

to sorow noght for hys syn as he sulde do

to do not all that he does for God's love
(ROLLFL,99.259)
to sorrow not for his sin as he should do
(ROLLFL,99.260)
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c.

And herfore monye men vson wel to come not in bedde wit schetis,
and therefore many men used well to come not in bed with sheets
but [to] be hulude aboue te bed
but [to] be covered above the bed
(WYCSER,I,479.641)

Table 3.1 provides the number of in nitivals with `(to)-verb-not' and `not-(to)-verb' order
ranging from early to late Middle English. The reason why we have no tokens in the rst
two periods is because the prevalent way of forming sentential negation in these periods
was with ne, which always precedes the main verb. In Old English, sentential negation was
formed with ne alone. Then in Middle English, both ne and not came to be used (often in
the same sentence), until ne is completely replaced by not in late Middle English.

1150-1250
1250-1350
1350-1420
1420-1500

not-(to)-verb
0
0
19
9

(to)-verb-not
0
0
6
10

Table 3.1: `not-(to)-verb' and `(to)-verb-not' order in negative in nitivals

For the counts in Table 3.1, we excluded purpose in nitival clauses in the form of `notto-verb'. This is because the not in `not-to-verb' may be negating the entire purpose clause
and so may not be a sentential negation of the in nitival clause.
According to Frisch (1997), not in Middle English is either a VP-adjoined adverbial,
or a sentential negation base-generated either in [Spec, NegP] or as the head of NegP. Let
us assume that the in nitive marker to originates and stays in a xed position, namely I0 ,
and that not originates and stays in a xed position lower than I0 as an adverbial or as a
sentential negation.
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(136)

IP
I0
I

NegP

to not VP
V
Given the phrase structure in (136), the word order `(to)-verb-not' can be derived only if
the verb moves across not and right-adjoins to I0 . But this is an unattractive solution in
that we are forced to admit right-adjunction in syntax. Moreover, the phrase structure in
(136) cannot derive the word order `not-(to)-verb'.
Alternatively, if to is in I0 , and not originates and stays in a xed position, then the
word order `not-(to)-verb' suggests that negation is structurally located higher than I0 .
(137)

NegP
not

IP
I0
I VP
to

V

But if not is structurally higher than to, as in (137), then there is no way to derive the word
order `(to)-verb-not'.

3.3.2 Two Possible Positions for Negation
If we could say that there are two possible structural positions for negation in the phrase
structure of English (see Zanuttini (1991), (1997)), then we can accommodate both the
`(to)-verb-not' and the `not-(to)-verb' order in Middle English. Motivations for positing two
structural positions for negation are present in Modern English as well. In this section,
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we discuss what they are and determine where the two negations are located in the phrase
structure of a sentence.
In to-in nitivals, not can either precede or follow to, as shown in (138). If to is structurally xed, then the variable word order calls for two possible locations for negation.
(138) a.

I promise not to be late.

b.

I promise to not be late.

Furthermore, in declaratives with a modal verb, negation not can occur either before or
after an adverb, or in both positions, as shown in (139).
(139) a.

John cannot always agree with his boss.

b.

John can always not agree with his boss.

c.

John can't always not agree with his boss.

Following Cinque (1998), we assume that adverbs occur in xed positions. Since always
occupies the same position in the sentences in (139), the fact that negation not can be
located above or below the adverb suggests again that there are two possible locations for
the negation.3
The higher negation has all the properties of sentential negation. It requires do-support
for lexical verbs (as in (141)), and it licenses NPIs (as in (142)).
(141) a. * John not always agrees with his boss.
b.
(142)

John does not always agree with his boss.
John will not certainly agree with anyone.

The lower negation also requires do-support for lexical verbs (as in (143)), and it also licenses
NPIs (as in (144)).4
3
Adverbs such as always can occur in two positions: either after an auxiliary verb (as in (139)), or before
an auxiliary verb (as in (140)).

(140)

He always should check with me rst.

Unlike in negative sentences in which do is adjacent to not, in negative sentences in which do is separated
from not by an adverb, do is emphatic, as in (143b). We do not have an explanation for this fact.
4
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(143) a. * John always not agrees with his boss.
b.
(144)

John does always not agree with his boss.
John will certainly not agree with anyone.

In addition, both the higher negation and the lower negation have similar scope properties.
For instance, both the sentences in (145) are ambiguous in that the negation can take either
wide scope or narrow scope with respect to the universal quanti er of the subject NP. The
ambiguous readings are paraphrased in (146).
(145) a.

All of the players will not certainly drop the ball.

b.

All of the players will certainly not drop the ball.

(146) a.
b.

for all x, x is a player, x will not drop the ball. (8 > not)
It is not the case that for all x, x is a player, x will drop the ball. (not > 8)

Given that the syntactic behavior of the lower negation is similar to that of higher negation,
we conclude that the lower negation is a sentential negation, just like the higher negation.
Then where are the higher negation and the lower negation located in the phrase structure of a sentence? The variable word order of negative in nitivals in Middle English suggests an answer. The word order `not-to-verb' indicates that the higher negation is located
immediately above to, and the word order `to-verb-not' suggests that the lower negation is
located somewhere below to. Let us assume that TP is the highest functional projection for
tensed sentences and that in in nitivals TP is either underspeci ed or does not project at
all (following Baltin (1993)). Such a phrase structure for in nitivals re ects the fact that
the in nitive does not have tense morphology.5 Let us further assume that to is in a functional head that hosts mood features, namely M0 . Then, the higher negation is immediately
above MP, deriving the word order `not-to-verb'. Supporting evidence for the assumption
that in nitivals do not project TP and that in nitival to cannot occupy T0 is provided by
Baltin (1993), who points out that negation can never precede nite auxiliaries, as shown
in (147).
For a di erent approach in which in nitivals are tensed, see Chomsky (1981), Stowell (1982), Pollock (1989).
5
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(147) a. * John not will leave.
b.

John will not leave.

If nite auxiliaries occupy T0 , the highest functional head for tensed sentences, and negation
occurs lower than T0 , as we have assumed, then nite auxiliaries cannot follow negation.
Further, if to also occured in T0 , then to should not be able to follow negation. But the
fact is that to can either precede or follow negation. Thus, to cannot be in T0 , and it
therefore occupies a functional head lower than T0 .6 As for the lower negation, we assume
that it occupies a position intermediate between MP and VP. The skeletal phrase structure
assumed here for English is given in (148).7
(148)

(TP)
NegP
not

MP
(to)

...
NegP
not

VP
... V ...

3.3.3 In nitive Verb Movement
We propose that the `to-verb-not' order in Middle English is derived by the movement of the
verb over the lower negation to an intermediate position between M0 and the lower Neg0 ,
call it F0 . If in nitives move over the lower NegP, then we expect to nd cases in which
The phrase structure assumed here for English is similar to Baltin (1993). The main di erence is that in
Baltin (1993), AgrOP projects immediately below TP and to is placed in AgrO0 , whereas we do not assume
the existence of AgrP. Instead, we assume that MP projects below TP and to is placed in M0 .
7
Zanuttini (1991) also argues that English has two positions for sentential negation. The analysis proposed
here di ers from Zanuttini (1991) in that she assumes that the presence of NegP1 is parasitic on the presence
of tense phrase, whereas we make no such assumption. As a consequence, unlike the analysis proposed here,
Zanuttini is forced to assume that in nitivals project TP.
6
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the in nitive verb precedes not and not in turn precedes a participle or a direct object.
We found such cases in PPCME. This expectation is borne out, as illustrated in (149) and
(150).
(149) to-verb-not-participle
a.

and said mayster parson, I praye you to be not displeasyd ...
and said master parson I pray you to be not displeased ...
(CAXPRO,88.176)

b.

Ha! What it es mykell to be worti lovyng and [to] be noght loved!
ha what it is much to be worth loving and [to] be not loved
(ROLLFL,88.52)

(150) to-verb-not-direct object
a.

to conforme noght his will to Gods will, to gyf noght entent till hes

b.

But God, of his grete marci, geue to us grace to lyue wel, ... and to spille
but God of his great mercy give to us grace to live well ... and to spill
not oure tyme, be it short be it long at Goddis ordynaunce.
not our time be it short be it long at God's ordinance
(PURVEY,I,56.73)

to conform not
prayers ...
prayers ...
(ROLLFL,99.263)

his will to God's will to give not

intent to his

A widely accepted diagnostic for verb movement is adverb placement with respect to
the verb. In Middle English nite clauses, adverbs such as often and ever usually follow the
tensed verb, as in (151). If these adverbs are VP-adjoined, then the fact that the tensed
verbs precede the adverbs suggests that the verb moves over the adverb.
(151) a.

b.

and [he] su ryd euer grete penaunce for Goddis sake in weryng of the
and [he] su ered always great penance for God's sake in wearing of the
heyre.
hair
(EDMUND,165.61)
Here men vndurstonden ofte by tis nygt te nygt of synne.
here men understood
often by this night the night of sin
(WYCSER,I,477.605)
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In Middle English in nitival clauses, adverbs can also follow the in nitive, as shown in
(152). This suggests that in Middle English in nitive verbs can also undergo movement.

(152) a.

Monye men han a maner to ete ofte for
to drynke
many men have a manner to eat often in-order to drink
(WYCSER,I,478.631)

b.

Te otur was tat God wold geue hur tat grace, to hur tat was te
the other was that God would give her that grace to her that was the
modur of God to do euer plesaund seruyse to God.
mother of God to do always pleasing service to God

(ROYAL,256.260)
c.

for tah neauer nere nan oder pine bute to iseon eauer te
for though never were no other pain except to see always the
unseli gastes & hare grisliche schape.
wretched spirits and their grizzly forms
(SAWLES,173.107)

In summary, we have shown that Middle English phrase structure for clauses allows
two possible positions for sentential negation based on the data from negative in nitivals.
We have also argued that in Middle English, in nitive verbs move over the lower negation
to an intermediate position between M0 and the lower Neg0 . Moreover, we have argued
that in nitivals do not project TP and that to is in M0 , which is located lower than the
higher Neg0 . The phrase structure for in nitivals that we adopt is given in (153). If the
proposed analysis is correct, then Middle English in nitivals are like their Modern French
counterparts in that the in nitive verb can move to an intermediate functional head (see
Pollock (1989) for an account of French in nitivals).
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(153)

NegP
Neg0
Neg

MP
M0

not

FP

M
to

F0
F

NegP
Neg0

V

i

Neg

VP

not

... t ...
i

The phrase structure for tensed sentences in Middle English is similar to that for in nitivals,
except that in tensed sentences, TP projects as the highest functional projection and the
verb moves all the way up to T0 , as shown in (154).
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(154)

TP
T0
T

NegP
Neg0

V

i

Neg

MP

not

M0
M

FP
F0

t

i

F

NegP

t

Neg0

i

Neg

VP

not

... t ...
i

The phrase structures in (153) and (154) are consistent with the structures assumed in Kroch
and Taylor (1998) for Middle English. As in Kroch and Taylor, we will assume without
argument that FP is a projection of aspect that encodes perfectivity or imperfectivity.

3.4 Development of Do-support in Imperatives
3.4.1 Verb Movement in Imperatives
Imperative verbs lack tense in their morphological makeup, just as in nitive verbs do. We
take this to mean that either TP is underspeci ed or does not project at all in imperatives,
as represented in (155).8
8

Zanuttini (1991) argues for Romance that imperatives do not project a tense phrase.
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(155)

CP
C0
C

MP
M0
M

FP
F0
F

VP
... V ...

In Old English and Middle English, the word order in imperatives suggests that the
imperative verb is in C0 . If we adopt the phrase structure in (155) for imperatives, then
the imperative verb moves to F0 , M0 and then to C0 . Under this analysis, imperatives are
similar to in nitivals in that the verb moves to F0 , but they di er in that the verb moves
further to C0 .

3.4.2 Do-support in Imperatives
3.4.2.1 Negative Imperatives
As mentioned earlier, the standard view in the literature is that the development of dosupport is a re ex of the loss of V-I movement for lexical verbs in the history of English.
Under the more articulated phrase structure proposed here, we are able to divide up V-I
movement into M-T movement and V-F movement, and we can rephrase the loss of V-I
movement as either the loss of V-F movement or the loss of M-T movement.
Recall that do forms in negative imperatives are almost non-existent before the end of
the 16th century, but gain ground rapidly after 1600. We propose that this is a re ex of
the loss of V-F movement, which begins at the end of the 16th century. As V-F movement
disappears, overt verb movement to C0 is replaced with LF verb movement to C0 . But
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when F0 and V0 are separated by negation do-support is required as a last resort device
since as in Chomsky (1991, 1993), LF verb movement is blocked by intervening negation.
This is represented in (156).9

(156)

...
FP
F0
F

NegP

do

Neg0
Neg

VP

not

... V ...

Auxiliary do then moves to C0 , deriving do-(subject)-not-verb order, as represented in (157).
Some examples of negative imperatives with do-support are given in (158).

An alternative approach to why do-support is required in negative sentences is given in Bobaljik (1995).
According to Bobaljik, do-support is triggered by a PF adjacency requirement between the morphology in
INFL and the verb. Given this approach, we can say that do-support is required in negative imperatives
because negation blocks PF adjacency between the morphology in the functional heads and the verb.
9
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(157)

CP
C0
C
do

i

MP
subject

M0
M
t

FP
F0

i

F

NegP

t

Neg0

i

(158) a.

Neg

VP

not

... V ...

Do not send me any letters (363 W:212a-33)

b.

but I will be your good lord, do you not doubt. (361 O:4-2-39)

c.

Do not bite your thumbs, sir. (364 N:281a-7)

d.

Do not come in my husband's sight in mean time. (363 W:228a-45)

The loss of V-F movement requires do-support in negative imperatives with higher
negation as well: as V-F movement is lost, further verb movement to M0 and to C0 is lost
as well, and overt verb movement to C0 is replaced by LF verb movement to C0 . However,
when M0 and C0 are separated by negation, LF verb movement to C0 is blocked, and so
do-support is required. In the spirit of Baltin (1993), we assume that an adjacent verbal
element adjoins to the higher negation. Thus, in negative imperatives with do-support and
higher negation, auxiliary do moves and adjoins to the higher negation, as in (159).
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(159)

...
NegP
Neg0
Neg

MP
M0

do not subject
i

M
t

FP
F0

i

F

VP
... V ...

The resulting complex of do and negation then moves to C0 as a unit, deriving the `do-not(subject)-verb' order illustrated in (160).
(160) a.

Good brother, do not you envy my fortunate achievement. (361 W:3-1-86)

b.

Don't read this, you little rogue, with your little eyes; (379 61-20)

c.

but don't lose your money. (379 13-16)

d.

Don't lose your money this Christmas. (379 161-21)

3.4.2.2 Armative Imperatives
Following Roberts (1985) and Kroch (1989b), we assume that as English lost verb movement
for lexical verbs, questions, which require overt verb movement to C0 , resorted to dosupport. Under the articulated phrase structure assumed here, do is inserted in T0 and
then moves to C0 . This is represented in (161).
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(161)

CP
C0
C

TP

do

i

T0

subject
T
t

MP
M0

i

M

FP
F0
F

VP
... V ...

Since imperatives also show overt verb movement to C0 , we expect the development of do
forms in armative imperatives to pattern with questions. However, the relative frequency
of do forms of armative imperatives never exceeded 1%. In present-day English, do forms
are restricted to emphatic armative imperatives, as illustrated in (162).
(162) a.
b.

Do come early.
Do enjoy the movie.

The proposed phrase structure for imperatives di ers from that of questions: imperatives
do not project tense phrase, whereas questions do. We argue that this is exactly why the
development of do forms in armative imperatives does not pattern with that of questions.
In questions, as overt verb movement is lost, the tense feature in T0 is stranded. But even
after the loss of overt verb movement, the requirement that features in T0 overtly move
to C0 persists. As a last resort device for movement to C0 , the stranded tense feature is
supported by do, which then overtly moves to C0 . But imperatives contain no functional
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head with tense features. This means that once overt verb movement to C0 is replaced by
LF movement, the requirement that features in T0 move to C0 cannot apply to imperatives,
and so imperatives do not develop do forms.
Our analysis reduces the problem of why armative imperatives do not allow do-support
in Modern English to why armative declaratives do not do so. It is widely assumed that
in English armative declaratives, the verb moves to INFL at LF and since there is no
blocking category for the movement, do-support is not allowed. Given our articulated
phrase structure, in armative declaratives, the verb moves to T0 through F0 and M0 at
LF and no do-support is allowed since there is no blocking category for LF verb movement.
Armative imperatives then do not allow do-support for the same reason that armative
declaratives do not allow do-support. Further, armative imperatives did not develop a
last resort device in which do-support takes place either in M0 or F0 , with further movement
of do to C0 for the same reason that armative declaratives did not develop a last resort
device in which do-support takes place either in M0 or F0 with further movement to T0 .

3.5 Sequential Loss of Verb Movement
If we assume the articulated phrase structure proposed here, we can imagine at least two
di erent ways in which the loss of verb movement can proceed: (i) the loss of V-F movement and M-T movement begins simultaneously; (ii) the loss of M-T movement historically
precedes the loss of V-F movement. We argue that the possibility (ii) makes the correct
predictions for English: the loss of M-T movement begins at the beginning of the 15th
century, and the loss of V-F movement begins at the end of the 16th century.
In a series of works on syntactic change, Kroch develops a model of change that accounts
for the gradual replacement of one form by another form (Kroch (1989a, 1989b, 1994); see
also Pintzuk (1991), Santorini (1992), Taylor (1994)). According to Kroch, the gradual
change in the relative frequencies of two forms is a re ex of the competition between two
grammars, rather than by a series of grammatical reanalyses. A reorganization of the
grammar takes place only when one form entirely displaces the other at the endpoint of a
change. In particular, Kroch argues that the statistical pattern in the development of do
forms re ects the competition between the old grammar that has V-I movement for lexical
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verbs and the new one that has lost it. In time, the grammar without V-I movement wins,
at the expense of the grammar that has V-I movement.
Extending Kroch's grammar competition model to our proposal, we conjecture as to
how the loss of M-T and V-F movements proceeds. We hypothesize that at the beginning
of the 15th century, the competition between the grammar with M-T movement and the one
without such M-T movement begins. Before the grammar with M-T movement completely
loses out, the competition between the grammar with V-F movement and the one without
such V-F movement begins at the end of the 16th century. The grammar without V-F
movement is constrained not to have M-T movement, since the loss of lower verb movement
prevents the verb from moving higher up. Thus, at this point, competition between three
grammars is taking place: one grammar with both M-T and also V-F movement, a second
grammar with V-F movement but no M-T movement, and a third grammar with neither
V-F nor M-T movement.
In what follows, we will discuss some of the consequences of the hypothesis that the loss
of M-T movement precedes the loss of V-F movement in the history of English.

3.5.1 Do-support in Negative Imperatives and Negative Declaratives
As shown in Figure 3.1, by 1575, the relative frequency of do forms in negative declaratives
is almost 40%, whereas the frequency of do forms in negative imperatives is remarkably
low. But at the end of the 16th century, the frequency of do forms in negative imperatives
suddenly rises, and around 1600, the development of do forms in negative imperatives is
roughly the same as in negative declaratives.
Given the articulated phrase structure proposed here, in declaratives in Middle English,
the verb moves all the way up to T0 , as represented in (154) (repeated below as (163)).
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(163)

TP
T0
T

NegP
Neg0

V

i

Neg

MP
M0
M

FP
F0

t

i

F

NegP

t

Neg0

i

Neg

VP
... t ...
i

Negative declaratives formed with higher negation require do-support when M-T movement
is lost. Moreover, all negative declaratives, whether formed with higher or lower negation
require do-support when V-F movement is lost. If the loss of M-T movement begins at the
beginning of the 15th century, we expect to nd do-support in negative declaratives much
before 1575. And this is indeed what we see in Figure 3.1.
On the other hand, in our phrase structure for imperatives, TP is underspeci ed or does
not project at all. Thus, in imperatives in Middle English, the verb moves to F0 and to M0
and then directly to C0 , as represented in (164).
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(164)

CP
C0
C

NegP
Neg0

V

i

Neg

MP
M0
M

FP
F0

t

i

F

NegP

t

Neg0

i

Neg

VP
... t ...
i

The absence of T0 in imperatives means that the loss of M-T movement has no consequences
for the development of do forms in negative imperatives. But the loss of V-F movement
does. If the loss of V-F movement begins at the end of the 16th century, we do not expect
to nd much do-support in negative imperatives before 1600. As shown in Figure 3.1, our
expectation is supported.
Another di erence between negative declaratives and negative imperatives has to do with
the development of do forms with be and auxiliary have. While negative imperatives require
do-support with these verbs, negative declaratives prohibit it. Ellegard's data contains 2
negative imperatives with be in 17th century, and both of them have do-support. We found
no negative declaratives with do-support on be and auxiliary have.
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(165) Negative Imperatives
a.

Well then, don't be so tedious, Mr. Presto (379 107-5)

b.

I mean decently, don't be rogues (379 174-17)

(166) Negative Declaratives
a.

It is not the tears of our own eyes only, but of our friends also, that do exhaust
the current of our sorrows (372 104-10)

b.

for I had not then hard of any alteration in this shire which the said letters
of commaundment did forbid. (324 273-119-6)

The standard view of why negative declaratives with an auxiliary verb prohibit do-support
is that auxiliary verbs undergo movement. The question then is why auxiliary verbs in
imperatives do not undergo movement, hence requiring do-support when negated. The
answer lies in the presence or the absence of the tense projection. That is, auxiliary verbs
can undergo movement only when the clause is tensed. Following Chomsky (1995), let
us think of movement as attraction. Then tense features in T0 attract auxiliary verbs,
allowing them to move up to T0 . If there is no tense projection, then there is no tense
feature to attract auxiliary verbs. We have assumed that imperatives are not tensed. That
is, imperatives do not project a tense phrase. This means that auxiliary verbs cannot be
attracted by tense features, and so they must remain in situ.10

3.5.2 Do-support in Questions and Negative Declaratives
Figure 3.1 shows that do-support was much more favored in questions than in negative
declaratives. By 1575, while the frequency of do forms is 40% in negative declaratives, it is
almost 60% in armative questions and almost 90% in negative questions. The di erence
in the frequency of do forms in questions and negative declaratives can be explained if the
loss of M-T movement precedes the loss of V-F movement.
In questions, the loss of M-T movement leads to do-support in T0 , and do moves to
C0 . On the other hand, in negative declaratives, the loss of M-T movement does not
Modal verbs such as must, can, might, should, etc. cannot occur in imperatives. If modal verbs are
merged in T0 and if imperatives do not project tense phrase, then we expect modal verbs to be barred from
imperatives.
10
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necessarily correlate with the development of do-support because negative declaratives have
two possible analyses. That is, a negative declarative can be formed with negation either
in the higher NegP or the lower NegP position, as schematized in (167).

(167) a.

TP
T0
T

NegP
Neg0
Neg

MP
M0
M

FP
F0
F

VP
... V ...
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b.

TP
T0
T

MP
M0
M

FP
F0
F

NegP
Neg0
Neg

VP
... V ...

During the period in which M-T movement is being lost and before the period in which
the loss of V-F movement begins, if (167a) is chosen, then do-support is required, as in
(168), and if (167b) is chosen, then do-support is not required, as in (169). This explains
why the frequency of do forms in negative declaratives is much lower than in questions.
(168) a.

I doubt sir, that this Pillorie fellowe doth not heare you at all. (338 149-4)

b.

In this kind of Oration, wee doe not purpose wholy to praise any bodie (338
29-9)

c.

I do not withdrawe my handes to bestow them vnto hard labour (326 152-36)

d.

nor he dothe not upbraide vnto the sinful person his of him self, procedynge
o ences (326 180-18)
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(169) a.

The stocke feeleth not the atterynge to be hydde (326 86-9)

b.

O my Pelargus, I sawe not or spied not the before (326 105-35)

c.

And yet I speake not this, but that both these are right necessary (338 9-30)

d.

And yet they thought not this fore Law sucient enough (338 45-37)

When V-F movement is lost after 1600, both analyses in (167) require do-support and so
the frequency of do forms in negative declaratives rises rapidly.
The proposed analysis also explains why the development of do forms in negative imperatives patterns with that of negative declaratives and not with that of negative questions
after 1600. In negative questions, do-support takes place because of the requirement of overt
tense feature movement to C0 , and due to the presence of negation which blocks LF verb
movement. When V-F movement is lost, the requirement for overt tense feature movement
to C0 does not apply in imperatives since imperatives are not tensed. The only reason
for do-support in negative imperatives is therefore the presence of negation, which blocks
LF verb movement. We have seen that do-support in negative declaratives is also due to
the presence of negation. Hence, it is not surprising that negative imperatives pattern like
negative declaratives with respect to the development of do forms after 1600.
Two questions remain: (a) why is the frequency of do forms in negative questions always
higher than in armative questions prior to the completion of the change, and (b) why does
the frequency of do forms drop suddenly in negative questions and in negative declaratives
during 1560{1590. We can only posit conjectures in addressing these questions. In negative
questions, do-support serves two functions: a last resort device for verb movement to C0
and a last resort device for problems related to negation. But in armative questions,
do-support serves only one function: as a last resort device for verb movement to C0 .
Hence, negative questions seem to provide a more favorable environment for do-support
than armative questions. As for why the frequency of do-support dropped so suddenly in
negative questions and negative declaratives during 1560{1590, we conjecture that the lower
negation gained ground in this period due to the loss of M-T movement. As M-T movement
is lost, do-support takes place in T0 when there is an intervening negation between M0 and
T0 . The idea is that selecting lower negation may have been more favorable than inserting
do in T0 as a last resort device. If the loss of V-F movement does not begin until the end of
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the 16th century, then we expect the frequency of do-support to drop in the latter half of the
16th century. Moreover, if the loss of V-F movement begins at the end of the 16th century,
we expect the frequency of do-support in negative questions and negative declaratives to
rise again after 1600. And this is exactly what happened, as shown in Figure 3.1. Questions
still remain as to why the use of lower negation gains ground as M-T movement is lost and
why the frequency of do forms drops again in negative sentences during 1610{1640.

3.6 No Do-support in In nitivals and Subjunctives
In this section, we address the question of why in nitivals and subjunctives in Modern
English do not have do-support. For subjunctives, we limit the discussion to mandative
subjunctives which occur as embedded clauses under directive verbs, such as require, demand, insist, suggest, etc., as exempli ed in (170).
(170) a.

I demand that John nish the homework.

b.

I insisted that John stay.

c.

I suggested that she leave soon.

3.6.1 In nitivals
The loss of V-F movement in in nitivals did not lead to the development of do-support
in negative in nitivals. We do not expect do-support in negative in nitivals formed with
higher negation because there is no verb movement to C0 (neither in the overt syntax nor at
LF). Further, if, as V-F movement disappeared, the in nitive to in M0 attracts the features
in F0 , then do-support is not expected in negative in nitivals formed with lower negation.
This is because the feature content of F0 is in e ect being supported by to in M0 .

3.6.2 Subjunctives
In Middle English, the subjunctive form of verbs were in ected and exhibited a present/past
tense distinction (Mosse (1952)). Moreover, the subjunctive verb underwent movement,
indicated by the fact that it precedes negation, as in (171).
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(171) a.

b.

But beware ye be nat defoyled with shame, trechory, nother gyle,
but beware you be not de led with shame treachery nor guile
(MALORY,46.37)
Ter-uore ich te rede wel tet tou ne musy nagt to moche hit uor to
therefore I you advise well that you ne spend not too much it for to
zeche uor
tou mygtest lygtliche guo out of te rigte waye.
seek because you might easily go out of the right way
(AYENBI,I,104.108)

In Modern English, subjunctive verbs are in their bare stem form and exhibit no
present/past tense distinction. They require an overt subject, and auxiliary verbs as well as
lexical verbs must stay in situ. This is indicated by the fact that both auxiliary and lexical
verbs follow negation in negative subjunctives, as shown in (172) and (173).
(172) a. * I suggest that you be not late.
b. * I insist that John be not invited to the party.
c. * I insisted that John stay not.
d. * I demanded that she leave not yet.
(173) a.

I suggest that you not be late.

b.

I insist that John not be invited to the party.

c.

I insisted that John not stay.

d.

I demanded that she not leave yet.

We take the disappearance of the present/past tense distinction in subjunctives as an indication that they stopped projecting TP at some point after Middle English. Furthermore,
we take the fact that subjunctives require an overt subject to indicate that the feature content of M0 assigns nominative case, licensing an overt subject. Thus, the phrase structure
of subjunctives (though not the feature content of M0 ) looks just like that of in nitivals, as
represented in (174).
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(174)

NegP
Neg0
Neg

MP
M0

not
M

FP
F0
F

NegP
Neg0
Neg

VP

not

... V ...
Given the phrase structure in (174), we can explain why auxiliary verbs as well as lexical
verbs must stay in situ in subjunctives. As V-F movement is lost, lexical verbs remain in
situ. Moreover, since there is no tense projection, there is no T0 to attract auxiliary verbs.
Thus, auxiliary verbs remain in situ as well.
Roberts (1985) takes the fact that in British English complement clauses of directive
verbs can contain modals (as in (175)) to indicate that subjunctives project TP.
(175) a.
b.

I insist that John should take the exam.
I demanded that the witness should be present at the hearing.

Roberts argues that subjunctive clauses are structurally analogous to the complement
clauses in (175). The only di erence is that complement clauses in (175) have an overt
modal should in T0 , whereas subjunctives have a covert modal in T0 . We agree with
Roberts that complement clauses in (175) project TP and that should is in T0 . But we do
not agree with his further conclusion. Clauses with should can occur in matrix contexts, as
shown in (176), but subjunctives cannot, as shown in (177).
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(176) a.
b.

John should take the exam.
We should invite John to the party.

(177) a. * John take the exam.
b. * The witness be present at the hearing.
To block subjunctives from occurring in matrix contexts, one would have to resort to a
stipulation that clauses with a covert modal in T0 cannot occur in matrix contexts. In
contrast, our proposal treats subjunctives as structurally parallel to in nitivals. Thus, we
expect subjunctives and in nitivals to behave alike in many ways, including the distributional restriction to embedded contexts.
If we adopt the phrase structure in (174) for subjunctives, we expect subjunctives not
to have do-support for the same reason that in nitivals do not. We revise the proposal in
Roberts (1985) that subjunctives have a covert modal in T0 , and assume instead that the
locus of the covert modal is M0 . This covert modal is similar to the to of in nitivals. The
di erence is that the covert modal assigns nominative case, whereas to assigns null case.
Recall our proposal that to in in nitivals attracts the feature content of F0 . We extend
this proposal to the covert modal in subjunctives. Moreover, in subjunctives, the verb does
not move to C0 either in the overt syntax or at LF. Thus, negative subjunctives, just like
negative in nitivals, do not allow do-support.
A potential problem with adopting the phrase structure in (174) for subjunctives is that
deriving the correct word order is not straightforward for negative subjunctives formed
with the higher negation. If the subject is in [Spec, MP], then the phrase structure wrongly
derives not-subject-verb order. A way out of this problem is to assume that the subject
moves to the higher [Spec, NegP] or adjoins to the higher NegP for reasons of predication, as
Zanuttini (1991) assumes for the Romance languages. Another potential problem with our
proposal concerning subjunctives is that we allow nominative case assignment in a tenseless
clause. However, as we will see in x4.4, languages such as Korean and Japanese can have
nominative case marked subjects in non- nite clauses. Also, in German, matrix in nitivals
with directive function can have a subject marked with nominative case, as illustrated in
(178).
107

(178) German
Jeder
mal herhoren!
everybody-Nom once listen
`Everybody listen up!'
Thus, our proposal that tenseless INFL in subjunctives assigns nominative case receives
some independent support.

3.7 Conclusion
We have argued that the syntax of Middle English in nitivals can be explained if we assume
two possible positions for sentential negation and an intermediate functional projection (FP)
between the mood phrase (MP) and the verb phrase (VP). We have been assuming that FP
is a projection of aspect, following Kroch and Taylor (1998). We were able to account for
the patterns of do-support in various sentence types based on the articulated phrase structure that we have proposed for Middle English. In particular, we have proposed that the
development of do-support in negative imperatives is a re ex of the loss of V-F movement.
That is, as V-F movement was lost, the verb in imperatives moves to C0 at LF. In negative
imperatives, do-support is required as a last resort device because negation blocks LF verb
movement. We have also argued that the di erences and similarities attested in the statistical patterns of the development of do forms between imperatives and questions, between
imperatives and declaratives, and between questions and declaratives can be explained if
the loss of M-T movement precedes the loss of V-F movement in the history of English. We
have also proposed that in nitivals and subjunctives do not develop do-support because the
elements in M0 in these clauses attract and support the feature content of F0 , rendering
do-support unnecessary.
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Chapter 4

Feature Content of the Imperative
Operator
4.1 Introduction
The discussions and conclusions reached in the previous two chapters on cross-linguistic
variation in the availability of negative imperatives and the evolution of the syntax of imperatives in the history of English led us to posit an imperative operator in C0 across
languages. We have also found it convenient to posit a subjunctive operator and an in nitival operator for subjunctives and in nitivals, respectively. In this chapter, we will further
explore the content of these operators. We will assume that the operators are sets of features
and identify their feature content. This way of looking at the issue will help us to account
for the close relation between imperatives, subjunctives and in nitivals that exists across
languages as well as for cross-linguistic variation in the syntactic behavior of the imperative
subject.
We propose that the imperative operator includes [directive] and [irrealis] features, and
that the in nitival and the subjunctive operators include only the [irrealis] feature. The
feature [directive] encodes directive illocutionary force, and it is responsible for driving verb
movement to C0 either before Spell-Out or at LF, depending on the language. The feature
[irrealis] contributes unrealized interpretation, and it selects/requires either subjunctive or
in nitive INFL. We show that the syntactic behavior of the imperative subject depends
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on what type of INFL the feature [irrealis] selects in the language. If subjunctive INFL
is selected, the imperative subject behaves just like subjunctive subjects in the language,
and if in nitive INFL is selected, then it behaves just like the subjects of in nitivals. Our
proposal also accounts for why languages select subjunctives or in nitivals in linguistic
contexts where the imperative form is not available. We will argue that when the imperative
operator which includes [directive] and [irrealis] features is ruled out for some reason in a
particular language, the language selects an operator whose feature content is in a subset
relation, which is a subjunctive or an in nitival operator that includes the [irrealis] feature.
This chapter is organized in the following manner. In x4.2, we observe that imperatives cannot be embedded across languages and that many languages use subjunctives or
in nitivals in embedded clauses of reported directives. We discuss what this implies for
the proper characterization of imperative, subjunctive and in nitival operators. In x4.3,
we address the question of why languages select subjunctives or in nitivals in linguistic
contexts where imperatives are ruled out or not available. We also address the issue of how
subjunctives and in nitivals in matrix contexts generate directive illocutionary force. We
argue that while the directive force of imperatives is directly encoded, the directive force of
subjunctives and in nitivals is generated through inference. We also consider and reject an
alternative account in which subjunctives and in nitivals that express directive force also
have an illocutionary force operator that encodes directive force. In x4.4, we argue that
the syntactic status of the empty subject in English imperatives is PRO, whose reference
is determined by the interpretive property of the imperative operator. Implications of the
proposed analysis for Control Theory are also discussed. We also provide an analysis of
cross-linguistic variation in the syntactic behavior of imperative subjects.

4.2 Feature Content of Imperative Operator
4.2.1 A Feature that Indicates Directive Illocutionary Force
Any matrix sentence expresses some illocutionary force. But when the same sentence is
embedded, it loses its illocutionary force. For instance, a matrix declarative which is an
assertion ceases to be an assertion when embedded. Similarly, a matrix interrogative which
is a question ceases to be a question when it is embedded.
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(179) a.
b.
(180) a.
b.

John is intelligent.
Mary thinks that John is intelligent.
Is John intelligent?
I don't know whether John is intelligent.

A standard way of de ning the semantics of declaratives and interrogatives is by identifying their semantics with that of the corresponding embedded clauses. The main motivation
for this approach is to allow a compositional semantics of sentences. Under this view, a
declarative denotes a proposition which is a set of worlds in which that proposition is true,
and an interrogative denotes a set of possible answers which can be thought of as a partition on the set of possible worlds (see Karttunen (1977), Groenendijk and Stokhof (1985)).
Given this approach, the illocutionary forces expressed in matrix contexts are explained as
the result of pragmatic inference or reasoning.
Although this approach has been quite successful in the domain of interrogatives and
declaratives, extending it to imperatives is not straightforward. This is because imperatives
di er from declaratives and interrogatives in that languages simply do not allow imperatives to be embedded (as noted by Sadock and Zwicky (1985) and Palmer (1986)). Many
languages use subjunctives or in nitivals in the embedded clauses of reported directives.
(181) English
a.

Give me the book!

b. * I demand that give me the book.
c.

I order you to give me the book.

d.

I demand that you give me the book.

(182) Modern Greek
a.

Grapse.
write-2sg.Imp
`Write!'

b. * O Yannis se dietakse grapse.
the Yannis you ordered-2sg write-2sg.Imp
`Yannis ordered you to write.'
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c.

O Yannis se dietakse
na grapsis.
the Yannis you ordered-2nd.sg NA write-2sg.Subj
`Yannis ordered you to write.'

(183) Spanish
a.

<Habla
le!
talk-2sg.Imp her
`Talk to her!'

b. * Pido que habla
le.
ask that talk-2sg.Imp her
`I ask that you talk to her.'
c.

Pido que le hables.
ask that her talk-2sg.Subj
`I ask that you talk to her.'

(184) Italian
a.

Fallo!
do-2sg.Imp-it
`Do it!'

b. * Ti ordino che fallo.
you order that do-2sg.Imp-it
`I order you to do it.'
c.

Ti ordino che lo faccia.
you order that it do-2sg.Subj
`I order you to do it.'

(185) French
a.

Finis!
nish-2sg.Imp
`Finish!'

b. * J'exige que tu nis.
I-require that you nish-2sg.Imp
`I require that you nish.'
c.

J'exige que tu nisses.
I-require that you nish-2sg.Subj
`I require that you nish.'
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(186) German
a.

Sei
nicht zu aufdringlich !
be-2sg.Imp Neg too pushy
`Don't be too pushy!'

b. * Hans emp ehlt, da Du nicht zu aufdringlich sei.
Hans suggests that you not too pushy
be-2sg.Imp
`Hans suggest that you not be too pushy.'
c.

Hans emp ehlt, da Du nicht zu aufdringlich seist.
Hans suggests that you not too pushy
be-2sg.Subj
`Hans suggests that you not be too pushy.'

Languages like Korean appear to pose a counterexample to the constraint against embedding imperatives because the sentence particle that occurs in imperatives -la can appear
in embedded clauses. However, on closer look, the morphology on the verb in imperatives
di ers from the verb in the corresponding embedded constructions.
(187) Korean
a.

Ppalli o-ala.
quickly come-Imp
`Come quickly.'

b. * Na-nun Mary-eykey ppalli o-ala-ko
myenglyengha-yess-ta.
I-Top Mary-to quickly come-Imp-Comp order-Past-Dec
`I ordered Mary to come quickly.'
c.

Na-nun Mary-eykey ppalli o-la-ko
myenglyengha-yess-ta.
I-Top Mary-to quickly come-la-Comp order-Past-Dec
`I ordered Mary to come quickly.'

The imperative in (187a) cannot be embedded as it is, as shown in (187b). The similarity
between -ala in (187a) and -la in (187c) might be taken to indicate that Korean allows
embedded imperatives, but the embedded form lacks the morphology that is essential in
making a sentence into an imperative, namely -a-. The crucial character of -a- in matrix
imperatives is illustrated in (188). The corresponding embedded construction cannot have
-a-, as shown in (187b), and must have -la, as shown in (189).
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(188) Korean
a.

ppalli o-a.
quickly come-Imp
`Come quickly.'

b. * ppalli o-la.
quickly come-la
`Come quickly.'
c. * ppalli o.
quickly come
`Come quickly.'
(189) a.

Na-nun Mary-eykey ppalli o-la-ko
myenglyengha-yess-ta.
I-Top Mary-to quickly come-la-Comp order-Past-Dec
`I ordered Mary to come quickly.'
b. * Na-nun Mary-eykey ppalli o-ko
myenglyengha-yess-ta.
I-Top Mary-to quickly come-Comp order-Past-Dec
`I ordered Mary to come quickly.'

In other words, the marker -la is a sentence- nal particle that can occur in imperatives, but
does not suce to mark a sentence as imperative. On the other hand, -a- alone can make
a sentence an imperative, but cannot appear on embedded verbs. Thus, Korean is not a
counterexample to the generalization that languages do not allow embedded imperatives.
The fact that languages do not have embedded imperatives and that it is matrix clauses
that express illocutionary force leads us to believe that the imperative operator has a feature
that encodes illocutionary force. We refer to this feature as [directive], because imperatives
canonically express directive illocutionary force.

4.2.2 A Feature that Indicates Selectional Restrictions on INFL
Recall from x4.2.1 that many languages use subjunctives or in nitivals in the embedded
clauses of reported directives, and that embedded clauses do not express illocutionary force.
The two facts together imply that if the force-indicating feature is stripped away from the
imperative operator, the remaining features derive a subjunctive or an in nitival clause
type. In other words, in addition to the [directive] feature that encodes directive illocutionary force, the imperative operator contains the feature necessary to derive subjunctives or
in nitivals.
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We refer to the feature that is necessary to derive subjunctives or in nitivals as [irrealis].
The term `irrealis' is intended to capture the intuition that the proposition denoted by
these subjunctives and in nitivals describes an unrealized situation. What we mean by
this will become clearer once we consider the interpretation of subjunctives and in nitivals
below. We assume that the [irrealis] feature requires/selects an INFL with the feature
content associated with subjunctive or the in nitival clauses. We will refer to this INFL as
subjunctive or in nitive INFL, respectively.
In the literature, di erent types of subjunctives and in nitivals have been identi ed.
Stowell (1982) identi es two types of in nitivals for English, Quer (1998) identi es two types
of subjunctives for Romance, and Portner (1992) identi es three types of subjunctives for
English. In the following sections, we brie y present their discussions of the properties of
di erent types of in nitivals and subjunctives and determine which types of in nitivals and
subjunctives have the INFL selected by the [irrealis] feature. We propose that the same
type of subjunctive or in nitive INFL occurs in imperatives.

4.2.2.1 Two types of in nitivals
According to Stowell (1982), the temporal properties of in nitivals in control environments
are di erent from those in ECM and raising contexts. He argues that in nitivals in control
environments have unrealized tense: that is, the tense of the in nitival complement is
understood as being unrealized with respect to the tense of the matrix. This means that
the event time of in nitival clauses is future with respect to the event time of the matrix
clause, as shown in (190).
(190) a.
b.

Jenny remembered [PRO to bring the wine].
John convinced his friends [PRO to leave].

On the other hand, Stowell argues that the temporal interpretation of in nitivals in ECM
and raising environments is completely determined by the semantics of the superordinate
verb.
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(191) a.

I expect [John to win the race].

b.

I remember [John to be the smartest].

c.

John appears [t to like poker].
i

i

Since one normally expects things about the future, the tense of the in nitival in (191a) is
understood as future with respect to the matrix tense.1 And since one normally remembers
things about the past, the tense of the in nitival in (191b) is understood as past with respect
to the matrix tense. Finally, the meaning of the verb appear forces the event time of the
in nitival clause to be contemporaneous with the matrix event time.
Stowell's explanation for this phenomenon is based on two assumptions: (a) a tense
operator ends up in COMP at some point in the derivation, and (b) in nitivals in control
contexts project CP, whereas in nitivals in ECM and raising contexts do not. Consequently,
the in nitival clauses that project CP will have an independent temporal interpretation
(speci cally, of future-oriented unrealized tense interpretation), whereas the temporal interpretation of in nitival clauses that do not project CP depends on that of the matrix
clause.

4.2.2.2 Two types of subjunctives
According to Quer (1998), subjunctive complements in Romance can be divided into two
types, depending on the selecting element. Extending Stowell (1993), Quer (1998) observes
that negation and the question operator select polarity subjunctives, while directive
verbs, modals, volitional verbs and verbs of causation select intensional subjunctives.
Quer (1998) identi es four properties with respect to which the two types of subjunctives
di er. Although he distinguishes subjunctive complements in Romance as intensional subjunctives or polarity subjunctives, this is simply a matter of terminological convenience.
The main point of his proposal is that there is only one type of subjunctive, and that
the way it behaves depends on the selecting element. Thus, the behavior of subjunctive
complements depends on the character of the matrix predicate, rather than re ecting some
intrinsic property of the complement itself. Keeping this in mind, we brie y present Quer's
Stowell (1982) is not concerned with in nitivals with perfect have, such as I expect John to have won
the race. In this sentence, the event time denoted by the in nitival is past with respect to the event time of
the matrix verb.
1
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discussion of how intensional and polarity subjunctives di er. Quer (1998) uses Catalan
examples, but the analysis is argued to apply to the Romance languages in general.
First, intensional subjunctives display tense restrictions, in that a past subjunctive under
a present matrix verb yields ungrammaticality. Polarity subjunctives display no such tense
restrictions.
(192) Catalan
a. * Vull
que acabes
la tesi.
want-1sg.Pres that nish-3sg.Past.Subj the dissertation
`I want her/him to nish the dissertation.'
b.

No recorda
que en Miquel treballes.
not remember-3sg.Pres that the Miquel work-3sg.Past.Subj
`S/he doesn't remember that Miquel worked.'

Second, intensional subjunctives do not alternate with indicatives, but polarity subjunctives
do (modulo interpretational di erences).
(193) Catalan
a. * Vull
que acaba
la tesi.
want-1sg.Pres that nish-3sg.Pres.Ind the dissertation
`I want him/her to nish the dissertation.'
b.

No recorda
que en Miquel treballa.
not remember-3sg.Pres that the Miquel work-3sg.Pres.Ind
`S/he doesn't remember that Miquel works.'

Third, intensional subjunctives are restricted to the immediately embedded context of the
selecting predicate, whereas polarity subjunctives can appear in consecutively embedded
complements of the selecting predicate.
(194) Catalan
a. * Vull
que creguin
que ens agradi.
want-1sg that believe-3sg.Subj that us please-3sg.Subj
`I want them to believe that we like it.'
b.

No crec
que pensi
que li convingui.
not believe-1sg that think-3sg.Subj that him be-convenient-3sg.Subj
`I don't believe that s/he thinks that it's convenient for him/her.'
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Fourth, intensional subjunctives tend to display a ban on coreference between the matrix and
the embedded subject. But polarity subjunctives do not generally show such an obviation
e ect.
(195) Catalan
a. * pro vull
que pro la convidi.
pro want-1sg that pro her invite-1sg.Subj
`I want to invite her.'
b.

i

i

i

i

pro no crec
que pro la convidi.
pro not think-1sg that pro her invite-1sg.Subj
`I don't think that I will invite her.'
i

i

i

i

What is most relevant for us is the fact that past tense intensional subjunctives are ruled
out in present tense matrix clauses. Quer (1998) argues that this is because selecting predicates introduce a set of future alternatives. For this reason, the event time of intensional
subjunctives only follows the event time of the matrix clause. But a past tense embedded
under a matrix present would imply that the future eventuality precedes the matrix event,
a contradictory situation.
Portner (1992) identi es three types of subjunctives in English: mandatives, counterfactuals and optatives.
(196) a.

I demand that you be there. (mandative)

b.

I wish that he were here. (counterfactual)

c.

Long live the king. (optative)

He groups together mandative and optative subjunctives and notes their future-orientation.
That is, the event time of mandative subjunctives is future with respect to the event time
of the matrix predicate, and that of optative subjunctives is future or near-future with
respect to the utterance time. According to Portner (1992:155), subjunctives denote \a set
of desirable alternatives to the reference situation," \a set of demand-alternatives to the
reference situation," or \a set of counterfactual-alternatives to the reference situation."
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4.2.2.3 Irrealis of subjunctives and in nitivals
In nitivals with unrealized tense (in the sense of Stowell (1982)), intensional subjunctives in
Romance (as identi ed by Quer (1998)), and mandative subjunctives in English (as identied by Portner (1992)) share the property that the situations they denote are unrealized at
the event time of their matrix clauses (which are their reference points), and that the time
in which they can be realized is understood to be future with respect to the event time of
the matrix clause. For the rest of this chapter, we use the term `subjunctive' and `in nitival'
to refer only to the types with unrealized interpretation, unless otherwise speci ed.
We propose that subjunctives and in nitivals have an operator (that is, a subjunctive
operator or in nitival operator) in C0 with the feature [irrealis]. We assume that this
[irrealis] operator is selected by the matrix predicate, and that it in turn requires/selects
subjunctive or in nitive INFL. The procedure by which a matrix predicate selects a certain
type of C0 , which in turn selects a certain type of INFL, is the standard way of dealing with
mood selection in complement clauses (Kempchinsky (1987), Zanuttini (1991), Laka (1994)).
Returning to imperatives, we propose that the [directive] feature of the imperative operator selects the [irrealis] feature. The feature [irrealis] in turn selects subjunctive INFL
of the kind involved in intensional subjunctives in Romance or mandative subjunctives for
English, or it selects in nitive INFL of the kind involved in deriving in nitivals with an
unrealized tense interpretation.

4.2.3 Syntactic Consequences of [directive] and [irrealis]
Let us summarize our proposal so far.


The imperative operator includes the features [directive] and [irrealis].



The subjunctive operator and in nitival operator include an [irrealis] feature.



The feature [directive] encodes directive illocutionary force, and the feature [irrealis]
contributes unrealized interpretation.



The feature [irrealis] requires/selects subjunctive INFL or in nitive INFL.
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In Chapters 2 and 3, we showed that the syntax of imperatives di ers from that of
subjunctives and in nitivals, at least in Italian, Spanish, Modern Greek and English. We
argued that the imperative operator drives verb movement to C0 either before Spell-Out
or at LF depending on the language, whereas the subjunctive operator or the in nitival
operator forms a chain with the verb in INFL. We can identify the feature content in C0 in
these languages as the source for the syntactic di erence between imperatives on the one
hand and subjunctives and in nitivals, on the other. We represent the syntax of imperatives
and subjunctives/in nitivals as in (197).
(197)

Imperatives

Subjunctives/in nitivals
CP

CP

C0

C0
C
Verb

i

directive,
irrealis

IP
... t ...

C

IP

irrealis

... Verb ...

i

We propose that the feature [directive] is responsible for driving verb movement to C0
in imperatives. In subjunctives and in nitivals, the subjunctive/in nitival operator in C0
does not contain [directive], prohibiting verb movement to C0 . But the operator includes
the [irrealis] feature, which is responsible for selecting subjunctive or in nitive INFL. The
selecting process is instantiated by chain formation between the operator and the selected
INFL, as discussed in x2.8.

4.3 Subjunctives and In nitivals with Directive Function
4.3.1 Describing the Problem
In many languages, when imperative forms are ruled out or are not available, subjunctive
or in nitival forms are used instead to serve the directive function. Thus, in the chapter
on cross-linguistic variation in the compatibility between negation and imperatives, we saw
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that some languages do not allow negative imperatives. Instead, prohibition is expressed
with negative subjunctives or in nitivals. For instance, to express prohibition, Modern
Greek selects negative subjunctives, and Spanish selects negative subjunctives or negative
in nitivals. We repeat the examples from Chapter 2 in (198) and (199).
(198) Modern Greek
a. * Mi grapse
to!
Neg write-2sg.Imp it
`Don't write it!'
b.

(Na) mi to grapsis!
NA Neg it write-2sg.Subj
`Don't write it!'

(199) Spanish
a. * <No lee
lo!
Neg read-2sg.Imp it
`Don't read it!'
b.

<No lo leas!
Neg it read-2sg.Subj
`Don't read it!'

c.

<No leer
lo!
Neg read-Inf it
`Don't read it!'

In addition, some Modern Greek verbs do not have imperative forms: e.g., verbs corresponding to be, know, etc. In order to express a command with these verbs, subjunctive
forms with subjunctive syntax are used.
(200) Modern Greek
a.

Na ise
etimos!
NA be-2sg.Subj ready
`Be ready!'

b.

Na kseris
to mathima!
NA know-2sg.Subj the lesson
`Know the lesson!'
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We have proposed that imperatives have an imperative operator in C0 whose feature
contents include [directive] and [irrealis], whereas subjunctives and in nitivals have a subjunctive or in nitival operator, respectively, in C0 and include the [irrealis] feature. The
feature content of the subjunctive/in nitival operator is a proper subset of the feature content in the imperative operator (f[irrealis]g  f[directive], [irrealis]g). This fact allows us to
explain why languages choose subjunctives or in nitivals (and not some other clause type)
to serve the directive function in linguistic contexts where imperatives are ruled out. In
this section, we use data from Modern Greek and Spanish for illustration.

4.3.2 Analysis
We propose that if the imperative operator is ruled out in some linguistic context, the
language selects an operator whose feature content is in a subset relation. This is the
subjunctive or the in nitival operator with [irrealis] feature. Thus, in Modern Greek, subjunctives serve the function of directive when no imperative form is available. And in
Spanish, subjunctives or in nitivals serve the function of directive when the corresponding
imperative forms are ruled out.
The question arises of how subjunctives and in nitivals can end up with directive force
when the subjunctive and in nitival operators only include the feature [irrealis]. Since the
[directive] feature is not present in these operators, one would expect subjunctives and innitivals to generate only an unrealized interpretation. We propose that directive force is
generated in this case through pragmatic inference. Like all matrix clauses, the subjunctive
and in nitival matrix clauses in Modern Greek and Spanish express some illocutionary force,
thereby performing some speech act. Although subjunctive and in nitival operators do not
include a force-indicating feature, directive illocutionary force is generated via pragmatic
inference by virtue of the fact that they are in matrix contexts. For this reason, we will call
this analysis an inference-based analysis. We claim that directive force can be generated because it is compatible with the unrealized interpretation contributed by the feature
[irrealis]. Thus, in Modern Greek, 2nd person negative subjunctives express prohibition,
and 2nd person subjunctives with the verbs corresponding to be and know express commands. And in Spanish, negative in nitivals and 2nd person negative subjunctives express
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prohibition.
Table 4.1 summarizes our analysis. If the [directive] feature is included in the morphosyntactic features of the operator in C0 , then imperative syntax is derived, and directive force is directly encoded in the syntax. If the [directive] feature is not included in the
morphosyntactic features of the operator in C0 , then subjunctive or in nitival syntax is
derived, and the presence of directive force is inferred.
Morphosyntactic
features in C0
[directive],
[irrealis]
[irrealis]

Syntax

Direct
interpretation
directive force,
unrealized
unrealized

imperative
subjunctive,
in nitival

Inference
|
directive force

Table 4.1: Morphosyntactic features and directive force

4.3.3 Predictions
4.3.3.1 Armative subjunctives and directive force
If 2nd person negative subjunctives can generate directive force through pragmatic inference,
their armative counterparts should be able to as well. This is indeed the case. In Modern
Greek, 2nd person armative subjunctives are considered to be a more polite, formal and
indirect way of expressing requests than 2nd person armative imperatives.
(201) Modern Greek
a.

Grapse!
write-2sg.Perf.Imp
`Write!'

b.

Na grapsis.
NA write-2sg.Perf.Subj
`I request that you write.'

Imperatives have the [directive] feature in the imperative operator in C0 , and so directive
force is directly encoded in the syntax. But subjunctives do not have the [directive] feature in
the subjunctive operator in C0 . The directive force of subjunctives is indirectly generated
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through pragmatic inference. Therefore, 2nd person armative subjunctives are a more
indirect way of expressing requests, and indirectness is generally perceived as politeness.
In Spanish, 2nd person armative subjunctives can also have directive force. But in
contrast to Modern Greek, they express emphatic commands, rather than polite requests.2
(202) Spanish
a.

<Que te calles!
that Re hush-2sg.Subj
`Hush!'

b.

<Que subas!
that come-up-2sg.Subj
`Come up!'

2nd person armative subjunctives cannot express polite requests in Spanish for the independent reason that Spanish does not form polite expressions with 2nd person forms.
In general, Spanish uses 3rd person forms to express polite formal expressions. For polite
requests, Spanish uses formal imperatives, whose verbal forms are identical to 3rd person
subjunctive forms, but whose syntax is same as 2nd person imperatives in that pronominal
clitics occur after the verb, as shown in (203a). For formal polite prohibitions, Spanish uses
3rd person negative subjunctives, and pronominal clitics occur before the verb, just as with
any other subjunctive, as shown in (203b).
(203) Spanish
a.

Hable
le.
speak-2sg.Imp(formal) her
`Please, speak to her.'

b.

No le hable.
Neg her speak-3sg.Subj
`Please, do not speak to her.'

In Spanish, while 2nd person armative subjunctives that express emphatic commands require complementizer que, 2nd person negative subjunctives that express prohibition do not. When a 2nd person negative
subjunctive occurs with que, it is interpreted as an emphatic prohibition. The obligatoriness of que in 2nd
person armative subjunctives may be a re ection of a surface licensing constraint on subjunctives: i.e.,
subjunctives can occur only in subordinate contexts. That is, it may be that for a 2nd person armative
subjunctive, que provides a subordinate context, whereas for a 2nd person negative subjunctive, que is not
required unless emphatic interpretation is called for because the presence of negation is enough to provide
a subordinate context. We will not pursue this issue any further.
2
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4.3.3.2 Cancellation of directive force
If matrix 2nd person subjunctives can generate directive force through pragmatic inference,
then in some contexts, it should be possible to cancel the directive force and to generate
some other illocutionary force with unrealized interpretation. This prediction is borne out
for armative 2nd person subjunctives, which can express wishes, in both Modern Greek
and Spanish, as in (204).
(204) a.

Spanish
<Que complas
muchos mas a~nos!
that count-2sg.Subj many more years
`May you have many more years!'

b.

Modern Greek
Na zisis!
NA live-2sg.Subj
`May you live!'

It is hard, however, to get a wish reading for 2nd person negative subjunctives. This is a
problem for our inference-based analysis, which we return to in x4.3.4.
Another prediction is that if 2nd person subjunctives can be used in matrix contexts
and receive their illocutionary force via pragmatic inference, then so should subjunctives in
other person forms. This also holds. For instance, in both Modern Greek and Spanish, 3rd
person subjunctives can be used in matrix contexts to express wishes or deontic modality.
(205) Spanish
a.

<Que viva
el rey!
that live-3sg.Subj the king
`Long live the king!'

b.

Que entre
y que se caliente.
that enter-3sg.Subj and that Re get-warm-3sg.Subj
`He should come in and get warm.'

(206) Modern Greek
a.

Na zisi
o Yannis!
NA live-3sg.Subj the Yannis
`May Yannis live!'
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b.

Na grapsi
kapios.
NA write-3sg.Subj somebody
`Somebody should write.'

What about in nitivals in Spanish? Can in nitivals be used in matrix contexts to serve
functions other than prohibition? The use of in nitivals in matrix contexts seems very
limited. Armative in nitivals can express directive force, but they are usually used in short
directions, as in notices to the public. It must be pointed out that negative in nitivals as
well are used to express prohibition less productively than negative subjunctives. In nitivals
in matrix contexts can also be used to express exclamations of surprise, as shown in (207d).
(207) Spanish
a.

<Callar!
hush-Inf
`Hush!'

b.

Adios, hija.
Conservar se.
good-bye daughter take-care-Inf Re
`Good bye, daughter. Take care of yourself.'

c.

Dirigir se dentro.
apply-Inf Re within
`Apply within.'

d.

>Abandonar le? <Nunca!
abandon-Inf him never
`Abandon him? Never!'

4.3.4 An Alternative Analysis
An alternative to the inference-based analysis would be to argue that matrix subjunctives
and matrix in nitivals that express directive force actually contain an operator that encodes
that force. In other words, languages like Spanish and Modern Greek have constructions
that look just like 2nd person subjunctives and in nitivals on the surface, but di er from
these clause types in that they have an operator which includes a feature [directive]. The
problem with this analysis is that the required feature cannot be the same feature as the
[directive] of the imperative operator because the morphosyntax of subjunctives/in nitivals
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that express directive force di ers from that of imperatives: imperatives have verb movement to C0 , whereas subjunctives/in nitivals do not, and the morphology on the verb in
imperatives and subjunctives/in nitivals di ers as well.
A re nement of the approach just rejected assumes that languages can have two di erent
instantiations of the [directive] feature: weak and strong. For the sake of discussion, we will
refer to the weak and strong directive feature as [directive0 ] and [directive], respectively. We
could then say that the [directive] feature attracts verb movement to C0 in the overt syntax
and is re ected in the unique imperative morphology on the verb. On the other hand, the
[directive0 ] feature does not attract verb movement to C0 until LF and, being weak, is not
morphologically re ected on the verb. Only the [irrealis] feature is re ected on the verb in
the form of subjunctive or in nitive morphology. Under this analysis, matrix subjunctives
and in nitivals that express directive force only appear to be subjunctives and in nitivals.
In reality, they are imperatives.
According to the analysis under discussion, a language can have two imperative operators
that serve the same function: one that includes the features [irrealis] and [directive], and
another that includes [irrealis] and [directive0 ]. We will therefore refer to this analysis as the
two-imperative-operator analysis. At rst blush, this analysis does not seem to t
well with a theory of morphology that assumes that morphological formatives are subject to
the blocking effect (Arono (1976)). The blocking e ect refers to the general principle
of morphology which excludes morphological doublets, or coexisting formatives that
are not functionally di erentiated. In particular, the presence of an irregular form in a
paradigmatic slot blocks the appearance of the regular form that would have occupied that
slot under the relevant morphological rule. For instance, in English, the sux -ness turns
adjectives into nouns.
(208) a.
b.

good - goodness
happy - happiness

But in some cases, words formed with -ness do not sound natural.
(209)

clear - ?clearness

According to Arono , *clearness is blocked by the existence of another form, clarity, which
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is formed with the exceptional sux -ity.
The question of the blocking e ect does not arise for negative sentences under the twoimperative-operator analysis, because the imperative operator that includes the [directive]
feature is ruled out in negative contexts for the reason given in Chapter 2. Thus, the only
available option is the imperative operator with [directive0 ]. This operator derives a structure that looks just like subjunctives for Modern Greek, and subjunctives or in nitivals for
Spanish. But the question of the blocking e ect does arise for armative sentences. However, neither of the proposed imperative operators blocks the other because they do not
have the same function. As discussed in x4.3, in Modern Greek, 2nd person armative subjunctives express polite requests, whereas armative imperatives express direct commands.
Under the two-imperative-operator analysis, this means that the imperative operator with
[directive0 ] generates a polite request reading, and the imperative operator with [directive]
generates a direct command reading. In Spanish, we saw that 2nd person armative subjunctives express emphatic commands, armative in nitivals are used in short directions as
in public notices, and armative imperatives express neutral commands. In other words,
the imperative operator with [directive] generates a neutral command reading, and the imperative operator with [directive0 ] generates slightly di erent readings. At this point, one
may nd it problematic that in Spanish [directive0 ] derives both structures that look like
subjunctives and like in nitivals. Presumably, the two clause types di er in other features,
and it is this di erence that is re ected in the di erent morphosyntax and di erent interpretational functions. As shown in Chapter 2, the in nitive verb moves higher than the
subjunctive verb in the phrase structure of Spanish. Moreover, unlike subjunctives, both
armative and negative in nitivals are usually used in short directions, as in public notices.
Compared to the inference-based analysis, one of the strengths of the two-imperativeoperator analysis is that it captures the intuition that the directive force expressed by 2nd
person negative subjunctives in Modern Greek and Spanish and negative in nitivals in
Spanish is quite direct without any apparent inference. Further, our analysis of Italian 2nd
person plural imperatives in x2.8.2 is not problematic under the two-imperative-operator
analysis. In x2.8.2, we proposed that in 2nd person singular imperatives, the verb moves up
to C0 , whereas in 2nd person plural imperatives, the verb overtly moves to a functional head
lower than C0 , moving to C0 only at LF. According to the two-imperative-operator analysis,
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the situation in Italian is expected to be possible. All we have to say is that in Italian,
2nd person singular and plural imperatives have the strong and weak directive feature,
respectively. In contrast, the inference-based approach to Italian imperatives is problematic
because Italian ends up being the only language with two di erent instantiations of the
imperative operator.
On the other side of the balance sheet, we must point out several facts that make us
suspicious of the two-imperative-operator analysis. As observed in x4.3, matrix subjunctives
in Modern Greek and Spanish and in nitivals in Spanish can serve functions other than
directive, such as wishes, deontic statements and surprise. Thus, we would not want to say
that all matrix subjunctives and in nitivals have an imperative operator with the feature
[directive0 ]. Further, we would not want to say that there are other operators with di erent
feature content, generating di erent interpretations, and yet all deriving structures that
are identical to subjunctives or in nitivals. But if inference is necessary to interpret matrix
subjunctives and in nitivals as wishes or deontic statements, and if it is possible to interpret
2nd person subjunctives and in nitivals as directives via inference, then conceptual economy
forces us to reject the two-imperative-operator analysis, despite its attractive properties. In
addition, given that illocutionary force is not encoded in embedded contexts, the twoimperative-operator analysis requires a stipulation concerning embedded subjunctives and
in nitivals. Speci cally, subjunctives and in nitivals in matrix contexts would be required
to have a force-indicating feature, whereas those in embedded contexts would be prohibited
from having one { despite their morphologically identical forms.
A question that arises for both the inference-based analysis and the two-imperativeoperator analysis is why a language should have imperatives at all given that subjunctives
and in nitivals can serve the directive function. However, this is not a question speci c to
the issue at hand. We know that languages in general have di erent ways of expressing the
same thing. For instance, the sentences in (210) mean roughly the same thing.
(210) a.

John ate an apple.

b.

It is an apple that John ate.

c.

What John ate is an apple.

d.

An apple, John ate.
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It has been shown that sentences that seem to express the same thing have di erent discourse
functions and so cannot be felicitously used in the same discourse context (Prince (1978,
1984, in press)). In fact, we have seen that imperatives, subjunctives and in nitivals have
di erent discourse functions as well. Thus, the situation that a language has imperatives
as well as subjunctives and in nitivals to express directives is an example of a more general
phenomenon that is pervasive in natural language.

4.4 The Subjects of Imperatives
We have argued that the imperative operator includes the feature [irrealis], which selects
either a subjunctive or an in nitive INFL. We will refer to imperatives with subjunctive or
in nitive INFL as `subjunctive type' imperatives and `in nitive type' imperatives, respectively.
So far, we have been assuming, without explicit argument that languages have two
options for deriving the imperative structure: in nitive type imperatives have an in nitive INFL, and subjunctive type imperatives have a subjunctive INFL. In this section, we
provide empirical support for our proposal. In particular, we tie the syntactic status of imperative subjects in a language to whether the language has subjunctive or in nitive type
imperatives, or both.
Languages vary with respect to the syntactic status of subjects in imperatives. The
subjects in Italian, French and Spanish must be covert. In other languages such as English,
German, European Portuguese, Modern Greek, Bulgarian, Korean, Japanese and Chinese,
imperative subjects can be either covert or overt. In addition, in some languages, the
syntactic behavior of imperative subjects seems idiosyncratic compared to those in other
clause types in the language. For instance, neither English, German nor French allow empty
subjects except in imperatives.
In what follows, we rst provide an analysis for the optionality of imperative subjects in
English. We then provide an analysis of cross-linguistic variation in the syntactic status of
subjects in imperatives. According to our analysis, the apparently idiosyncratic syntactic
behavior of imperative subjects in some languages turns out to be predictable given the
syntax of the language as a whole.
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4.4.1 Optionality of Imperative Subjects in English
In English imperatives, subjects can be overt or covert. It is plausible to posit that the
empty subject in imperatives corresponds to the 2nd person pronoun, based on the wellknown and straightforward evidence from binding and tag-question formation in (211) and
(212).
(211) a.

Behave yourself/yourselves.

b. * Behave himself/myself/ourselves/themselves.
(212) a.

Be quiet. Will you?

b. * Be quiet. Will he/I/they/we?
But what kind of empty category is the covert 2nd person pronoun in imperatives? Is
it a trace of some kind, pro or PRO? Or is it some other kind of empty category that is
restricted to imperatives? According to Schmerling (1975), imperatives are a sentence type
in their own right, with certain formal properties peculiar to them, and the covert subject
in imperatives is the result of a special deletion rule that is not a subcase of any general
phenomenon of the language. Beukema and Coopmans (1989) claim that the covert subject
in imperatives is the wh-trace of an empty topic operator. Beukema (1992) and Potsdam (1997b) argue that it is pro. Platzack and Rosengren (1996) propose that imperatives
have no true syntactic subjects, but have a null actor argument in [Spec,VP] referred to as
imppro. Moreover, according to them, an overt 2nd person pronoun in imperatives is not
the overt realization of imppro, but is rather an addressee argument in the speci er of the
phrase that heads imppro. Platzack and Rosengren refer to the overt 2nd person pronoun
as an imperative pronoun and derives its overtness from pragmatic considerations.
The claim that the covert subject in imperatives is either the trace of an empty topic
operator or pro entails the unattractive conclusion that English allows these empty categories only in imperatives. Likewise, the claim that imperatives have imppro, which is not
a true syntactic subject, or that the covert subject in imperatives is the result of a special
subject deletion rule applying only to imperatives entails the unattractive conclusion that
English has a fourth empty category that occurs only in imperatives.
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4.4.2 Two Types of Imperatives
We propose that English allows both subjunctive type and in nitive type imperatives, and
further, that subjunctive type imperatives have overt subjects, whereas the in nitive type
imperatives have empty PRO subjects. Our analysis of English imperatives is supported by
the fact that in other languages both subjunctive and in nitive INFL are consistent with
directive interpretation, as we saw in x4.3. We emphasize that this does not mean that
the syntax of imperatives on the one hand, and subjunctives and in nitivals on the other
is identical. Rather, as discussed, the [directive] feature in the imperative operator drives
verb movement to C0 at LF, and the [irrealis] feature in the imperative operator selects
either the subjunctive or the in nitive INFL. In contrast, subjunctives and in nitivals have
an operator in C0 that only includes the [irrealis] feature, which does not drive movement
of the verb. We will see that the morphosyntactic di erence between imperatives and
subjunctives/in nitivals is re ected in the presence versus absence of do-support in negative
imperatives and negative subjunctives/in nitivals.

4.4.2.1 Subjunctive type imperatives
(Mandative) subjunctives occur as embedded clauses under directive verbs, such as require,
demand, insist, suggest, etc., as exempli ed in (213).
(213) a.

I demand that John nish the homework.

b.

I insisted that John stay.

c.

I suggested that she leave soon.

The obligatoriness and morphological form of the subject indicate that subjunctive INFL
assigns nominative case. Moreover, neither auxiliary nor lexical verbs undergo V-I movement in subjunctives. That is why auxiliary verbs must follow not and lexical verbs do not
require do-support in connection with negation.
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(214) a. * I suggest that you be not late.
b. * I insist that John be not invited to the party.
c. * I insisted that John do not stay.
d. * I demanded that she do not leave yet.
(215) a.

I suggest that you not be late.

b.

I insist that John not be invited to the party.

c.

I insisted that John not stay.

d.

I demanded that she not leave yet.

The syntax of imperatives with an overt subject is similar to that of subjunctives. In
these imperatives, auxiliary as well as lexical verbs are prohibited from undergoing V-I
movement. But the presence of [directive] in the imperative operator in C0 forces verb
movement to C0 at LF, requiring do-support for both auxiliary and lexical verbs with
negation.3
(216) a.

Don't you be late.

b.

Don't you leave yet.

c.

Don't anybody move.

Since the syntax of imperatives with an overt subject is similar to that of subjunctives, the
subject in imperatives is licensed in the way it is licensed in subjunctives: namely, INFL
assigns nominative case.4
According to Bobaljik (1995), do-support is triggered by a PF adjacency requirement between in ectional
morphology in INFL and the lexical verb in English. If we adopt this analysis, we can say that do-support
is required in negative imperatives because negation blocks the PF adjacency requirement between the
morphology in C0 and the lexical verb. Since both auxiliary and lexical verbs in imperatives stay in-situ,
negation blocks the adjacency requirement between the morphology in C0 and the verb for both types of
verbs. Thus, do-support is required for auxiliary as well as lexical verbs in negative imperatives.
4
We leave open the question of how our analysis of imperatives can be extended to account for the syntax
of let-constructions, such as in (217).
3

(217) a.
b.
c.

Let's go home.
Let us go see a movie.
Don't let's go see a movie.

For an account of the syntax of these constructions, see Davies (1986), Clark (1993a), and Potsdam (1997b).
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4.4.2.2 In nitive type imperatives
In nitivals occur as the complements of control verbs, such as promise, persuade, order,
etc.
(218) a.
b.

John promised to return the books.
John persuaded Mary to return the books.

These in nitivals have an empty PRO subject. Following Chomsky (1993), we take this
to mean that in nitive INFL assigns null case to PRO, thereby licensing it. In in nitivals,
as in subjunctives, neither auxiliary nor lexical verbs undergo V-I movement, as shown by
the fact that auxiliary verbs follow negation and lexical verbs with negation do not require
do-support.
(219) a.

John promised Mary to not be late.

b. * John promised Mary to be not late.
(220) a.

The commander ordered the sergeant to not move.

b. * The commander ordered the sergeant to do not move.
The syntax of imperatives with an empty subject is similar to the syntax of in nitivals, which is consistent with their both having an in nitive INFL. In these imperatives,
neither auxiliary nor lexical verbs undergo V-I movement. But as in the subjunctive type
imperatives, in in nitive type imperatives, the imperative operator in C0 includes [directive]
feature which forces verb movement to C0 at LF. Do-support is therefore required for both
auxiliary and lexical verbs with negation.
(221) a.

Don't be late.

b.

Do not move.

c.

Don't cause any trouble.

Since imperatives with an empty subject have in nitive INFL, the syntactic status of the
subject in these imperatives is PRO. Imperatives have future-oriented temporal interpretation: that is, the situation described by an imperative in general is not realized at the
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utterance time, but can be realized in the future. Given this future-oriented temporal interpretation, our proposal that the empty subject in imperatives is PRO is consistent with
Stowell's (1982) observation that in nitivals with PRO, as opposed to ones in raising or
ECM environments, have unrealized future-oriented interpretation.
The question now arises of how the reference of PRO is identi ed as 2nd person. In
the literature, the theory concerned with the reference of PRO is called control theory.
There are two di erent approaches to control theory. Under one approach, which we call
the modular approach, control theory is argued to be a separate module of the grammar
(Chomsky (1981), Lasnik (1992)). PRO is both pronominal and anaphoric, and it must
be ungoverned. PRO is controlled by (thereby coreferential with) the higher NP that ccommands it. A PRO that has no controller has arbitrary interpretation (indicated as hence
PRO ). Another approach, which we call the binding approach attempts to assimilate
control theory to binding theory (Bouchard (1984), Koster (1984), Borer (1989)). According
to this approach, there are two types of PRO, pronominal and anaphoric. Pronominal PRO
(that is, PRO ) refers freely, just like any pronoun, whereas anaphoric PRO must be
bound by its antecedent.
Under the modular approach, the absence of a syntactic controller of the empty subject
in imperatives wrongly predicts an interpretation as PRO . Under the binding approach,
PRO in imperatives is predicted to be pronominal, and so it should refer freely. However,
the reference of PRO is restricted to 2nd person, suggesting that PRO in imperatives is
anaphoric PRO.
We tackle this problem by extending the account in Bhatt and Izvorski (to appear) of
PRO to imperatives. Extending the analysis in Epstein (1984), Bhatt and Izvorski (to
appear) propose that PRO must be controlled by a generic implicit argument in the
immediately higher predicate . Otherwise, there is no PRO interpretation available. The
predicates in (222) have an implicit argument paraphrasable as for someone. This implicit
argument is interpreted generically because the entire sentence is generic. Hence, PRO
is licensed. The examples in (222), (223) and (224) are from Bhatt and Izvorski (to appear)
(B&I, for short).
arb

arb

arb

arb

arb

arb

arb

135

(222) a.

[PRO

arb

to walk alone at night] is dangerous. (B&I, 15a)

b.

[PRO

arb

writing haiku] is fun. (B&I, 21a)

c.

It is dicult [PRO

d.

Ships are sunk [PRO

arb

to dance the tango]. (B&I, 20b)

arb

to collect insurance]. (B&I, 28a)

In (223), either there is an explicit argument which is not generic, as in (223a,b), or the
implicit argument is not generic, as in (223c-e). Hence, PRO is not licensed.
arb

(223) a.

[PRO to walk alone at night] is dangerous for Elena . (B&I, 15b)
i

i

b.

It is dicult for Isabella [PRO to dance the tango]. (B&I, 24b)

c.

Yesterday, [PRO writing this poem] was fun. (B&I, 23a)

d.

Yesterday, [PRO to write haiku] on the grass was fun. (B&I, 22a)

e.

This ship was sunk [PRO to collect insurance]. (B&I, 30a)

i

i

In (224), the matrix predicates have no implicit argument, and so PRO cannot have an
arbitrary interpretation. Indeed, the sentences are ungrammatical altogether, due to the
lack of a controller for PRO.
(224) a. * It is certain [PRO to leave early]. (B&I, 26a)
b. * It is sure [PRO to eat ice cream]. (B&I, 26b)
c. * [PRO leaving early] is certain. (B&I, 27a)
d. * [PRO eating ice cream] is likely. (B&I, 27b)
Bhatt and Izvorski's analysis is semantic in nature in that it appeals to the interpretational property of the sentence in which PRO is licensed. They show that PRO is
licensed in generic sentences with a predicate that has implicit arguments. We propose to
extend the analysis given by Bhatt and Izvorski to the domain of imperatives by appealing
to the fact that the imperative operator has an implicit addressee argument, which is contributed by the meaning of the [directive] feature in the imperative operator. A sentence
with directive force must be aimed at an addressee. We discuss this issue further in the
next chapter when we discuss the interpretation of the imperative operator. For now, let us
arb
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arb

say simply that the imperative operator has an implicit addressee argument, which controls
the PRO subject, assigning 2nd person reference to it.
Once we appeal to the interpretational component to predict the correct reference for
PRO, we immediately realize that syntax plays a minimal role in control theory. This is
evident in cases where PRO and its antecedent are not structurally related, as in (225).
Such cases provide independent motivation for an appeal to the interpretational component
in determining the reference of PRO. Examples (225a-c) are from Bouchard (1984).
(225) a.

Tom felt embarrassed. [PRO pinching elephants] was a mistake.
i

i

b.

[PRO to nish his work on time] is important for a child's development.

c.

Mary thought I said that [PRO to see each other/ourselves] would be
dicult.

d.

[PRO to see a movie alone] is boring for John .

e.

[PRO talking to John] is hard for Mary .

i

i

i

j

i;j

i

i

i

i

Moreover, even the cases of obligatory control that are supposed to demonstrate the
syntactic character of control can be argued to involve some semantics.
(226) a.

The commander ordered the sergeant [PRO to leave].

b.

John promised his advisor [PRO to nish the paper].

c.

John persuaded Mary [PRO to nish the paper].

i

i

i

i

i

i

In (226), the controller of PRO happens to be present syntactically in each matrix clause,
and it happens to c-command PRO. But the way the reference of PRO is determined can be
given a semantic account: namely, the semantics of the higher predicate plays an important
role in determining the reference of PRO. In (226a), when the commander gives an order to
the sergeant, the sergeant is assumed to carry out the order, hence the reference of PRO is
the sergeant. In (226b), when John makes a promise with his advisor, John is assumed to
carry out the promise, hence PRO is coindexed with John. In (226c), when John persuades
Mary to do something, Mary is assumed to carry out the action that she has been persuaded
to do, hence PRO is coindexed with Mary.5
There have been attempts to appeal to the interpretational component to predict the correct antecedent
for PRO in cases of obligatory control. Lasnik (1988) shows that some instances of obligatory control in
5
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Our analysis of the assignment of 2nd person reference to PRO subjects in imperatives
implies that although the distribution of PRO is determined by the syntax (PRO is restricted
to the subject position of in nitival clauses), its interpretational content is determined by
the semantics of the sentence in which it occurs. Thus, the domain of control theory is more
abstract than previously thought, for all types of PRO.
To summarize, English imperatives are distinguished into two types: those with subjunctive INFL and those with in nitive INFL. Subjunctive type imperatives have an overt
subject because subjunctive INFL licenses nominative case, and in nitive type imperatives
have a PRO subject because in nitive INFL assigns null case. According to our analysis,
the apparent anomaly that imperatives are the only matrix clause type in English to allow
both overt and covert subjects follows straightforwardly from independently motivated facts
of the language.

4.4.3 Other Languages
Recall that there is cross-linguistic variation with respect to the syntactic status of subjects
in imperatives. We propose that the syntactic status of imperative subjects in a language
depends on what type of syntactic structure the language selects for the imperative.
German is similar to English in that imperatives are the only matrix context in which
subjects can be deleted.
English seem to require that the theta-roles of PRO and its antecedent be identical. He argues that the
matrix subject and the PRO subject of the in nitival complement of serve must both bear the instrument
role.
(227) a. The ice served [PRO to chill the beer].
b. * Edison served [PRO to invent the light bulb].
In the grammatical (227a), the matrix and the embedded subjects both bear the instrument role. In
contrast, (227b) is ruled out because the matrix subject bears the agent role, whereas the embedded subject
the instrument role. Lee and Kaiser (1994) argue that all instances of obligatory control in Korean require
both PRO and its antecedent to bear identical theta-roles. For instance, in (228), PRO can only be coindexed
with the matrix object because they have identical theta-roles (here, theme).
(228)

Korean
Jiho-kai Minho-lulj [PROi=j=k kukcang-ey ka-la-ko seltukha-yss-ta.
Jiho-Nom Minho-Acc PRO
theatre-Loc go-Comp persuaded
`Jiho persuaded Minho to go to the theatre.'
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(229) German
a.

Schreib
den Aufsatz!
write-2sg.Imp the paper
`Write the paper!'

b.

Schreib
du den Aufsatz!
write-2sg.Imp you the paper
`You write the paper!'

And just as in English, in German, in nitivals prohibit overt subjects, whereas subjunctives
require overt subjects.
(230) German
a.

Ich mochte [PRO den Aufsatz schreiben].
I want PRO the paper write-Inf
`I want to write the paper.'

b. * Ich mochte [ich den Aufsatz schreiben].
I want I the paper write-Inf
`I want to write the paper.'
(231) German
a.

Hans emp ehlt, [da du nicht zu spaet kommst].
Hans recommends that you not too late come-2sg.Subj
`Hans recommends that you not come too late.'

b. * Hans emp ehlt, [da pro nicht zu spaet kommst].
Hans recommends that pro not too late come-2sg.Subj
`Hans recommends that you not come too late.'
We extend the analysis for imperative subjects in English to German. That is, just as in
English, the imperative operator in German selects either the in nitive or the subjunctive
INFL. Selecting in nitive INFL requires a covert subject whose syntactic status is PRO,
whereas selecting subjunctive INFL requires an overt subject.6
Italian, French and Spanish do not allow an overt subject in imperatives. In French,
imperatives can have a disjunctive subject pronoun in the 2nd person: toi for singular, and
vous for plural, as shown in (232).
German di ers from English in having overt verb movement to C0 . It therefore requires no last resort
device similar to the English do-support for negative imperatives.
6
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(232) French
a.

Choisis
un numero, toi!
choose-2sg.Imp a number you-2sg.Disj
`Choose a number, you!'

b.

Vous,
choisissez
un numero!
you-2pl.Disj choose-2pl.Imp a number
You, choose a number!'

However, these disjunctive subject pronouns are not the structural subject of the imperative.7
This becomes clear when we consider other environments in which disjunctive subject pronouns can occur: immediately before the subject, immediately after the subject if the
subject is a noun, and at the end of the clause if the subject is a pronoun.
(233) French
a.

Moi, j'aime bien voyager, mais mon frere, lui, prefere rester a la
I-Disj I
like travel but my brother he-Disj prefers stay at the
maison.
house
`Personally I like traveling, but my brother prefers to stay at home.'

b.

Tu y vas souvent, toi?
you go there often, you-Disj
`Do you go there often?'

Just as in (233), disjunctive subject pronouns in imperatives occur either in the beginning
or the end of the clause, and they express emphasis.
In nitivals in French, Italian and Spanish cannot have an overt subject. We illustrate
this point with examples from French.8
(234) French
a.

Jean veut PRO/*il gagner.
Jean wants PRO/*he win-Inf
`Jean wants to win.'

In contrast to conjunctive pronouns which are clitics on the verb, disjunctive pronouns are separated
from the verb.
8
French, Italian and Spanish do not have ECM constructions. Thus, in nitivals in these languages can
only have a PRO subject.
7
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b.

Jean lui a ordonne de PRO/*elle chanter.
Jean her has order to PRO/*she sing-Inf
`Jean ordered her to sing.'

We therefore propose that imperatives in French, Italian, and Spanish have the syntactic
structure of in nitivals. They have in nitive INFL, and so only PRO is licensed, whose
reference is determined by the interpretational property of the imperative operator, as
argued in the previous section.
European Portuguese allows imperatives to have an overt subject, as shown in (235).
(235) European Portuguese
a.

Lava
(tu) os pratos!
wash-2sg.Imp you-sg the plates
`(You sg.) wash the dishes!'

b.

Lavai
(vos) os pratos!
wash-2pl.Imp you-pl the plates
`(You pl.) wash the dishes!'

Some in nitivals in European Portuguese can be in ected, and these in ected in nitivals
can have an overt subject, as discussed by Raposo (1987). It turns out that directive verbs
such as mandar `order' can take in ected in nitival complements and as expected, they can
have either an overt or a covert subject, as in (236).
(236) European Portuguese
Eu mandei lavarem
(eles) os pratos.
I ordered wash-3pl.Inf (they) the plates
`I ordered them to wash the plates.'
If we assume that imperatives in European Portuguese have the syntactic structure of
in nitivals of the in ected kind, the availability of overt subjects, as in (235), is exactly
what we predict.
In Balkan languages such as Modern Greek, Bulgarian, and Serbo-Croatian, imperative
subjects can be either covert or overt.
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(237)

Modern Greek
Grapse
(esi)!
write-2sg.Imp you
`You write!'

As is well-known, the Balkan languages do not have in nitives. The closest constructions
to in nitivals in these languages are subjunctives, and the subjects of subjunctives in these
languages can be either overt or covert. We illustrate this point with examples from Modern
Greek in (239). In particular, when the subject of the complement subjunctive clause is coindexed with the indirect object of the matrix clause, as in (239b), the complement subject
is usually covert, in which case it has been argued to be pro (Philippaki-Warburton (1987),
Iatridou (1993), Varlokosta and Hornstein (1993)). But it can be overt for emphasis or
contrastiveness.9
(239) Modern Greek
a.

O Yannis protine na grapsi
(afti).
the Yannis proposed NA write-3sg.Subj she
`Yannis proposed that she write.'

b.

O Yannis se dietakse na grapsis
(esi).
the Yannis you order NA write-2sg.Subj you
`Yannis order you to write.'

We propose that imperatives in the Balkan languages have subjunctive INFL. Thus, the
imperative subject is optional, and the syntactic status of the covert subject is pro. In nitive
There are other types of subjunctive clauses in Modern Greek in which the subject must be covert, as
shown in (238).
9

(238) Modern Greek
a. Ton vlepo ec na tiganizi
psaria.
him see ec NA fry-3sg.Subj sh
`I see him fry sh.'
b. Ksero ec na kolimbao.
know ec NA swim-1sg.Subj
`I know how to swim.'
The syntactic status of the covert subject in these types of subjunctives is disputed. Iatridou (1993) and
Varlokosta and Hornstein (1993) argue that it is PRO, whereas Philippaki-Warburton (1987) argues that it
is pro.
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type imperatives are impossible in these languages due to the absence of in nitival clauses
in general.
In Korean, subjects in imperatives can be either covert or overt.
(240) Korean
a.

(ne-ka) pang-ul chengsoha-yla!
you-Nom room-Acc clean-Imp
`(You) clean the room!'

b.

Chelswu-ya, (ne-ka) pang-ul chengsoha-yla!
Chelswu-Voc you-Nom room-Acc clean-Imp
`Chelswu, (you) clean the room!'

One might think that the 2nd person pronoun in (240a) is a vocative subject not structurally
related to the imperative. However, we can see that it is the structural subject of the
imperative because it has a nominative case marker. In Korean, vocative subjects, marked
with -ya, can co-occur with an overt or a covert subject in imperatives, as shown in (240b).
Accordingly, we cannot claim that Korean imperatives have the syntactic structure of
subjunctives, or that of either subjunctives or in nitivals, because Korean does not have a
mood category that corresponds to the subjunctive of Indo-European languages. However,
Korean does have several types of embedded clauses that cannot have a tensed verb. We
take these clauses to correspond to the in nitivals of the other languages that we have
discussed. What is relevant is that the in nitivals in Korean allow both overt and covert
subjects, as in (241) (Heycock and Lee (1989)).
(241) Korean
a.

[salamtul-i/PRO cakicasin-ul cimyunghanun-kes-un] elyep-ta.
people-Nom/PRO oneself-Acc nominate-fact-Top dicult-Pres.Decl
`To nominate oneself is dicult.'

b.

na-nun [John-i
party-ey ka-tolok] pro seltukhayessta.
I-Top John-Nom party-to go-as-to pro persuade-Past.Decl
`I persuaded John to go to the party.'
j

j

j

c.

j

na-nun [PRO party-ey ka-tolok] John-ul seltukhayessta.
I-Top PRO party-to go-as-to John-Acc persuade-Past.Decl
`I persuaded John to go to the party.'
j

j

j

j
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We claim that imperatives have the syntactic structure of in nitivals in Korean and that
they allow both covert and overt subjects because in nitivals in Korean allow both options.
The facts of Japanese are similar to those of Korean. In Japanese, the imperative
subject can be either overt or covert. When an imperative has an overt subject, it takes a
nominative case marker. Further, the nominative case marked subject in imperatives can be
preceded by a vocative noun phrase. Thus, the overt subject is truly the structural subject
of the imperative.
(242) Japanese
a.

(omae-ga) tabe-ro!
you-Nom eat-Imp
`(You) eat!'

b.

Nobo-yo, omae-ga tabe-ro!
Nobo-Voc, you-Nom eat-Imp
`Nobo, you eat!'

As in Korean, the subject of Japanese in nitivals can be overt or covert, as in (243)
(Heycock and Lee (1989)).
(243) Japanese
a.

watasi-wa [otooto-ga uti-e kaette-kite] hosi-i.
I-Top
brother-Nom home-to return
want-Pres
`I want my brother to go back home.'

b.

watasi-wa [PRO uti-e kaette-kite] hosi-i.
I-Top
PRO home-to return
want-Pres
`I want to go back home.'

If Japanese imperatives have the syntactic structure of in nitivals, then we expect them to
allow overt as well as covert subjects, just as in in nitivals.10
10

Contrary to Korean (see x4.2.1), Japanese apparently allows embedded imperatives.

(244) Japanese
a. syouko-o
inmetu-siro!
evidence-Acc destroy-Imp
`Destroy the evidence!'
b. Akira-wa Takasi-ni syouko-o
inmetu-siro-to
meireisita.
Akira-Top Takasi-Dat evidence-Acc destroy-Imp-Comp ordered
`Akira ordered Takasi to destroy the evidence.'
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In Chinese, it is a bit dicult to determine whether imperatives exist as a grammatical
category because Chinese has no mood/tense morphology on the verb. Sentences are formed
with a bare verb form and it can be assertions with present or past temporal interpretation
or commands, depending on the context.
(246)

Chinese
N zou.
you walk
`You walked.'
`You are walking.'
`You walk!'

However, facts from negation provide evidence that Chinese does have the imperative as a
grammatical category. When the negative marker bie occurs in a matrix clause, it can only
take 2nd person subject pronoun (which can be covert) and the sentence can only have a
directive function. This is illustrated in (248).11
(245) Japanese
a. tabe-runa!
eat-not.Imp
`Don't eat!'
b. Akira-wa Takasi-ni tabe-runa-to
meireisita.
Akira-Top Takasi-Dat eat-not.Imp-Comp ordered
`Akira ordered Takasi to not eat.'
In (244) and (245), the endings on matrix and embedded verbs are identical. Thus, Japanese seems to pose
a counterexample to the generalization that imperatives cannot be embedded. One possibility of preserving
the generalization is to say that [directive] feature in the imperative operator is not marked with distinctive
morphology in Japanese. That is, the imperative operator with both [directive] and [irrealis] features and
the operator with only [irrealis] feature are instantiated with the same morphology on the verb. Further
study on Japanese verbal morphology is required in order to evaluate this proposal.
11
When bie occurs in an embedded clause, it can only occur if the matrix predicate is a directive predicate,
as in (247).
(247) Chinese
a. ta mngling wo bie da lanqiu.
3sg order I not play basketball
`S/he ordered me not to play basketball.'
b. * wo zhdao ta bie chu guo.
I know 3sg not exit country
`I know that s/he did not leave the country.'
It looks like bie requires a licenser: it is licensed either by [directive] feature in the imperative operator or
a directive predicate. Thus, when bie occurs in a matrix context, it is licensed by [directive] feature in the
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(248) Chinese
a.

(ni) bie da ren!
you don't hit person
`(You) don't hit anyone!'

b.

(ni) bie dong!
you don't move
`(You) don't move!'

c. * ta bie du.
3sg don't gamble
`He shouldn't gamble.'
According to our informants, the presence/absence of an overt subject makes no di erence
in meaning in the sentences in (248). That is, the sentences with an overt subject are no
more emphatic than the ones with a covert subject. Moreover, the overt subject ni is not a
vocative subject. A vocative subject in Chinese is followed by a pause. But in the sentences
in (248), when ni is present, it is not necessarily followed by a pause, indicating that it is a
structural subject of the sentences in which it occurs.
As mentioned earlier, Chinese does not have tense morphology. A bare verb form is used
for both present and past temporal interpretation. Moreover, Chinese freely allows covert
subjects in other sentence types, as in (249). If we take the absence of tense morphology to
mean that the clause is in nitival, then all Chinese sentences are in nitivals, and they all
allow covert subjects.
(249) Chinese
a.

(wo) xhuan ch pngguo.
I like eat apple
`I like to eat apples.'
`I liked to eat apples.'

b.

(ni) qu?
you go
`Are you going?'
`Did you go?'

imperative operator and so it can only take a 2nd person pronominal subject and the sentence in which it
occurs can only have a directive function. On the other hand, when bie occurs in an embedded context, it
is licensed by a directive predicate in the matrix clause and since embedded clauses do not have directive
illocutionary force, it can occur with a 3rd person subject.
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Imperatives are no di erent. As in nitivals, they allow covert subjects just like any other
sentence type in Chinese.
In summary, we have argued that the syntactic behavior of the imperative subject is
predictable, and that it depends on what type of syntactic structure the language selects for
the imperative. The subjects of in nitive type and subjunctive type imperatives behave like
the subjects of other in nitival and subjunctive clauses, respectively, for a given language.
Table 4.2 summarizes this section, clearly showing that the value for the imperative subject
in a given language is identical to the value for the subject of the clause type selected by
the imperative of that language.

English,
German
French
Italian,
Spanish
European
Portuguese
Modern Greek,
Bulgarian,
Serbo-Croatian
Korean,
Japanese,
Chinese

Imperative
subject
overt, empty

Imperative
syntax
subjunctive,
in nitival
in nitive
in nitive

In nitival
subject
empty

Subjunctive
subject
overt

empty
empty

overt
overt, empty

overt, empty

overt, empty

overt, empty

in nitive
(in ected)
subjunctive

|

overt, empty

overt, empty

in nitive

overt, empty

|

empty
empty
overt, empty

Table 4.2: Subjects and syntactic structure of imperatives

4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we argued that the imperative operator includes the features [directive]
and [irrealis], whereas the subjunctive and in nitival operators include the feature [irrealis].
Based on this proposal, we explained why languages select subjunctives or in nitivals in
linguistic contexts where imperatives are ruled out or are not available, and we showed
that while the [directive] feature encodes directive force in imperatives, subjunctives and
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in nitivals generate directive force through pragmatic inference. We argued that the syntactic status of the empty subject in imperatives in English is PRO, and that its reference
is determined by the interpretational property of the imperative operator. We discussed
the interpretational content of PRO in obligatory control constructions that are standardly
assumed to show that control is mainly a syntactic phenomenon, and we suggested that
even here the interpretational component plays an important role in determining the reference of PRO. The proposed analysis implies that the domain of Control Theory, which
predicts the reference of PRO, is more abstract than previously thought. Finally, we identied the source of cross-linguistic variation in the syntactic behavior of imperative subjects
as the type of syntactic structure that a language selects for the imperative. Depending
on whether a language selects the in nitive or the subjunctive type, the imperative subject
behaves like the subject of an in nitival or subjunctive in the language in question. In sum,
our analysis captures the close relation among imperatives, in nitivals and subjunctives
that exists across languages, and it accounts for the syntactic behavior of the imperative
subject in a given language in a predictable way.
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Chapter 5

Interpreting Imperatives: the
Contribution of Mood and Force
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we present a way of interpreting imperatives based on the conclusions we
have reached about their syntax. We have argued that while subjunctives and in nitivals
have a subjunctive/in nitive operator in C0 that includes only the [irrealis] feature, imperatives have an imperative operator in C0 whose feature contents include both [irrealis]
and [directive]. We have also argued that [irrealis] selects subjunctive or in nitive INFL
and contributes the unrealized interpretation, and that [directive] drives verb movement
to C0 either before Spell-Out or at LF (depending on the language) and encodes directive
illocutionary force. Given the semantic principle of compositionality, according to which
the meaning of a whole is a function of the meaning of its parts, our syntactic analysis of
imperatives implies that both the semantics of the propositional type for subjunctives or
in nitivals and the semantics of directive force contribute in deriving the interpretation of
imperatives.
According to our analysis, the directive force of imperatives is not the result of Gricean
reasoning or inference, but is directly encoded in their logical form. We propose that the
directive force of imperatives turns the sentence into a directive action, which we in
turn de ne as an instruction to the hearer to update his/her plan set. A plan set is a set
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of propositions that specify the hearer's intentions, and it represents the state of a airs that
the hearer intends to bring about. We will show that these de nitions yield quite interesting
linguistic results.
This chapter is organized as follows. In x5.2, we propose that the logical form of imperatives contains two components: one component encodes directive force, and the other
encodes modality that contributes unrealized interpretation. We also propose a way of interpreting the two components. In x5.3, we discuss some of the consequences of the proposed
analysis. In x5.4, we investigate the interpretational behavior of imperatives in discourse
and explore how the modality in imperatives allows modal subordination of subsequent
modal sentences.

5.2 Logical Form of Imperatives
5.2.1 Force in the Logical Form
Although Frege viewed truth as the key concept of the theory of meaning, he was also aware
that understanding the meaning of a sentence involves more than just knowing its truth
conditions (Frege (1960)). Frege asserted that a sentence is a complex of two components:
a component that expresses its thought (sense), and a component that expresses its force,
where to know the sense of a sentence is to know under what conditions it is true, and to
know the force of a sentence is to know the conventions of its use in discourse. According to
Frege, there are linguistic expressions which serve as force-indicators of a sentence, playing
the part of an assertion sign, a question sign, or a command sign. Thus, in addition to the
signs for sentential operators such as negation and conjunction that contribute to the sense
of the sentence, he proposed that signs for force-indicating expressions are also necessary.
Lewis (1976) expresses a similar opinion. According to Lewis (1976), a sentence should
be divided into two components: the sentence radical and the mood. The sentence radical
speci es a state of a airs, and the mood determines whether the speaker is declaring that
the state of a airs holds, commanding that it hold, or asking whether it holds. Lewis's
use of the term `mood' corresponds to our use of `force.' Lewis represents a sentence as in
(250). S is the category for sentence radicals, and the Mood category can be instantiated
by either declarative (dec), imperative (imp) or interrogative (int). Thus, force-indicating
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symbols are part of the syntax of a sentence.
(250)

Sentence
Mood
fdec,

S

imp, intg

According to Lewis, sentence radicals have truth-values as extensions, and functions from
possible worlds to truth-values as intensions. The entire apparatus of model-theoretic semantics pertains to sentence radicals and constituents thereof. The semantics of mood is
something entirely di erent. It interacts with rules of language use in discourse.
We believe that the syntax of imperatives across languages indeed shows that the imperative directly encodes the information that it has directive force. We have identi ed this
information as a morphosyntactic feature [directive] included in the imperative operator located in C0 . We have also argued that the imperative operator includes an [irrealis] feature
which selects subjunctive or in nitive INFL. The feature [irrealis] encodes modality which
contributes unrealized interpretation. Based on the syntactic information, we can represent
the logical form of imperatives as in (251). This logical form is the output of syntax and
serves as the input to interpretation.
(251)

Logical form of imperatives:
directive(irrealis(p))

In this logical form, directive corresponds to the force-indicator of Frege and Lewis, and
irrealis(p) corresponds to the sentence radical that expresses the sense and intension of
Frege and Lewis. We can say that irrealis(p) denotes a set of hypothetical possible worlds
in which p is satis ed. Further, the speaker is agnostic as to whether the real world is
included in this set of possible worlds. In other words, as far as the speaker is concerned, it
is possible for the real world to be included in this set but s/he does not know whether it is.
In general, the set of possible worlds denoted by irrealis(p) is restricted to future-oriented
possible worlds due to the meaning of directive. The interpretation of directive will be
discussed in x5.2.2.
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Our proposal for the logical form of imperatives di ers from the approach that imperatives merely denote a certain type of proposition. Bolinger (1977) argues that imperatives
are a type of bare in nitival that denotes hypothetical situations. Huntley (1984) and
Davies (1986) argue that imperatives denote propositions that specify potential situations.
Wilson and Sperber (1988) argue that imperatives denote propositions that specify possible
and desirable situations, where the situation is either desirable to the speaker or the hearer.
According to all these studies, the directive illocutionary force expressed by imperatives
is the result of pragmatic reasoning and inference based on discourse contexts. However,
if imperatives simply denote a certain type of proposition, the fact that they cannot be
embedded remains mysterious (recall x4.2.1). Our approach provides a straightforward explanation for this fact: the logical form of imperatives includes an operator that expresses
directive illocutionary force, and since embedded clauses do not express illocutionary forces,
imperatives cannot be embedded. Moreover, under the pragmatic approach, it is unclear
why so many languages have special morphosyntactic forms for the expression of directives.
Under our approach, imperatives are grammatically speci ed to express directive force,
whereas reasoning and inference play a role in explaining the variability of directive forces
that can be expressed by imperatives.

5.2.2 Speech Acts
Now we need to de ne what directive means. In e ect, directive is responsible for expressing
directive force, thereby making a sentence into a directive speech act such as commanding,
ordering, and requesting. As rst articulated in detail in Austin (1962) and systematically
explored in Searle (1969, 1976), sentences are not used just to say things, but rather actively
to do things. The action performed by uttering a sentence is called a speech act. In
so-called performative sentences, the act being performed is explicitly expressed in the
matrix clause: for instance, I hereby christen this ship the H.M.S. Flounder, I declare war
on Zanzibar, and I apologize perform christening, declaring and apologizing, respectively.
Declaratives canonically perform the speech act of assertion, interrogatives, the speech act
of request for information, and imperatives, the speech act of directive. Sentences also
perform indirect speech acts, where a sentence performs a speech act that is not canonically
152

associated with it. For instance, a declarative Your services are no longer needed here can
perform the act of ring someone, and a rhetorical question Who has Sam ever liked? can
express the assertion Sam has never liked anyone.
Since Austin (1962) and Searle (1969), there have been many works on speech act theory
from the linguistic and computational perspectives. Some of the early works on speech
act theory in linguistics pursued the performative hypothesis, according to which all
sentences can be reduced to performatives (Ross (1970), Sadock (1974)). That is, every
sentence has a higher performative clause in its underlying structure, where the subject of
this clause is rst person singular, the indirect object second person singular, and the verb
is drawn from a delimited set of performative verbs and is in the indicative active simple
present tense form. For instance, the underlying structures of imperatives, interrogatives
and declaratives contain the higher performative clause I order you, I ask you, and I assert
to you, respectively. The claim is that after a certain number of transformations, the
correct surface forms for imperatives, interrogatives and declaratives are derived. Such a
performative analysis implies that no special theory of illocutionary force and speech acts
is needed because illocutionary force is fully speci ed by the meaning of the performative
clause itself. However, many problems with the performative analysis have surfaced, leading
to the conclusion that it is not feasible. For instance, according to the performative analysis,
a declarative sentence and the corresponding performative sentence should have the same
truth-conditions. But our intuition says otherwise. While the sentence in (252a) is true by
virtue of the fact that the speaker has uttered it, the sentence in (252b) is simply false.
(252) a.
b.

I hereby assert to you that the world is at.
The world is at.

Another problem comes from adverb placement: for instance, certain adverbs can occur
in performative sentence, but not in the corresponding imperative, as in (253). Moreover,
the imperative and the corresponding performative sentence modi ed by an adverb do not
mean the same thing, as in (254). In (254a), the adverb frankly is modifying the verb order.
But in (254b), it is not clear what frankly is modifying.
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(253) a.

I hereby order you to polish your boots.

b. * Hereby, polish your boots
(254) a.

I frankly order you to go home.

b. ? Frankly, go home.
If an imperative and the corresponding performative sentence have the same D-structure,
and so the same meaning, we would not expect such asymmetries. A way of handling these
problems is to stipulate that covert performative clauses are not visible for truth-conditional
purposes and adverbial modi cation. But then acknowledging that sentences with covert
performative clauses di er from sentences with overt performative clauses is the same as
acknowledging a theory of illocutionary force which cannot be reduced to anything else.
Other works on speech act theory start from the assumption that illocutionary force is
an aspect of meaning that cannot be reduced to matters of truth conditions. According to
this approach, all utterances not only serve to express propositions, which are subject to
truth-conditional semantics, but also express a certain illocutionary force, thereby performing certain actions called speech acts. The proper characterization of illocutionary force is
provided by specifying the set of felicity conditions for each force. These felicity conditions
specify under what conditions a certain illocutionary force can be achieved. This approach
entails that the theory of illocutionary force and speech acts belongs in the realm of pragmatics and not in truth-conditional semantics. Many recent works on speech act theory in
computational linguistics start with the assumption that utterances are actions and provide
a model of the way hearers infer speaker's intention and respond accordingly from observing
the speaker's speech acts (Allen (1983), Cohen and Levesque (1992)).

5.2.3 Interpreting Directive Action
We take the position that traditional truth-conditional semantics cannot be expressive
enough to model the meaning of illocutionary force and the corresponding speech act. But
here, rather than de ning illocutionary force and the corresponding speech act in terms
of felicity conditions under which they can be appropriately used, our goal is to suggest a
more direct way to interpret them, from which the felicity conditions are made to follow.
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Our main concern is to interpret the notions `directive force' and `directive action.' But
once we do this, a similar approach should be extendible to interpreting the question force
of interrogatives and the assertive force of declaratives.
We believe that an appropriate way of de ning `directive action' is to use the concept
of instruction. We propose that by performing a directive action, the speaker instructs
the hearer to update a particular module which we call the plan set. A hearer's plan
set is a set of propositions that speci es his/her intentions which represents the state of
a airs the hearer intends to bring about. Thus, an imperative, directive(irrealis(p)), is
an instruction to the hearer to add p to his/her plan set. The notion of plan presupposes
that the planner has the ability to carry out the plan. In imperatives, since the speaker is
instructing the hearer to update the plan set, the hearer is, in e ect, the planner. Hence,
issuing this instruction implies that the speaker believes that the hearer has the ability to
bring about p. If the hearer updates the plan set with p, then the hearer intends to bring
about the situation described by p. Moreover, a plan is a future-oriented notion: if you
are planning to bring about the situation described by p, then the situation is not realized
at the time that p is planned and it can be realized in the future. Thus, it makes sense
for directive to take irrealis(p) as its argument because the future-orientation of directive
is compatible with the unrealized interpretation contributed by irrealis. Further, if the
speaker tells the hearer to plan to bring about the situation described by p, the implication
is that the speaker wants the situation described by p to be brought about.

5.2.4 Variability in the Illocutionary Force of Imperatives
Given our de nition of directive force and directive action, an imperative canonically expresses such directives as order, command, or request.
(255) Order, command
a.

Stand at ease! (a commander in the army to his soldiers)

b.

Take down this poem. (a teacher to her class)

c.

Clean that mess up at once! (a mother to her child)
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(256) Request
a.

Please bring me some water.

b.

Open the window, would you please?

But imperatives can also express illocutionary forces that do not seem to be straightforwardly directives, such as permissions, wishes, threats and dares. For instance, in a
context in which someone knocks on your door and you reply by uttering Come in, you are
not usually ordering or requesting the knocker to come in, but rather giving him/her the
permission to do so.
Sentences in general can be used to perform indirect speech acts. For instance,
although interrogatives canonically perform the speech act of requesting information, they
can also perform the indirect speech act of requesting action. For instance, Can you open
the window? has the literal force of a question requesting information as to whether the
hearer has the ability to open the window, but it can also have an indirect force of a request
to open the window. We argue that imperatives, just like other sentence types, can also be
used to perform indirect speech acts, and we adopt the approach that sentences can be used
this way by virtue of conversational implicatures arising from Gricean inference in certain
discourse contexts (see Gordon and Lako (1971), Grice (1975), Searle (1975)). Since the
description of the inference process is beyond the scope of this work, here we can only make
brief and informal remarks.
In a context in which a person A has expressed the desire and intention to perform p,
the implication is that A already has p in her plan set. For instance, if A knocks on your
door, then A is expressing her desire and intention to come in. That is, by knocking on
your door, A is implying that her plan is to come in. By uttering Come in! in this context,
you are acknowledging A's plan, rather than instructing A to update her plan set. It may
be that if an imperative directive(irrealis(p)) is uttered in a context in which it is already
known that the hearer has p in the plan set, then it performs the speech act of permission
as an indirect speech act.
An imperative such as Have a nice day! expresses a wish in general. A person does
not usually have a control over having a nice day. She may have the desire and intention
of having a nice day, but bringing about this state of a airs is not completely up to her.
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It will depend on events that are not always under her control. For instance, she may
be hit by a cyclist and fall, thereby her day is ruined. It may be that an imperative
directive(irrealis(p)) can be used to perform the speech act of wishing as an indirect
speech act if it is known that the hearer does not have control over realizing p.
Imperatives that have the force of threats or dares express the opposite of what they
literally mean. For instance, the second imperative in the sequence Go ahead. Hit me.
Then you'll be sorry! is actually expressing that the speaker is warning the hearer not to
hit him/her. This is not speci c to imperatives. Declaratives can also express the opposite
of their literal meaning when they are used ironically or sarcastically. In (257), what B is
actually saying is that Clinton is not smart.
(257) a.
b.

A: Clinton messed up again.
B: Yeah, he is really smart. (sarcastic)

Imperatives that express threats and dares are comparable to declaratives that express irony
and sarcasm. Just as we would not want to complicate the literal meaning of declaratives to
handle uses as in (257b), we would not want to complicate the literal meaning of imperatives
to handle the former. Instead, they should be handled by Gricean reasoning and inference.

5.2.5 Extension to Declaratives and Interrogatives
It is dicult to determine whether declaratives explicitly mark assertive force in the syntax
or whether the force is the result of pragmatic inference. This is because the morphosyntax
of declaratives in matrix contexts is identical to that of reported assertions in embedded
contexts. For instance, (258a) and the embedded clause in (258b) have the same word order
and verbal morphology.
(258) a.
b.

The world is at.
The king believes that the world is at.

However, whether or not assertive force of a declarative is encoded in its logical form, we
need to de ne what assertive force means. By analogy to the way we have de ned directive
force, an assertive force of a declarative can be de ned as an instruction to the hearer to
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update his/her belief set with the proposition expressed by the declarative. A belief set
of a hearer is a set of propositions that represents what is believed to be true.
What about interrogatives? At least in English, interrogatives in matrix context exhibit
subject-verb inversion, whereas indirect questions in an embedded context do not. This may
be an indication of the presence/absence of a question force-indicating operator in syntax.
There are also other facts that indicate the presence of a force-indicating operator in matrix
interrogatives. As pointed out in x2.9, a negative yes-no question in which both the negation
and the verb are in C0 as a unit and a negative yes-no question in which the negation is
lower in the clause have di erent interpretational e ects, although they both denote the
same partition in which one block represents the positive answer p and the other block
represents the negative answer :p, assuming the semantics of questions in Groenendijk and
Stokhof (1985). The intuition is that the former implies that the speaker is asking whether
p holds, and the latter implies that the speaker is asking whether :p holds. For instance,
the question in (100) (repeated here as (259a)) asks whether John is intelligent and the
question in (102) (repeated here as (259b)) asks whether John is not intelligent.
(259) a.
b.

Isn't John intelligent?
Is John not intelligent?

If we posit the presence of an interrogative operator in C0 that encodes question force,
we may have a partial explanation as to the interpretational asymmetry between (259a)
and (259b). We can say that even though the two questions denote the same thing truthconditionally, they have di erent implications due to the di erence in the way negation
and the interrogative operator interact depending on where the negation is located with
respect to the interrogative operator. That is, when negation ends up in C0 , where the
interrogative operator is, the negation interacts with the interrogative operator to generate
the interpretational e ects described above. On the other hand, when negation is lower in
the clause in interrogatives, it does not interact with the interrogative operator in C0 , and
these interpretational e ects are absent. However, further study is required to determine
the exact nature of the interaction between negation and the interrogative operator and its
e ects on interpretation.
158

Without further argument, we assume that interrogatives have an interrogative operator
that encodes question force in the syntax, and we de ne question force in terms of the
instruction concept. As in Groenendijk and Stokhof (1985), we assume that a question `p?'
denotes a partition that represents the set of possible answers: namely the positive answer
p and the negative answer :p. Given this, simplifying matters a bit, we suggest that the
question force is an instruction to the hearer to retrieve the proposition that represents the
true answer (based on her beliefs about the state of a airs) from the partition and plan to
notify the speaker of the proposition that has been retrieved. Thus, if p is retrieved from
the partition, then the hearer is instructed to update his/her plan set with a proposition
I tell the speaker p. More on the illocutionary force of interrogatives will be presented in
Chapter 6 where we discuss interpretation of rhetorical questions.

5.3 Consequences
5.3.1 Issuer of the Directive
The meaning of directive force in the logical form of imperatives encodes that it is the
speaker who issues the directive. The prediction is that as a reply to an imperative, a
question as to who issued the directive should never come up. But the felicity of the
interaction in (260) seems to contradict this prediction.
(260) a.
b.

A: Leave!
B: Who says so?

On a closer look, what B is asking is not who issued the directive, but who is responsible
for A's issuing the directive. B may also be asking whether the speaker has the authority
to issue the directive. The question in (260b) has these interpretations exactly because the
imperative operator encodes that the speaker issues the directive.1
The original issuer of a directive expressed by an imperative may not be the speaker. For instance, in
a military context, a lieutenant can issue an order in the form of an imperative which was originally issued
by a colonel. Although the lieutenant, who is the speaker, is not the original issuer of the order, s/he is still
the issuer of the order. Moreover, in a palace, assume that a chancellor says to you Bow down! The emperor
demands it. Here, the original issuer of the order is the emperor. But the chancellor is still issuing an order
by way of transmitting the emperor's order.
1
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5.3.2 Target of the Directive
In imperatives, the speaker issues the directive to an addressee (or addressees). This is
clearly so in cases where imperatives have overt 2nd person subjects, or empty subjects
that are understood to be 2nd person. An apparent counterexample to this generalization
is the fact that imperatives can have 3rd person subject NPs in English.
(261) a.

Nobody move.

b.

Everybody get out as quick as he/you can.

c.

Somebody pay the bill.

d.

The boy in the corner stand up.

However, on a closer look, as pointed out by Stockwell et al. (1973), even in the imperatives
in (261), the subject referent is in some sense being addressed by the speaker. Evidence
that the subjects in imperatives are being addressed by the speaker comes from examples
like the following. The examples in (262) show that the subject in the tag question must be
in the 2nd person, even though the subject in the preceding imperative is in the 3rd person.
The examples in (263) show that the 3rd person subjects of imperatives are anaphorically
related to a 2nd person pronoun in the subsequent sentences.
(262) a. * The boy in the corner stand up, will he?
b.
(263) a.
b.

The boy in the corner stand up, will you?
Nobody move. I am begging you /*him /*them .
i

i

i

i

Somebody pay the bill. I am begging you /*him /*them .
i

i

i

i

This property is captured by the proposal that the directive force encodes the information
that the speaker issues the directive to the addressee.

5.3.3 Future Orientation
Imperatives in general have future orientation. This can be shown by the fact that imperatives are compatible with future oriented adverbials, but not with past oriented adverbials.
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(264) a.

Finish your homework tomorrow.

b. * Finish your homework yesterday.
In addition, even adverbs that are not necessarily future-oriented can only be future-oriented
in imperatives. For instance, now and tonight can occur in linguistic contexts that are not
future-oriented, as shown in (265). In fact, tonight can even be past-oriented, as in (265b).
(265) a.
b.

John is eating now.
John nished his homework tonight.

But when now and tonight occur in imperatives, they can only be future-oriented. In
particular, now in (267) means something similar to from now on.
(266) a.
b.
(267) a.
b.

Behave yourself when the guests arrive tonight.
Finish your homework tonight.
Behave yourself now.
Finish your homework now.

Moreover, as observed by Katz and Postal (1964), tag questions that follow imperatives are most natural with auxiliary will, providing a support for future orientation of
imperatives.
(268) a.
b.

Behave yourself, will you?
Behave yourself, won't you?

Bolinger (1977) argues that auxiliary will in tags following imperatives does not refer to
futurity, but rather to willingness, and that the tag will you is paraphrasable as are you
willing to. Even so, if you are willing to do p, you do p in the future. Hence, the futurity
of will remains.
The future orientation of imperatives is captured by our proposal that the logical form
of imperatives encodes future-orientation. That is, in directive(irrealis(p)), the meaning
of directive encodes future-orientation, thereby restricting the denotation of (irrealis(p))
to the set of future-oriented possible worlds.
Imperatives, however, can also refer to the present, as noted by Bolinger (1977).
161

(269) a.
b.

Please, be thinking about me.
(Holding a lottery ticket, a person utters the following imperative)
Please be the right number.

Bolinger also claims that imperatives can refer to past events and provides the examples in
(270) as supporting evidence.
(270) a.
b.

Don't have three-fourths of the whiskey drunk already.
Please, do have made that call by six o' clock.

However, these examples actually refer to the present state as indicated by the use of present
perfect. Imperatives can refer to the present when they express the speaker's wish. The
examples in (269) and (270) express the speaker's wish concerning the present, and they
can be felicitously used only if the speaker does not know whether the situation described
by the imperative has been realized or not. We have already pointed out that imperatives
can be used to express a wish as an indirect speech act. In this case, the denotation of
(irrealis(p)) is not restricted to the set of future-oriented possible worlds. It can denote a
set of possible worlds that describe what the current state might be like.

5.3.4 Negation and Directive Force
The directive force contributed by the imperative operator cannot be negated. In a negative
imperative, negation does not have scope over the directive force. Rather, the directive force
always has scope over the negation. We illustrate this point in (271) and (272).
(271)

Don't go.
 It is required that you not go.
6 It is not required that you go.

(272)

Nobody move.
 It is required that not anybody move.
6 It is not required that anybody move.

In Chapter 2, we explored the impossibility of negated illocutionary force to account for
the cross-linguistic variation in the compatibility between imperatives and negation. Our
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proposal is that languages do not allow negative imperatives if the imperative operator in C0
ends up in the scope of negation because the directive force contributed by the imperative
operator ends up being negated, resulting in an incoherent interpretation.
In the logical form of imperatives that we have proposed, directive(irrealis(p)), directive
takes the logical form as its argument. We have proposed that directive is a function that
instructs the hearer to update his/her plan set with the proposition p. In e ect, it is a
non-truth-conditional operator that returns a non-truth-conditional object. On the other
hand, negation is a truth-conditional operator that operates on a proposition and returns
a proposition. Thus, it is impossible for negation to operate on illocutionary forces. That
is why a representation in which negation takes scope over an illocutionary force operator
results in an incoherent interpretation.
According to Dummett (1973), Frege asserted that a sign for illocutionary force cannot
meaningfully occur within the scope of sentential operators such as negation, but can attach only to a complete sentence as a whole. However, Dummett argues that illocutionary
force signs can be negated and provides as evidence what he believes to be natural language expressions with negated illocutionary force. In particular, he claims that the case
is very clear in imperatives. He believes that permissive may involves negating the force
sign in imperatives. For him, if the force sign in a negative imperative is negated, the corresponding natural language expression is a permission sentence with the modal verb may,
as represented in (273). The exclamation ! is a sign indicating directive force.
(273)

You may do X  not!(you do not do X)

However, we do not believe that this is a valid proposal. The permission sentence You may
do X is an indicative sentence with a modal verb may. Nothing compels us to represent
this sentence with a negated directive force sign. We could very well represent it with an
assertive force sign which takes scope over a permissive modal operator. In (274), jj is a
sign indicating assertive force, and P is the permissive modal operator.
(274)

You may do X  jjP (you do X)

In particular, the equivalence in (273) crucially depends on the equivalence between
:!: and P ::, where P is a permissive modal operator, in analogy to the equivalence
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between :2: and 3:: in modal logic.2
(275) a.
b.

:!: 

P ::
:2:  3::

If this is correct, then the equivalences in (276) should hold as well.
(276) a.

!:  :P

b.

:!  P :

That is, my directing : should be the same as my not permitting , and my not directing
 should be the same as my permitting :. But this is dubious. Consider the interaction
in (277).
(277) a.
b.

A: I don't want to leave yet.
B: Ok. Then, don't leave.

In this context, the imperative Don't leave uttered by B does not mean the same as I am
not permitting you to leave. Rather, it means something similar to I am permitting you to
not leave. Furthermore, the equivalence in (276b) cannot be valid either. For example, if I
do not order you to leave, this does not mean that I am giving you permission to not leave.
Dummett's permission sentences involve two instances of negation: one that negates
the directive force, and another one that negates the propositional content. We might then
expect an imperative with double negation to generate a permissive reading. But this does
not occur. The imperative in (278a) is a request to close the window and the imperative in
(278b) is a request to nish the cake. The permissive readings you may close the window
and you may nish your cake are not available for the imperatives in (278).
(278) a.
b.

Don't not close the window.
Don't not nish your cake.

Further, it is well known that an armative imperative can express a permission depending
on the context. Although the imperatives in (279) do not involve any negation, they can
perfectly well express permissions.
2

For explanations of de nitions used in modal logic, see Hughes and Cresswell (1996).
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(279) a.
b.

Come in. (as a reply to a knock on the door)
A: Can I open the window?
B: Sure. Open it.

We therefore do not believe that permission sentences are natural language expressions
for negated directive force. Instead, we accept Frege's intuition that force-indicating signs
cannot be in the scope of negation.
A question arises at this point as to the scope possibility of other truth-conditional
operators and force-indicating operators. We conclude this subsection with a brief discussion
on this issue, limiting it for simplicity to the directive-force indicating operator. We believe
that the arguments carry over to other force-indicating operators. Let us rst consider the
scope possibilities of the conditional operator and the directive force-indicating operator in
conditional imperatives, as in (280).
(280) a.

Go inside if it rains.

b.

If it rains, go inside.

For (280a), we can say that the entire sentence is a CP and the imperative operator which
encodes directive force is in C0 , and the conditional clause if it rains is an adjunct clause
that is right adjoined to IP or to VP, as illustrated in (281a) and (281b).
(281) a.

CP
C
IP

Imp-Op
IP

CP

go inside

if it rains
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b.

CP
C
Imp-Op

IP
VP
VP

CP

go inside

if it rains

For (280b), we can say that its structure is just like that of (280a), except that the conditional clause has topicalized to the left periphery of the sentence. The conditional clause
then reconstructs to its original position for interpretation. This is illustrated in (282).

(282) a.

CP
CP

C

If it rains

i

Imp-Op
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IP
IP

CP

go inside

t

i

b.

CP
C

CP
If it rains

i

Imp-Op

IP
VP
VP

CP

go inside

t

i

Thus, imperative operator scopes over the entire sentence in both of the conditional imperatives in (280).
Other truth-conditional operators that require attention are and and or. In natural
language, these operators can coordinate entire sentences (as in (283)) as well as subconstituents of a sentence (as in (284)).
(283) a.
b.
(284) a.
b.

Eat an apple or eat an orange.
Have dinner and watch a movie.
Eat an apple or an orange.
Buy beer and wine.

The sentences in (284) are examples of NP coordination. For these sentences, we can just say
that the entire sentence is a CP with the imperative operator in C0 . And so the imperative
operator has scope over the entire sentence. But we cannot say the same thing for the
examples in (283). In (283), two imperatives are coordinated in each example. The verbs
in each conjunct are in the imperative form. In e ect, in (283), and and or have scope over
two imperatives. Given this fact, we restrict the truth-conditional operators that cannot
scope over illocutionary-force operators to negation and the conditional operator.
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5.3.5 Speaker's Belief in the Realization of the Situation Described by
the Proposition
Speakers believe that the state of a airs described by the proposition of an imperative is
realizable. Hence, it is infelicitous to follow an imperative with a sentence that expresses
the speaker's belief that the situation described by the proposition of the imperative will
not be realized.
(285) # Eat this sh! But you won't.
Moreover, imperatives with individual-level stative predicates are infelicitous because the
states of a airs described by individual-level statives are not something that can be realized
unless they have already been realized.3
(286) a. # Be tall.
b. # Have blue eyes.
This property is captured by our proposal that the directive force encodes the information
that the speaker believes that the addressee has the ability to bring about the state of a airs
described.

5.3.6 Agentivity
Imperatives are in principle agentive. That is, the situation described by the imperative
presupposes an agent who is responsible in bringing it about (unless the imperative is used
to express a wish as in (269b)). That is why imperatives with individual-level predicates are
infelicitous as shown in (286): i.e., the situation described by an individual-level predicate is
not something that an agent can bring about under normal circumstances. According to our
de nition of the logical form of imperatives directive(irrealis(p)), the situation described
by the imperative, p, is a plan. Since plan is something that is carried out by an agent, we
expect the situation described by p in imperatives to be agentive.
The sentences in (286) can be felicitous if the speaker is a fairy godmother or if the speaker is expressing
a wish.
3
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5.3.7 Truth
Imperatives cannot be said to be true or false. Since imperatives denote directive actions,
and since a directive action is an instruction to the hearer to update his/her plan set, it
does not make sense to predicate truth or falsity of an imperative.
In contrast, we can say that a declarative is either true or false. We have suggested that
a declarative canonically performs an assertive act, which can be de ned as an instruction
to the hearer to update his/her belief set with a proposition. A belief set is a description of
what the hearer believes the state of a airs to be like. Thus, a declarative that performs an
assertive act can be said to be true if the proposition associated with it is consistent with
the hearer's belief set, and false if the proposition associated with it is not consistent with
the hearer's belief set.

5.4 Imperatives in Discourse
In this section, we discuss the interpretational behavior of imperatives in discourse. In particular, we will see how the modality of imperatives e ect the interpretation of subsequent
modal sentences.

5.4.1 Issues
When an imperative is followed by the disjunction or and a sentence of the form will(p),
the rst sentence has directive force and the second has a conditional-like interpretation in
which the interpretation of the sentence depends on the negation of the proposition of the
rst sentence.
(287)

Come to the party, or John will be unhappy.
 Come to the party. If you don't come to the party, John will be unhappy.

When an imperative is followed by the conjunction and and a sentence of the form
will(p), the rst sentence does not have directive force. The entire sequence has a conditionallike interpretation in which the interpretation of the second sentence depends on the rst
sentence.
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(288)

Be late, and you'll miss the train.
 If you are late, you'll miss the train.

5.4.2 A Previous Study: Clark 1993b
Clark (1993b) provides an account of the interpretation of the sequences imp(p) and will(q),
and imp(p) or will(q) by appealing to the pragmatic principle of relevance and the semantics
of imperatives proposed by Wilson and Sperber (1988). According to Wilson and Sperber,
imperatives denote propositions that specify possible and desirable situations, where the
situation is either desirable to the speaker or the hearer.

5.4.2.1 imp(p) and will(q)
The sequence in (289) has directive force: it is a request for the hearer to come closer.
(289)

Come closer, and I'll give you ve pounds.

Clark argues that the imperative in the rst conjunct is responsible for the directive force
in (289). In (289), the imperative in the rst conjunct expresses that the speaker regards
the state of a airs described as desirable from her own point of view. This utterance will
have the force of a request. Given a context which contains the assumption communicated
by the rst conjunct (that the speaker wants the hearer to come closer), the most likely
and relevant interpretation that comes to the hearer's mind for the second conjunct would
be I'll give you ve pounds if you come closer. This is so because `the processing e ort
involved is not unjusti able.' The e ect of the entire sequence is to direct the hearer to
come closer.
The sequences in (290) and (291) do not have directive force.
(290) a.
b.
(291) a.
b.

Come one step closer, and I'll shoot.
Open the Guardian, and you'll nd three misprints on every page.
Catch the u, and you'll be ill for weeks.
Life was hard in those days. Say one word out of turn, and they'd dock you
a week's wages.
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With respect to the sequences in (290), Clark claims that the rst conjunct in (290a) can
be interpreted as something like you want to come closer and you think you can. The most
accessible interpretation consistent with the principle of relevance for the second conjunct
is something like I'll shoot when you come closer. Since being shot is not a desirable
situation in normal circumstances, the e ect of the entire sequence is to dissuade the hearer
from coming closer. As for (290b), the interpretation of the rst conjunct is something
like you might think that it is possible and desirable that you open the Guardian at some
time. The most accessible interpretation consistent with the principle of relevance for the
second conjunct is something like you'll nd three misprints on every page when you open
the Guardian. Since nding misprints is neither desirable nor undesirable, the e ect of the
entire sequence amounts to an o er of information.
As for the sequences in (291), Clark argues that the rst conjuncts in the sequences
are not imperatives, although they appear to be so, and the sequences should be treated as
truth-conditionally equivalent to conditionals. Some of the reasons given by Clark as to why
the rst conjuncts in (291) are not imperatives are: (i) the subject can be understood to be
generic (as in (291a)), (ii) when an overt you occurs in examples like (291a), it is the weak
unstressed form rather than the strong, stressed form which are found in imperatives, (iii)
these constructions can be taken to refer to past events as in (291b), whereas imperatives
are future-oriented.
However, examples in (290) can also have an overt 2nd person subject, and when they
do, it is the weak unstressed form, and not the strong, stressed form which is found in
imperatives. This is shown in (292). Moreover, the subject in (292b) can be understood as
generic.
(292) a.
b.

You come one step closer, and I'll shoot.
You open the Guardian, and you'll nd three misprints on every page.

Thus, the imperatives in (290) and (291) should not be thought of as two di erent types of
constructions as Clark does. They should be given a uni ed account.
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5.4.2.2 imp(p) or will(q)
The imperative in the sequence imp(p) or will(q) has directive force, and the second conjunct will(q) has a conditional-like interpretation, :p ! will(q), as in (293).
(293)

Go away, or I'll push you downstairs.
 Go away. If you do not go away, I'll push you downstairs.

To account for the interpretation of sequences such as (293), Clark (1993b) argues that
a sequence of sentences p _ q in general has the logical form `p ^ (X _ q)' where X is a
variable slot to be lled by some proposition which is pragmatically inferred from p. In
(293), the hearer recovers something like It is potential and desirable that you go away. X
or I'll push you downstairs. The variable slot X is lled by you will go away because this
proposition is related to the one which is explicitly expressed by the rst clause and so it
can be pragmatically inferred from it. In other words, the content of X is pragmatically
accommodated with the contextually salient proposition. And then, by converting X _ q
to :X ! q, the conditional interpretation is derived If you do not go away, I will push
you downstairs. The e ect of the entire sequence is to direct the hearer to go away. Note
that Clark (1993b) does not directly convert p _ q to :p ! q. This is because such a direct
conversion would result in a wrong interpretation. That is, (293) would end up with an
interpretation paraphrasable as It is potential and desirable that you go away. If it is not
potential and desirable that you go away, then John will be unhappy.
Under Clark's account, the value for X in `p ^ (X _ q)' is determined by pragmatic
reasoning and inference. Thus, we would expect the content of X to be variable depending
on the context. Moreover, if an imperative imp(p) means It is potential and desirable that
p, then there is no reason why we could not infer It is desirable that p or It is potential that
p from imp(p). But the fact is that the content of X can only be p. This suggests that the
mechanism involved in determining the value of X is automatic and should not depend on
pragmatic inference or reasoning.
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5.4.3 imp(p) and will(q)
5.4.3.1 Imperatives?
The imperative in the sequence imp(p) and will(q) does not have directive force and the
entire sequence simply has conditional-like interpretation. It may appear that the imperative in some instances of the sequence imp(p) and will(q) has directive force. However,
the directive force comes not from the imperative itself, but from the implicatures arising
from the entire sequence in a certain context. Given the sequence Come closer and I'll give
you 5 pounds, the entire sequence has the e ect of persuading the hearer to come closer
in a context where the speaker believes that the hearer wants to acquire 5 pounds. The
directive force is canceled in a context in which acquiring 5 pounds is to be avoided. The
way in which directive force is implied in some instances of imp(p) and will(q) is similar to
the way it is implied in conditionals such as If you come closer, I'll give you 5 pounds in
some discourse contexts.
If imp(p) in the sequence imp(p) and will(q) does not have directive force, then we are
faced with a problem. According to the interpretation of imperatives given earlier, imperatives should have directive force. But this is not so for imperatives in imp(p) and will(q).
Either the interpretation of imperatives that we have given earlier is wrong, or the imperative in imp(p) and will(q) sequence is not really an imperative, but merely an imperativelike construction. Here, we argue for the second approach by showing that although
the imperative-like constructions all look like imperatives on the surface, there are many
properties that distinguish them from true imperatives. We will also show that languages
with distinctive imperative morphology on the verb either allow imp(p) and will(q) sequence under the conditional reading only in a limited way, or prohibit imp(p) and will(q)
sequence under the conditional reading altogether.
First, while imperatives can have do for emphasis, imperative-like constructions cannot.
(294) a.

Do put the light on.

b.

Do come one step closer.

c.

Do open the Guardian.
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(295) a. * Do put the light on, and you'll see better.
b. * Do come one step closer, and I'll shoot.
c. * Do open the Guardian, and you'll nd three misprints on every page.
Second, strings that are not acceptable as imperatives are perfectly acceptable as imperativelike constructions, as noted in Davies (1986).
(296) a. ? Know the answer.
b. ? Doubt that you will succeed.
c. * Be 7 ft. tall.
(297) a.
b.

Know the answer, and you'll get an A.
Doubt that you will succeed, and you won't.

c. ? Be 7 ft. tall, and you can play in the NBA.
Third, also noted in Davies (1986), while imperative-like constructions can contain NPIs,
imperatives cannot.
(298) a. * Come any closer.
b. * Lift a nger to help her.
c. * Say one word to anyone about this.
(299) a.

Come any closer, and I'll shoot.

b.

Lift a nger to help her, and you'll be sorry.

c.

Say one word to anyone about this, and I'll never forgive you.

Fourth, as noted by Clark (1993b), while the covert subject in imperative-like constructions,
which has the content of 2nd person, can have impersonal, generic interpretation, the covert
subject in imperatives can only refer to an addressee (or addressees).
(300) a.
b.

Wash yourself every day, and your skin gets dry.
Catch the u, and you'll be miserable for days.
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Fifth, as noted by both Davies (1986) and Clark (1993b), in contrast to imperatives,
imperative-like constructions may be interpreted with past time reference.
(301) a. * Say one word out of turn in those days.
b. * Take a holiday in those days.
(302) a.
b.

Life was hard in those days. Say one word out of turn, and they'd dock you
a week's wages.
Take a holiday in those days, and you were regarded as a spendthrift.

Sixth, imperatives can have inde nite quanti ers such as someone, everyone, nobody as
subjects, whereas imperative-like constructions cannot.
(303) a.

Nobody help her!

b.

Everybody come to the party!

c.

Someone open the window.

(304) a. * Nobody help her, and she will fail.
b. * Everybody come to the party, and she will be happy.
c. * Someone open the window, and we'll get some fresh air.
Finally, negated imperative-like constructions are degraded, unlike negative imperatives.
(305) a.
b.

Don't show up on time.
Don't you worry so much.

(306) a. ? Don't show up on time, and you'll miss the beginning of the movie.
b. * Don't you worry so much, and you'll be happier.

5.4.3.2 Other languages
Imperatives in Korean, German and Modern Greek are formed with distinctive imperative
morphology on the verb.
In German and Modern Greek, although judgments vary across speakers, a generalization that emerges is that imp(p) and will(q) sequences are possible under the conditionalreading only when imp(p) can be a well-formed imperative by itself.
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(307) German
a.

Ruf
sie an, und sie freut
sich bestimmt.
call-Imp her Part and she makes-happy Re certainly
`Call her, and she's sure to be happy.'

b.

Komm (du) blo einen Schritt naher, und ich schiee.
come-Imp you only one step closer and I shoot
`Come one step closer, and I'll shoot.'

c. ? Verspate dich nur mal funf Minuten, und du iegst aus der Klasse
delay-Imp Re only once ve minutes and you y out-of the class
raus.
out
`Come just ve minutes late, and you'll be kicked out of the class.'
d. ?? Erwisch die Grippe, und du fuhlst dich tagelang elend.
catch-Imp the u
and you feel Re days-long miserable
`Catch the u and you'll feel miserable for days.'
e. * Sei
2 m gro, und du kannst in der Nationalliga spielen.
be-Imp 2 m big and you can in the national-league play
`Be 2 m tall, and you can play in the national league.'
f. * Ruhr einen Finger, um ihr zu helfen, und du wirst es bereuen.
lift-Imp a
nger, Prep her to help and you will be sorry
`Lift a nger to help her, and you will be sorry.'
(308) Modern Greek
a.

Pare
tis tilefono, ke tha xari.
talk-Imp her telephone and Fut happy
`Talk to her on the telephone, and she will be happy.'

b.

Ela
pjo konda, ke tha se pirovoliso.
come-Imp more close and Fut you shoot
`Come closer, and I'll shoot you.'

c.

Ela
5 lepta argotera, ke ise ektos taksis.
come-Imp 5 minutes later
and are out class
`Come 5 minutes late, and you are out of the class.'

d. ?? Griposou, ke meta ise kathilomenos sto krevati meres.
get- u-Imp and then are stuck
in-the bed days
`Catch the u, and you are stuck in bed for days.'
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e. * Ekino ton kero i zoi itan diskoli. Lege kati
lathos, ke se
that the time the life was hard. say-Imp something wrong and you
apoliane.
red
`Life was hard in those days. Say something wrong, and they would re you.'
For instance, the imperatives in (307a-c) and (308a-c) are all ne by themselves: it is
perfectly reasonable to request someone to make a call, someone to come closer and someone
to come ve minutes late. However, the imperatives in (307d,e) and in (308d) do not sound
so felicitous by themselves: it is odd to request someone to catch the u, and it is very
strange to tell someone to be 2 meters tall. The imperative in (308e) is out under a generic
reading with past tense reference, which is forced by the context. Moreover, the imperative
in (307f) is out due to the presence of an NPI. The corresponding imperatives and their
grammaticality judgment are given in (309) and (310). The fact that imp(p) and will(q)
sequences under conditional-reading degrade if imp(p) is ill-formed by itself in German
and Modern Greek suggest that imp(p) is being interpreted as a real imperative in both
languages.
(309) German
a.

Ruf
sie an.
call-Imp her Part
`Call her.'

b.

Komm (du) blo einen Schritt naher.
come-Imp you only one step closer
`Come just one step closer.'

c.

Verspate dich nur mal funf Minuten.
delay-Imp Re only once ve minutes
`Come just ve minutes late.'

d. ?? Erwisch die Grippe.
catch-Imp the u
`Catch the u.'
e. * Sei
2 m gro.
be-Imp 2 m big
`Be 2m tall.'
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f. * Ruhr einen Finger, um ihr zu helfen.
lift-Imp a
nger, Prep her to help
`Lift a nger to help her.'
(310) Modern Greek
a.

Pare
tis tilefono.
talk-Imp her telephone
`Talk to her on the telephone.'

b.

Ela
pjo konda.
come-Imp more close
`Come closer.'

c.

Ela
5 lepta argotera.
come-Imp 5 minutes later
`Come 5 minutes late.'

d. ?? Griposou.
get- u-Imp
`Catch the u.'
e. * Lege kati
lathos.
say-Imp something wrong
`Say something wrong.' (generic, past tense reference)
The apparent conditional reading in (307a-c) and (308a-c) can be attributed to modal
subordination. Following Roberts (1989), the interpretation of a modal sentence in
modal subordination depends on some set of contextually given propositions. In other
words, a modal sentence is modally subordinated if the determination of the modal context depends on the proposition contributed by a preceding modal sentence or some contextually salient proposition, where the modal context of a sentence can be thought of as
the set of possible worlds with respect to which the sentence is interpreted. This means that
a modally subordinated sentence ends up with a conditional-like interpretation in which the
antecedent corresponds to the proposition contributed by the preceding modal sentence or
some salient proposition. In imp(p) and will(q) sequences, both conjuncts are modal sentences, providing the perfect environment for modal subordination. The imperative imp(p)
in the rst conjunct has the modality of unrealized interpretation. It provides a modal
context, a set of hypothetical possible worlds in which p is satis ed, and will(q) in the
second conjunct is evaluated with respect to this modal context. Thus, the interpretation
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of will(q) is modally subordinated to the proposition contributed by imp(p), resulting in a
conditional-like reading if p; q.
Given this approach, imp(p) in imp(p) and will(q) in German and Modern Greek is
interpreted as a real imperative with directive force, unlike in English. And the modality
of imp(p) allows modal subordination of the subsequent modal sentence will(q). Then, the
question is how sequences such as (307b,c) and (308b,c) are possible, since the imperatives
in these sequences clearly express the exact opposite of what they literally mean. All of
these sequences imply that the speaker does not want the hearer to bring about the situation
described by the imperative. But as pointed out earlier, natural language allows sentences
to be used in a sarcastic and ironical way. Thus, it is not surprising that imperatives are
not exempted from being used in such a way.
Korean prohibits imp(p) and will(q) sequences under the conditional reading altogether.
(311) Korean
a. * Sue-eykey cenwhahayla. kuliko Sue-ka cohahal-kesita.
Sue-to call-Imp
and Sue-Nom happy-Fut-Decl
`Call Sue, and she will be happy.'
b. * Pwul-ul kyela.
kuliko pang-i
palkacil-kesita.
light-Acc turn-on-Imp and room-Nom become-bright-Fut-Decl
`Turn on the light, and the room will become bright.'
c. * Cokum-man wumcikyela. kuliko ssonta.
little-only move-Imp and shoot-Decl
`Move a little bit, and I'll shoot.'
d. * Kamki-ey kelyela. kuliko myechil tongan kosaynghal-kesita.
u-at
catch-Imp and days during miserable-Fut-Decl
`Catch the u, and you will be miserable for days.'
e. * Khi-ka
khela. kuliko nongku senswu-ka toyl swuissta.
height-Nom big and basketball player-Nom become can-Decl
`Be tall, and you can become a basketball player.'
In Korean, if kuliko (`and') is replaced with kulemyen (`then'), the rst three sequences in
(311a-c) become well-formed, but the ones in (311d,e) remain ill-formed.
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(312) Korean
a.

Sue-eykey cenwhahayla. kulemyen Sue-ka cohahal-kesita.
Sue-to call-Imp
then
Sue-Nom happy-Fut-Decl
`Call Sue. If you do, she will be happy.'

b.

Pwul-ul kyela.
kulemyen pang-i
palkacil-kesita.
light-Acc turn-on-Imp then
room-Nom become-bright-Fut-Decl
`Turn on the light. If you do, the room will become bright.'

c. ? Cokum-man wumcikyela. kulemyen ssonta.
little-only move-Imp then
shoot-Decl
`Move a little bit. If you do, I'll shoot.'
d. * Kamki-ey kelyela. kulemyen myechil tongan kosaynghal-kesita.
u-at
catch-Imp then
days during miserable-Fut-Decl
`Catch the u. If you do, you will be miserable for days.'
e. * Khi-ka
khela. kulemyen nongku senswu-ka toyl swuissta.
height-Nom big then
basketball player-Nom become can-Decl
`Be tall. If you are, you can become a basketball player.'
In (312a-c), the imperatives are interpreted as true imperatives with directive force, and the
second conjuncts are modally subordinated to the rst conjuncts, generating conditionallike interpretation. The sequences in (312d,e) are ill-formed because the imperatives are illformed: it is odd to direct someone to catch the u or to be tall. Hence, imp(p) then will(q)
sequences in Korean behave just like imp(p) and will(q) sequences in German and Modern Greek. However, Korean di ers from the other two languages in not allowing modal
subordination in imp(p) and will(q) sequences.

5.4.3.3 Syntax and semantics of imperative-like constructions
Returning to English, let us determine the syntax and semantics of imperative-like constructions.
Imperative-like constructions di er from imperatives in that they do not allow do, and
only marginally allow don't.4
4
Clark (1993b) claims that imperative-like constructions form negatives with not rather than don't or do
not. Clark gives the examples in (313) as supporting evidence.

(313) a.
b.

John was a big part of my life. Not see him again, and I knew I'd never forgive myself.
My lecturer is a real tyrant. Not show up on time, and he'll throw you out of the course.
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(314) a. * Do put the light on, and you'll see better.
b. ? Don't show up on time, and you'll miss the beginning of the movie.
c. * Don't you worry so much, and you'll be happier.
Moreover, imperative-like constructions di er from imperatives in that they allow only
2nd person subjects. This is shown in (304), repeated below as (316), and in (317).5
(316) a. * Nobody help her, and she will fail.
b. * Everybody come to the party, and she will be happy.
c. * Someone open the window, and we'll get some fresh air.
(317) a.
b.

Buy yourself a new dress, and you will be happy.
Miss this train, and you will be late.

Even when the subject is interpreted as generic, it is understood to have 2nd person reference, as shown in (318) and (319).
(318) a. * Wash oneself everyday, and one's skin will get dry.
b. * Wash one's hair everyday, and one's hair will become dry.
(319) a.
b.
c.

Wash yourself everyday, and your skin will get dry.
Wash your hair everyday, and your hair will become dry.
The safety drill is important. Not listen, and it'll be your own fault if you get into trouble.

However, the native speakers of English that we have consulted absolutely did not allow negative imperativelike constructions without do-support.
5
Bolinger (1977), Davies (1986) and Clark (1993b) claim that imperative-like constructions that are used
with conditional function can have subjects other than 2nd person. Some of the examples they provide as
supporting evidence are given in (315).
(315) a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

Miss this train, and we'll never get there on time. (Clark 1993b)
Buy myself a new suit, and my wife raises the roof. (Bolinger 1977)
Shake down too many people, and they get caught. (Bolinger 1977)
Tell myself that it's true, and I end up believing it. (Bolinger 1977)
Find myself a place to live, and I'll soon settle down. (Davies 1986)
Get themselves organized, and they'll soon start making a pro t. (Davies 1986)

However, none of the native speakers of English that we have consulted found them to be possible.
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Based on these facts, we propose that imperative-like constructions have a syntax similar
to that of imperatives, but that imperative-like constructions lack some of the feature
content that imperatives have in the imperative operator in C0 . Speci cally, we claim that
imperative-like constructions lack the feature content that is responsible for illocutionary
force. Thus, imperative-like constructions are just like imperatives in having an operator
in C0 that includes an [irrealis] feature, but they di er in that the operator in C0 has a
defective [directive] feature. The defective [directive] feature encodes the information that
the subject is the addressee, but it does not encode illocutionary force.6
The question that arises at this point is why English has defective imperatives, whereas
languages such as Korean, Modern Greek and German do not. A plausible answer, we conjecture, is that English uses bare verb forms for imperatives, whereas German, Korean, and
Modern Greek have distinctive morphology for imperative verbs. In English, the absence of
some of the morphosyntactic features associated with the imperative operator would have
no e ect on the bare verbal form. But in languages with distinctive morphology on the verb
for imperatives, the absence of some of the morphosyntactic features of imperative operator
would likely to have an e ect on the verbal form. Thus, in these languages, there are no
defective imperatives that look just like imperatives.
Given this analysis, we expect negative imperative-like constructions to require dosupport, just like true negative imperatives. We have seen that this is indeed the case, as
in (314). But we have also seen that negative imperative-like constructions in general degrade, and that emphatic do cannot occur in armative imperative-like constructions. Our
explanation for this is that the presence of do in imperative-like constructions forces them
to have directive force (more in armative imperative-like constructions than in negative
imperative-like constructions), for the reasons which not yet known to us. But since they
cannot have directive force by de nition, imperative-like constructions with do degrade or
are ruled out altogether.
Our account of imperative-like constructions is similar to that given in Davies (1986): imperative-like
constructions lack directive force. But the two accounts di er as to why. We have argued that the lack of
directive force in imperative-like constructions re ects the defective feature content in the operator in C0 . In
contrast, Davies argues that imperative-like constructions have the same morphosyntax as imperatives and
that the presence of directive force in imperatives and its absence in imperative-like constructions are due
to pragmatic inference. Further, our analysis implies that addressee reference of the subject is independent
of the directive force.
6
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Recall that imperative-like constructions can have overt subject you, as in (292) (repeated below as (320)). This is expected if the syntax of imperative-like constructions is
similar to imperatives except that they lack the feature content that expresses directive
force.
(320) a.
b.

You come one step closer, and I'll shoot.
You open the Guardian, and you'll nd three misprints on every page.

Further, recall that subjects in imperative-like constructions are restricted to 2nd person
pronominals, whereas imperatives can have inde nite quanti ers such as someone, everyone, nobody as well as 2nd person pronominals as subjects, as shown in (303) and (304).
This asymmetry is unexpected given our proposal that both the syntax of imperatives and
of imperative-like constructions encodes the information that the subject refers to the addressee. We believe that this asymmetry re ects the presence/absence of the directive force:
while the presence of the directive force in imperatives allows inde nite quanti ers to be
compatible with addressee reference, its absence in imperative-like constructions prohibits
inde nite quanti ers from being compatible with addressee reference, thereby restricting
the subject to 2nd person. In addition, 2nd person subject in imperative-like constructions
can have impersonal generic interpretation, unlike in imperatives. Again, we believe that
this di erence is due to the lack of directive force in imperative-like constructions.
As for the semantics of imperative-like constructions, they express what imperatives express, except for the illocutionary force. This means that they can denote a set of unrealized
future-oriented possible worlds in which the proposition expressed by the construction is
satis ed. Further, the absence of illocutionary force implies that imperative-like constructions can denote any proposition, including one describing a situation that the hearer has
little or no control over bringing about, as in (297), repeated here as (321).
(321) a.
b.

Know the answer, and you'll get an A.
Doubt that you will succeed, and you won't.

c. ? Be 7 ft. tall, and you can play in the NBA.
Moreover, since an imperative-like construction lacks directive force, the set of possible
worlds denoted by it is not restricted to future-oriented possible worlds. Thus, such a
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construction can denote a set of hypothetical past-oriented possible worlds. This explains
why imperative-like constructions may be interpreted with past time reference, as shown in
(302), repeated here as (322).
(322) a.
b.

Life was hard in those days. Say one word out of turn, and they'd dock you
a week's wages.
Take a holiday in those days, and you were regarded as a spendthrift.

5.4.3.4 Interpreting imp(p) and will(q)
We will use dynamic semantics in interpreting imp(p) and will(q) sequences. Dynamic
semantics is a good framework for this purpose because it provides a procedural and compositional way of interpreting sequences of sentences in discourse.
In dynamic semantics, the meaning of a sentence is not de ned by its truth conditions,
but rather by how the sentence changes (or updates) the semantic agent's information state
situated in a discourse context (Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991), Groenendijk et al. (1996)).
We de ne a discourse model M as a tuple hW; S; F; Ai, where W is a set of possible
worlds, S is a set of information states, F is an interpretation function, and A is an accessibility relation referent system. An information state s is a set of pairs of a possible world
and an accessibility relation referent system A. The accessibility relation referent system A
is the same for all pairs in an information state.7
(323) a.
b.

M  hW; S; F; Ai
d

s

d

fhw; Ai

: w 2 Wg

The interpretation function F takes a proposition p and returns a set of worlds that satis es
that p.
(324)

F (p) 

d

fw

: w 2 pg

An information state can be identi ed with di erent things, depending on what aspect of information
change potential is being modeled. In Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991), an information state is identi ed
with a set of pairs of assignment functions to provide an analysis of pronominal co-reference, in particular
donkey anaphora and intersentential anaphora. In Groenendijk et al. (1994, 1996), an information state
is identi ed with a set of possibilities which is a triple of a possible world, a referent system and an
assignment function to account for how a sentence changes the information about the world and about the
discourse.
7
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The accessibility relation referent system A is a tuple hR; V; Pow(W )i, where R is a function
from V to Pow(W ), V is a set of variables v, and Pow(W ) is the power set of a set of worlds.
The system A is extended by introducing a variable v in V and associating it with a set of
worlds in Pow(W ). The system A plays an important role in interpreting a modal sentence
and its subsequent modal sentences.8
(325) a.

An accessibility relation referent system A:
A  hR; V; Pow(W )i, where R is a function from V to Pow(W ), V is a set
of variables, Pow(W ) is a power set of a set of worlds.
d

b.

Extending A:
A is extended by introducing a variable v in V and associating it with a set
of worlds in Pow(W ) by function R.

A semantic agent's information can grow in two ways: by eliminating possible worlds
and by extending A. The possible worlds that are inconsistent with the new information
are eliminated from the information state. In addition a modal sentence can introduce a
new variable v in V and associate it with a set of worlds in Pow(W ). We call this set of
worlds a hypothetical information state. We can think of hypothetical information
states as being accessible from the actual information state, where the term accessible
is de ned as in modal logic. Subsequent modal sentences can be interpreted with respect
to this hypothetical information state. This is what is involved in the so-called modal
subordination phenomenon (Roberts (1989)).
We will assume that a sentence  is a partial function, [], from information states
to information states, as in update semantics (Groenendijk et al. (1994), Groenendijk
et al. (1996), Beaver (1995)). We use the notation s[] to refer to the result of updating s with , and s[][ ] to refer to the result of rst updating s with , and next updating
s[] with .
In dynamic semantics, a conjunction is simply a sequence of updates on information
states.
The accessibility relation referent system A is comparable to the referent system de ned in Groenendijk et al. (1994, 1996). The referent system is a function from a nite set of variables to a set of
discourse entities and is used to keep track of possible pronominal anaphoric relations.
8
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(326)

s[ ^ ] = s[][ ]

In order to derive the correct interpretation for imp(p) and will(q) sequences, we need to
extend the update function of conjunctions and allow them to be updates on hypothetical
information states as well. What this means will become clear as we discuss an example.
Let us interpret the sequence in (327).
(327)

Put the light on, and you'll see better.

The claim is that the rst sentence Put the light on denotes a set of hypothetical possible
worlds, where the proposition of the construction is satis ed.9 Assume a discourse model
M = hW; S; F; Ai, as de ned above. Given an information state s, updating s with Put the
light on extends the accessibility relation referent system A: i.e., a variable v is introduced
in V and it is associated with a hypothetical information state s0 in Pow(W ), by function
R. This hypothetical information state s0 is a set of possible worlds that is just like the set
of possible worlds in the actual information state s except that in s0 the proposition You put
the light on is satis ed. Then, the sentence You'll see better is interpreted. This sentence
contains a modal verb will. This means that it should be interpreted with respect to a
contextually salient modal context (Roberts (1989)). This modal context is provided by
the hypothetical information state s0 . Subsequently, this hypothetical information state s0 is
updated with the proposition You see better. More formally, we can implement this process
by co-indexing the variable introduced by You'll see better with that introduced by Put the
light on. This is a way of dealing with modal subordination in dynamic semantics. In a
sense, in dynamic semantics, a sentence is modally subordinated to a preceding sentence if
its modal context is anaphorically related to the modal context of the preceding sentence
(Portner (1994), Stone (1997)).
The information update functions of imp(p) and will(q) can be de ned as in (328).
(328)

s[imp (p) and will (q)] = fhw; A0 i : there exists A such that A0 is an extension
of A & hw; Ai 2 s & for all w 2 s0 , where s0 = s[p] = R(v), w 2 s0 [q]g
v

v

We have proposed that the logical form of an imperative includes a component that encodes directive
force and a component that encodes modality, as in directive(irrealis(p)). The dynamic semantics assumed
here cannot handle illocutionary force. Thus, the interpretational procedure given here for imperatives
handles only up to the modal component of the imperatives, irrealis(p).
9
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This kind of update simulates the update process of the antecedent and then the consequent of conditionals: the antecedent de nes the modal context and the consequent updates this modal context. Hence, if the proposed way of deriving the interpretation of
imp(p) and will(q) sequences is correct, we have an explanation for why they end up with
a conditional-like interpretation. Moreover, we also have a partial explanation for the licensing of NPIs in imperative-like constructions like (299), since NPIs are also licensed in
the antecedent of a conditional, as shown in (329).
(329) a.
b.

If you lift a nger to help her, you'll be sorry.
If you make any noise, I'll hit you.

We can say that NPIs are licensed in imperative-like constructions because they end up
with similar semantics as an antecedent of a conditional, through the process of modal
subordination. However, we cannot say that we have fully accounted for the fact that NPIs
are licensed in imperative-like constructions because modal subordination is not sucient
to license NPIs in general.

5.4.4 imp(p) or will(q)
The imp(p) in imp(p) or will(q) sequence is a real imperative with directive force. This is
supported by the fact that it can have do for emphasis, requires do for negation and does
not license NPIs.
(330) a.
b.

Do come to the party, or John will be unhappy.
Don't you show up, or John will be unhappy.

c. * Lift a nger to help her, or you'll be sorry.
The question is how will(q) in imp(p) or will(q) ends up with a conditional-like interpretation where the antecedent is the negation of the proposition of the imperative. In
order to account for the interpretation of imp(p) or will(q) sequences, we need to de ne an
information update instruction for disjunction or in dynamic semantics.
(331)

s[ _ ] = fhw; Ai 2 s : hw; Ai 2 s[] or hw; Ai 2 s[ ]g
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According to the de nition in (331), rst s is updated with , and then the update e ects
of  on s is undone and s is updated with . The update e ects of  on s is not inherited
to .
As an example, let us interpret the sequence in (287), repeated here as (332).
(332)

Come to the party, or John will be unhappy.
 Come to the party. If you don't come to the party, John will be unhappy.

First, the imperative Come to the party is interpreted. Given an information state s,
updating s with the imperative extends the accessibility relation referent system A by
introducing a variable v in V and associating it with a hypothetical information state s0
in which the proposition You come to the party is satis ed. Due to the update function
of disjunction or, the update e ects of the imperative cannot be inherited to subsequent
sentences. Now, we need to interpret John will be unhappy. Since the update e ect of the
imperative is not inherited, the hypothetical information state s0 is not accessible to John
will be unhappy as its modal context. That is, John will be unhappy cannot be interpreted
with respect to s0 . The variable introduced by John will be unhappy has to be associated with
a set of worlds in which the proposition You come to the party is not satis ed. As a result, the
complement of s0, s00 , becomes accessible, where s00 consists of a set of worlds in which You
do not come to the party is satis ed. Thus, John will be unhappy updates s00 , deriving the
conditional interpretation If you do not come to the party, John will be unhappy. Disjunction
or is di erent from logical _, as de ned here. Its function of blocking the inheritance of
information update functions of the previous sentence has the e ect of partitioning the
hypothetical information states into two, resulting in an exclusive interpretation.
According to the analysis presented here, an imp(p) or will(q) sequence implies that
the modal context of will(q) describes a state of a airs not desired by the speaker. This
is because the set of worlds evoked by the imperative is implied to describe a state of
a airs desired by the speaker, according to the interpretation of the imperative operator
de ned earlier, and will(q) evokes a set of worlds that is the complement set evoked by the
imperative. Assuming that one does not desire contradictory state of a airs under normal
circumstances, if p is desired, then :p is not desired. If so, then imp(p) or will(q) sequences
in which will(q) implies that the set of worlds in which :p is true is desirable are predicted
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to be infelicitous. This prediction is borne out.
(333) # Pass the exam, or I will reward you.
In (333), the imperative has the e ect of causing the hearer to believe that his/her passing
the exam is desired by the speaker. Due to the update function of or, the subsequent
sentence is interpreted with respect to a modal context in which the addressee has not
passed the exam, which is not desired by the speaker. But then, it is odd for the speaker
to reward someone who has acted contrary to the speaker's desire, since under normal
circumstances, rewarding someone implies that the person has done a desirable deed.

5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have proposed a way of interpreting imperatives. We have argued
that the logical form of imperatives includes two components: one that encodes directive
illocutionary force and another that encodes the modality of unrealized interpretation. We
de ned the component that encodes directive force as a function that takes a proposition
that denotes a set of hypothetical possible worlds and turns it into a directive action. We
de ned a directive action in turn as an instruction to the hearer to update a plan set
with a proposition. According to our analysis, the directive force of imperatives is not the
result of Gricean inference, but is directly encoded in their logical forms. We have also
examined the interpretational behavior of imperatives in imp(p) and will(q) sequences and
imp(p) or will(q) sequences, concluding that imp(p) in the rst type of sequence in English
is not a true imperative in that it does not express directive force, whereas imp(p) in the
second type of sequence is a real imperative with directive force. We also showed that in
languages with distinctive imperative morphology on the verb, imp(p) in imp(p) and will(q)
sequences is a true imperative. In addition, we have explored how the modality contributed
by imperatives allows for the modal subordination of subsequent modal sentences.
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Chapter 6

Deriving the Interpretation for
Rhetorical Questions
6.1 Introduction
In the chapter on the interpretation of imperatives, we saw that although imperatives
canonically express various directive illocutionary forces, they can also express illocutionary
forces that do not seem to constitute a straightforward directive, such as wishes, threats
and dares. In order to account for the variation in illocutionary forces associated with
imperatives, we appealed to Gricean reasoning. The situation is more or less similar in
the case of interrogatives. Interrogatives canonically express question force, but they can
also express requests, and in some cases, known as rhetorical questions, they can even
express assertions.
In this chapter, we present a case study of how the pragmatics and the output of syntax
interact to generate a non-canonical force in the case of rhetorical questions. While an
ordinary question seeks information or an answer from the hearer, a rhetorical question
does not expect to elicit an answer. In general, a rhetorical question has the illocutionary
force of a strong assertion of the opposite polarity from what is apparently asked (Sadock
(1971, 1974)). That is, a rhetorical positive question has the illocutionary force of a negative assertion, and a rhetorical negative question has the illocutionary force of a positive
assertion. Consider the questions in (334).
190

(334) a.
b.

What has John ever done for Sam?
What hasn't John done for Sam?

Under the rhetorical question reading, the wh-questions in (334) assert John has done
nothing for Sam and John has done everything for Sam, respectively.1
(335) a.
b.

Did I tell you that writing a dissertation was easy?
Didn't I tell you that writing a dissertation was easy?

Under the rhetorical question reading, the yes-no questions in (335) respectively assert I
didn't tell you that writing a dissertation was easy and I told you that writing a dissertation
was easy.
The main goals of this chapter are (i) to show that rhetorical questions and ordinary
questions do not pattern alike with respect to various well-formedness conditions, (ii) to
address the question of why rhetorical questions are interpreted as an assertion of the
opposite polarity from the surface form, given the semantics of questions in Groenendijk
and Stokhof (1985), and (iii) to account for the formal properties of rhetorical questions.
We will conclude that the interaction between the output of syntax (LF) and pragmatics
derives an interpretational representation over which various well-formedness conditions are
stated.
Sadock (1971, 1974) argues that a rhetorical question is semantically equivalent to an
assertion of the opposite polarity from what is apparently asked, followed by a tag question
with a falling intonation. Other studies on rhetorical questions include Linebarger (1987),
Progovac (1993), Lee (1995) and Gutierrez-Rexach (1997). They are mainly concerned with
accounting for the licensing of negative polarity items (NPIs) in rhetorical questions. In this
study, we add new observations with respect to the behavior of NPIs in rhetorical questions.
But more importantly, we explain why rhetorical questions have the interpretation that they
do. The NPI licensing facts follow directly from the proposed analysis.
In x6.2, we show that rhetorical questions have the formal properties of assertions rather
than of questions. We also show that NPI licensing in ordinary questions and rhetorical
questions is not the same. In x6.3, we review some of the previous works on rhetorical
1

In this chapter, we limit the discussion of wh-questions to those with argument wh-phrases.
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questions: Sadock (1971, 1974), Progovac (1993) and Lee (1995). In x6.4, we brie y discuss
the semantics of questions and semantics of wh-words that we are assuming. In x6.5, we
address the question of why a rhetorical question has the illocutionary force of an assertion of
the opposite polarity. In x6.6, we propose a way of deriving the interpretation of rhetorical
questions. Based on the proposed system, we provide an account of formal properties
of rhetorical questions including NPI licensing facts in x6.7. In particular, in x6.7.3 and
x6.7.4, we provide further evidence for the proposed account from the interpretation of
rhetorical questions containing a deontic modal and from the behavior of postverbal negative
constituents in rhetorical questions in Italian, a negative concord language. In x6.8, we show
that under the proposed analysis the interpretation of rhetorical questions can be derived
compositionally.

6.2 Formal Properties of Rhetorical Questions
6.2.1 Rhetorical Questions as Assertions
Sadock (1971, 1974) provides tests to show that rhetorical yes-no questions are formally
assertions and that they di er formally from information-seeking ordinary yes-no questions.
As an introductory item, after all can occur with rhetorical yes-no questions, but not with
ordinary yes-no questions. For instance, the question in (336) can only be interpreted as a
rhetorical question.
(336)

After all, do phonemes have anything to do with language?

A rhetorical yes-no question can be followed by a yet-clause, but an ordinary yes-no question
cannot. Therefore, the question in (337) can only be interpreted as a rhetorical question.
(337)

Do phonemes have anything to do with language? Yet people continue to believe
in them.

Rhetorical yes-no questions do not allow phrases such as by any chance, which signal ordinary information-seeking questions. The question in (338) can only be an ordinary question.
(338)

Does Arthur, by any chance, know anything about syntax?
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Extending Sadock's tests to rhetorical wh-questions yields the same results as for rhetorical yes-no questions. The introductory item after all can occur with rhetorical wh-questions,
but not with ordinary wh-questions. For instance, (339) can only be interpreted as a rhetorical question.
(339)

After all, who helped Mary?

While rhetorical wh-questions can be followed by a yet-clause, ordinary wh-questions cannot.
The question in (340) is felicitous only if it is interpreted as a rhetorical question.
(340)

Who helped Mary? Yet she managed everything by herself.

The parenthetical by any chance can occur with ordinary wh-questions, but not with rhetorical wh-questions. The question in (341) can only be interpreted as an ordinary question.
(341)

Who helped Mary, by any chance?

Finally, Sadock (1974:126) shows that when a rhetorical wh-question is used as a parenthetical, it can be in the form of a nonrestrictive relative clause, as shown in (342a).
But when an ordinary wh-question is used as a parenthetical, it cannot be reduced to a
nonrestrictive relative clause, but must have the form of a conjunct. This is shown in
(342b,c).
(342) a.

Symbolic logic, which who cares about anyway, is awfully tough.

b. * Symbolic logic, which by the way who invented, isn't my cup of Postum.
c.

Symbolic logic { and by the way who invented it? { isn't my cup of Postum.

6.2.2 NPI Licensing
Ordinary yes-no questions are known to license weak NPIs, such as any (Ladusaw (1980),
Linebarger (1987), Progovac (1993), Higginbotham (1993)).2
Zwarts (1996) makes a distinction between weak and strong NPIs. Weak NPIs include any and ever.
They can be licensed by any downward entailing operator, such as few NP, or less than four NP. Strong
NPIs include lift a nger, budge an inch, etc. and can only be licensed by negative elements such as no or
not.
2

193

(343) a.
b.

Did anybody visit John?
Did John visit anyone?

However, ordinary yes-no questions do not license strong NPIs, such as lift a nger
and budge an inch. Yes-no questions with strong NPIs can only have a rhetorical question
reading.
(344) a.
b.

Did John lift a nger to help Sam?
Did John budge an inch when Sam was in trouble?

For example, (344a) can only be interpreted as an assertion of the speaker's belief that John
didn't lift a nger to help Sam.
As for NPI licensing in argument wh-questions, Han and Siegel (1997) point out that
when the trace of the wh-phrase c-commands the weak NPI, both the ordinary question
reading and the rhetorical question reading are available (as in (346)), whereas when this
c-command relationship does not hold, only the rhetorical question reading is available (as
in (347)).3
(346) a.

Who t has ever been to Seoul?
i

i

b.

Who t said anything interesting at the seminar?

(347) a.

What has Sam ever contributed t to the project?

b.

i

i

i

i

What did anybody say t at the seminar?
i

i

For instance, (346a) can be interpreted either as a question about visitors to Seoul, or as an
assertion of the speaker's belief that no one has been to Seoul. However, (347a) can only
be interpreted as an assertion that Sam has not contributed anything to the project.
Just like ordinary yes-no questions, ordinary wh-questions do not license strong NPIs.
Wh-questions with strong NPIs can only be interpreted as rhetorical questions.
A possible counterexample to this generalization is found in Linebarger (1980:153).
(345)
Which books have any students complained about?
Note that the trace of the wh-phrase does not c-command the NPI any students in (345). According to
Linebarger, the question in (345) does not have to have a rhetorical question reading; it would be appropriate
as an ordinary information-seeking question if, for example, I am making up a reading list for a course and
want to know which books have elicited complaints in the past. The fact that the wh-phrase is D-linked
may be responsible for the availability of the non-rhetorical reading.
3
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(348) a.
b.

Who lifted a nger to help Mary?
Who budged an inch when you were in trouble?

(348a) can only be interpreted as an assertion that no one helped Mary.
While an ordinary negative question can contain a weak NPI, a rhetorical negative
question cannot. The questions in (349) and (350) are good under the ordinary question
reading. For example, (349a) can be a question that asks whether John visited anyone or
not, and (350a) can be a question about visitors to Seoul. However, the questions in (349)
and (350) do not have the rhetorical question reading. For example, (349a) cannot mean
that John visited someone, and (350a) cannot mean that everybody has been to Seoul.
(349) a.

Didn't John visit anyone?

b.

Didn't anyone visit John?

(350) a.
b.

Who hasn't ever been to Seoul?
Who didn't say anything interesting at the seminar?

The fact that rhetorical negative questions do not license NPIs is quite surprising. This
means that the negation that is present in the surface string of rhetorical negative questions
does not function as the licenser of NPIs. It suggests that the NPI licensing condition applies
at a more abstract level, where the representation of rhetorical negative questions does not
contain a licenser for NPIs.

6.3 Previous Studies of Rhetorical Questions
6.3.1 Sadock (1971, 1974)
Sadock (1971, 1974) is mainly concerned with rhetorical yes-no questions. He argues that
they are semantically similar to tag questions with falling intonation and proposes that
both types of questions share similar D-structures. For instance, for Sadock, the questions
in (351) and in (352) have similar D-structures.
(351) a.
b.

Syntax isn't easy, is it?
Is syntax easy?
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(352) a.
b.

Syntax is easy, isn't it?
Isn't syntax easy?

The polarity of the tag in tag questions corresponds to the polarity of the corresponding
rhetorical questions. Moreover, the polarity of the body in tag questions corresponds to the
polarity of the assertion expressed by the corresponding rhetorical questions.
Sadock proposes that the D-structure of a tag question is a conjunction of an assertive
and an interrogative clause in that order. Furthermore, the D-structure of the corresponding
rhetorical question is a conjunction of an interrogative clause and an assertive clause in that
order. The D-structures of the questions in (351) and (352) are given below. Sadock uses
a higher abstract performative to specify the illocutionary force.
(353) a.

[ [ Speaker-declare-Syntax isn't easy] [ Speaker-ask-Is syntax easy]] (tagquestion)

b.

[ [ Speaker-ask-Is syntax easy] [ Speaker-declare-Syntax isn't easy]] (rhetorical question)

(354) a.

[ [ Speaker-declare-Syntax is easy] [ Speaker-ask-Isn't syntax easy]] (tagquestion)

b.

[ [ Speaker-ask-Isn't syntax easy] [ Speaker-declare-Syntax is easy]] (rhetorical question)

S

S

S

S

S

S

S

S

S

S

S

S

In order to derive the correct surface string, Sadock claims that at S-structure, part of
the second conjunct of a tag question, but all of the second conjunct of a rhetorical question
undergoes deletion. But if the D-structures of both tag questions and rhetorical questions
are conjunctions of an assertive and an interrogative clause and the only di erence is the
ordering of the conjuncts, the asymmetry in the deletion of second conjuncts is mysterious.
Moreover, Sadock would have to say that in rhetorical questions with a strong NPI, the
NPI is licensed by the negation in the deleted assertive conjunct. For instance, given Sadock
(1971, 1974), give a damn in (355a) is licensed by the negation in the second conjunct in
(355b).
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(355) a.
b.

Does John give a damn about syntax?
[ [ Speaker-ask-Does John give a damn about syntax] [ Speaker-declareJohn doesn't give a damn about syntax]]
S

S

S

Assuming that strong NPIs are licensed if they are in the c-command domain of negation,
NPI licensing in rhetorical questions ends up being a special case. That is, in the rst
conjunct of rhetorical questions, strong NPIs are licensed even though they are not ccommanded by the licensing negation. Even if we accept that NPI licensing in rhetorical
questions is a special case, the prediction is that tag questions that have a negative tag
should be able to license an NPI in the body as well. But this prediction is not borne out,
as shown in (356a).
(356) a. * John gives a damn about syntax, doesn't he?
b.

[ [ Speaker-declare-John gives a damn about syntax] [ Speaker-ask-Doesn't
John give a damn about syntax]]
S

S

S

If tag questions and rhetorical questions have similar D-structure and similar semantics, it
is mysterious why there should be asymmetry in NPI licensing.

6.3.2 Progovac (1993)
Progovac (1993) is mainly concerned with accounting for NPI licensing in various types of
constructions. She argues that NPIs are similar to anaphors in their need for licensing by a
local antecedent and proposes an account of the licensing of polarity items that combines a
modi ed version of the downward entailment approach of Ladusaw (1980) and the Binding
Theory of Chomsky (1981), as extended by Aoun (1985, 1986) to include both A and
A'-binding. She extends the proposed analysis to NPI licensing in rhetorical wh-questions.
The claim is that NPIs are subject to Principle A of the Binding Theory. A potential
binder for NPIs is either the local negation or an empty polarity operator generated in
[Spec, CP]. Further, only NPIs that undergo Quanti er Raising at LF can be licensed by
the empty polarity operator. This means that while weak NPIs such as ever and any can
be licensed by the empty polarity operator in [Spec, CP], strong NPIs such as budge an
inch and lift a nger, which are not quanti ers, can only be licensed by local negation. In
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principle, the empty polarity operator (Op) is generated in [Spec, CP] of all clauses, but is
ltered out in upward entailing clauses by the following lter.
(357)

*Op in an upward entailing clause

Thus, in (358a), local negation binds and licenses the NPI anyone. In (358b), an empty
polarity operator is generated in [Spec, CP] of the complement clause. Since the complement
clause of forget is not an upward entailing environment, the operator is not ltered out and
is hence able to bind and license the NPI anyone . In (358c), the NPI anything does not have
a binder and so is not licensed because there is no local negation and the empty operator
cannot be generated in the absence of a [Spec, CP] position.
(358) a.
b.

John did not see anyone.
Mary forgot that anyone visited her on Monday.

c. * Mary forgot anything.
In (359a), the strong NPI lift a nger is licensed by local negation. But in (359b), since the
strong NPI lift a nger cannot raise at LF, it is not licensed even though an empty polarity
operator is present in [Spec, CP].
(359) a.

Sue did not lift a nger to help John.

b. * Sue forgot that Mary lifted a nger to help John.
According to Progovac, wh-questions come out as upward entailing (adopting the definition of Karttunen (1977)). This is so because every true answer to (360b), which is of
the form x has a cat entails a true answer to (360a), which is of the form x has a pet. But
every true answer to (360a) does not entail a true answer to (360b). Thus, it is surprising
that wh-questions license NPIs.
(360) a.

Who has a pet?

b.

Who has a cat?

Progovac proposes that wh-words are ambiguous between NPIs and true question words,
based on the fact that in languages like Chinese and Serbo-Croatian, wh-words can serve
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as NPIs. She claims that in principle, a wh-question starts with both a wh-operator and
an empty polarity operator in [Spec, CP]. When the question does not contain an NPI, the
empty polarity operator is suppressed, and the wh-word is a true question word. The whoperator binds and merges with the wh-word, and the question is interpreted as an ordinary
information-seeking question. But when the question contains an NPI, it requires the empty
polarity operator to license the NPI. In this case, the wh-operator is suppressed, and the whword is forced to be an NPI word. The empty polarity operator binds and merges with the
NPI wh-word, licensing the NPI ever as well, and the question is interpreted as a rhetorical
question. (362) demonstrates the interpretational process for the wh-question with an NPI
in (361):
(361)

Who did Mary ever visit in Seoul?

(362) a.

[

b.

[

Polarity-Op who [ 0 did Mary ever visit in Seoul?]]

c.

[

Polarity-Op anyone [ 0 did Mary ever visit in Seoul?]]

d.

[

CP

CP

CP

CP

WH-Op Polarity-Op who [ 0 did Mary ever visit in Seoul?]]
C

C

C

no one [ 0 did Mary ever visit in Seoul?]]
C

Progovac assumes that the merger of the wh-word and the empty polarity operator in
[Spec, CP] takes place prior to the application of the ltering process. Otherwise, the
empty polarity operator would be precluded from appearing in the clause in the rst place.
Progovac (1993) accounts for the rhetorical question reading of wh-questions with weak
NPIs. But her system cannot account for the ordinary information-seeking reading that is
available in some wh-questions with weak NPIs: she wrongly predicts that all wh-questions
with NPIs can only have rhetorical question reading. Furthermore, as observed in Horn
and Lee (1995), her analysis wrongly predicts that strong NPIs cannot occur in rhetorical
questions, since they cannot undergo Quanti er Raising. Moreover, since it is the presence
of an NPI that triggers the suppression of the wh-operator, Progovac wrongly predicts that
rhetorical wh-questions without NPIs cannot exist. A more general system that can account
for the syntactic and semantic properties of rhetorical questions with or without NPIs would
be preferable.
199

6.3.3 Lee (1995)
According to Lee (1995), argument rhetorical wh-questions cannot license subject position
NPIs, whereas object position NPIs or verbal NPIs, such as budge an inch, are licit.
(363) a. * Who did anyone see?
b. * What did anyone buy?
(364) a.
b.

Who said anything to you?
Who budged an inch to help Bob?

Lee notes that the grammaticality of (363a,b) improves when the NPI anyone is focused.
But she marks them ungrammatical assuming that focused forms are syntactically distinct
from non-focused ones. She assumes a basic tree structure in which NegP appears above
VP but below the surface subject position, in the spirit of Pollock (1989).
(365)

CP
AgrP
NegP
TP
VP

Lee argues that argument wh-phrases in rhetorical questions activate NegP by moving
through its speci er on the way to [Spec, CP]. The activated NegP is then able to license NPIs that appear below it, but not ones above it. So object and verbal NPIs can be
licensed, but subject NPIs cannot.
The presence of an overt negation in declarative sentences triggers do-support in English,
as in (366).
(366)

John did not say anything.
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If an account of do-support is adopted that appeals to PF adjacency requirement between
the main verb and the in ection on INFL, as in Bobaljik (1995), then Lee correctly predicts
that do-support should not be triggered in (367a) under the rhetorical question reading.
This is because negation in rhetorical questions is covert, and so the in ection in INFL and
the main verb are adjacent to each other at PF.
(367) a.

Who said anything interesting at the seminar?

b. * Who did say anything interesting at the seminar?
However, if we adopt an account of do-support according to which do-support is required in
negative declaratives because negation blocks LF verb movement to INFL, as in Chomsky
(1991, 1993), then Lee (1995) wrongly predicts that the question in (367a) should trigger
do-support under the rhetorical question reading. Since negation in rhetorical questions is
structurally located in the same position as in negative declaratives, according to Lee, LF
verb movement should be blocked in rhetorical questions as well and so do-support should
be triggered.
Furthermore, Lee assumes that the examples in (363) are ungrammatical because the
NPI has to be focused in order for such cases to have a rhetorical question reading. However,
all rhetorical questions have to be uttered with a focus on some constituent or other. Hence,
we believe that the examples in (363) are just as grammatical as those in (364). An adequate
analysis should be able to account for the fact that argument wh-questions with subject NPIs
can have a rhetorical question reading.

6.4 Semantics of Questions and Wh-words
6.4.1 Semantics of Questions
Let us de ne, as in Groenendijk and Stokhof (1985), the denotation of a question as a
function which partitions the set of all possible worlds. The partition represents the set
of propositions which are possible answers, including the negative answer. That is, each
block of the partition corresponds to the set of possible worlds in which one of the possible
answers is true. For instance, the yes-no question Does John drink? returns the bipartition
in (368).
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(368) [ Does John drink?]]
John drinks

John doesn't drink
One block of the partition represents the positive answer, and the other block represents
the negative answer.
Assuming that the domain of universe contains three individuals Mary, John and Bill,
the wh-question Who drinks? returns the partition in (369).
(369) [ Who drinks?]]
Everybody drinks
Mary, Bill drink
Mary, John drink
John, Bill drink
Mary drinks
Bill drinks
John drinks

Nobody drinks

Each block in the partition represents a possible answer, and one of them contains the true
answer.

6.4.2 Semantics of Wh-words
The semantics of questions in Groenendijk and Stokhof (1985) suggests an algebraic account of the possible values for wh-words, as in Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1993) and GutierrezRexach (1997). For instance, in (369), given that the domain of universe contains three
individuals Mary, John and Bill, the possible values for the wh-word who is the power set
of the set containing the three individuals, including the empty set and the unit set.
(370)

ffMary,

Bill, Johng, fMary, Billg, fMary, Johng, fJohn, Billg, fMaryg, fBillg,

fJohng, ;g

The power set in (370) is closed under intersection, union, and complement. That is,
intersection, union and complement are de ned for every element in the power set. This
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means that the result of intersection and union for any two elements in the power set and
the result of the complement of any element in the power set are included in the power
set. For instance, the intersection of fMary, Bill, Johng and fMary, Billg is fMary, Billg,
the intersection of fMaryg and fBillg is the empty set, the complement of fBillg is fMary,
Johng, the union of fJohng and fBillg is fJohn, Billg. This is exactly what the domain of
a power set boolean algebra is like.
A power set boolean algebra is a six-tuple hB; 1; 0; \; [;0 i, where B is the domain of
the algebra, 0 and 1 are elements of B , corresponding to the empty set and the unit set
respectively, \ and [ are binary functions corresponding to intersection and union, and
0 is a unary function corresponding to the complement, and B is closed under the three
functions. 1 and 0 are also called the top element and the bottom element, respectively.
Thus, we can say that a wh-word, such as who and what, is a variable that ranges over the
domain of context which is structured as in a power set boolean algebra. We illustrate the
power set boolean algebra whose domain is the power set of fMary, Bill, Johng in Figure
6.1.4
Mary, Bill, John

Mary, Bill

Mary

Mary, John

Bill

Bill, John

John

Figure 6.1: Boolean algebraic structure
4

See Keenan and Faltz (1985) for an application of boolean algebra to natural language semantics.
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Further, we assume that a yes-no question includes a covert wh-word that has the semantics of whether. This assumption is motivated by the obligatory presence of whether in
indirect yes-no questions. Moreover, in some languages such as Yiddish, the word corresponding to whether, which is overt in indirect questions, is optionally overt in direct yes-no
questions.
(371) a.

John asked me whether Mary smokes.

b. * John asked me Mary smokes.
(372) Yiddish
a.

(Tsi) reykhert Miryam?
whether smokes Miryam
`Does Miryam smoke?'

b.

Shmuel hot mikh gefregt, tsi
Miryam reykhert.
Shmuel has me asked whether Miryam smokes
`Shmuel asked me whether Miryam smokes.'

The semantics of yes-no questions in Groenendijk and Stokhof (1985) suggests that
whether is a variable ranging over a domain with two elements: a positive polarity and a
negative polarity. That is, the possible values for whether are either the positive or the
negative polarity. If we think of the positive polarity as truth (1) and the negative polarity
as falsity (0), then the set f0, 1g is closed under conjunction (^), disjunction (_), and
complement (0 ). This is exactly how the domain of a two algebra is like.
A two algebra is a six-tuple h2; 1; 0; ^; _;0 i, where 2 is f0, 1g, 1 (which is the top element)
corresponds to truth, 0 (which is the bottom element) corresponds to falsity, ^ and _ are
binary functions corresponding to conjunction and disjunction, respectively, and 0 is a unary
function that corresponds to complement. The domain of two algebra is closed under these
functions, as shown in (373).
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(373)

1^1=1
1^0=0^1=0^0=0
1_1=1_0=0_1=1
0_0=0
10 = 0
00 = 1

Thus, we can say that whether is a variable that ranges over positive and negative polarity
and is structured as in a two algebra. We illustrate two algebra with Figure 6.2.
1

0

Figure 6.2: Two algebraic structure

6.4.3 The Source of Negation in Rhetorical Questions
Given the semantics of wh-words in wh-questions assumed here, a wh-word is a variable that
ranges over a domain of context which has the structure of a power set boolean algebra.
Thus, the domain of a wh-word includes the empty set. Moreover, whether is a variable that
ranges over a domain that includes a positive polarity and a negative polarity. The empty set
(; in Figure 6.1) and the negative polarity (0 in Figure 6.2) contribute the model-theoretic
equivalent of negation in the language.

6.5 An Assertion of the Opposite Polarity
Recall that rhetorical questions are interpreted as assertions of opposite polarity from what
is apparently asked. We propose that the negation contributed by the semantics of whwords is responsible for the polarity reversal in the interpretation of rhetorical questions.
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That is, the polarity reversal in the interpretation of rhetorical questions is the result of the
principle in (374).
(374) In rhetorical questions, wh-words denote the bottom element in their denotational
domains.
a.

In rhetorical yes-no questions, whether denotes the negative polarity.

b.

In rhetorical wh-questions, the wh-phrase denotes the empty set.

Then the question is `Why?' To put it di erently, why shouldn't the wh-phrase in rhetorical
wh-questions always denote some non-empty set, and why shouldn't whether in rhetorical
yes-no questions always denote the positive polarity?

6.5.1 Yes-no questions
It turns out that ordinary questions also have polarity reversal e ects in terms of the
speaker's expectations towards the answer. Ordinary negative yes-no questions implicate
that the speaker expects a positive answer.
(375) a.
b.

Didn't John nish the paper?
Speaker's expectation: John nished the paper.

In general, a positive yes-no question has no implications as to the speaker's expectations
towards the answer. However, sometimes it implicates the speaker's expectations towards
the answer, and when it does, it implicates that the speaker expects a negative answer.
(376) a.
b.

Did John nish the paper?
Speaker's expectation: John didn't nish the paper.

Assume that the speaker thought that John didn't nish the paper. But he is not completely
sure. In such a context, the speaker would utter (376a), rather than (375a).
If a positive assertion is followed by the conjunction but and a tag question, the tag
question must be in the positive form, as in (377). If a negative assertion is followed by
but and a tag question, the tag question must be in the negative form, as in (378). The
conjunction but requires the second conjunct to contrast with the rst conjunct. A positive
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tag question can be the second conjunct in (377a) because it expresses the speaker's expectation towards the negative answer. A negative tag question can be the second conjunct in
(378a) because it expresses the speaker's expectation towards the positive answer. In both
cases, the rst conjunct contrasts with the second one.
(377) a.

John said that he nished the paper, but did he?

b. # John said that he nished the paper, but didn't he?
(378) a.

John said that he didn't nish the paper, but didn't he?

b. # John said that he didn't nish the paper, but did he?
A possible explanation for the polarity reversal e ects as to the speaker's expectation
towards the answer in yes-no questions may come from Gricean maxims (Grice (1975)). The
speaker's expectation may be the result of an instantiation of the rst part of the Gricean
maxim of Quantity:
(379)

Make your contribution as informative as is required.

We take the notion of `informativeness' to be relative to the individual's degree of belief
in a certain proposition p in a given context c. The idea of assigning a degree of belief for
p is adopted from various probabilistic ways of modeling epistemic states (e.g., Bayesian
models for degrees of beliefs,5 see Gardenfors (1988:36)). Such models take into account
individuals' beliefs that are partial in the sense that they are neither accepted nor rejected.
If a speaker believes that it is very likely that p holds in c, the most informative proposition
in c is :p. For instance, assume that you believe that it is very likely that it is raining and
someone says to you It is raining (q). Then q is not adding much to what you already know.
But if someone says to you It is not raining (q0 ) and you believe him to be truthful, then
you have to change your beliefs about the weather. The claim is that q0 is more informative
than q because you have to change your beliefs if you accept q0 . We speculate that when a
speaker is formulating a question to nd out whether p or :p, s/he formulates the question
in the form of the proposition that would be the most informative if it turned out to be
true. This means that if a question has the form :p?, the speaker believes that :p is the
Each proposition has associated with it a probabilistic belief function b: P
of propositions and [0,1] is the real interval between 0 and 1.
5
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! [0,1], where P is the set

most informative proposition if it turned out to be true. This in turn means that in such
a context, the speaker believes that it is likely that p holds. In other words, the likelihood
that a speaker will use a negative question :p? is equal to the speaker's assessment of the
probability of p.
Before we go on to explain how the pragmatics of yes-no questions relate to the polarity
reversal e ects of rhetorical yes-no questions, let us point out that a rhetorical question has
an intonational contour of an assertion. Unlike an ordinary question, which has a rising
intonation, a rhetorical question has a falling intonation, just like a declarative sentence
expressing an assertion. We claim that the intonational contour serves as a cue for the
rhetorical question function. Using the intonation contour as a cue for a certain illocutionary
force is not restricted to the domain of questions. For instance, a declarative sentence with
a rising intonation expresses question force rather than assertive force. Thus, assuming that
falling intonation contour in a question is an indication of assertive force seems reasonable.
We do not know why a question can be used to express an assertion. But let us take
this fact as given, just as we take as given the fact that a declarative can be used to
express a question. The question then is how we compute that a rhetorical yes-no question
expresses an assertion of the opposite polarity. Our answer to this question depends on
the semantics and pragmatics of yes-no questions. According to the semantics of yes-no
questions, the denotation of a yes-no question p? is a function which partitions the set of
all possible worlds into two blocks, where one block represents the positive answer p and
the other block represents the negative answer :p. Further, according to the pragmatics
of yes-no questions, given a yes-no question p?, the speaker believes that the proposition
of the opposite polarity :p is likely to be true. The semantics of yes-no questions makes
available either p or :p as the assertion expressed by a rhetorical yes-no question p?. Among
the two choices, the negative answer is the one that is consistent with the pragmatics of
yes-no questions. Thus, the negative answer is selected as the assertion expressed by the
rhetorical yes-no question. In e ect, rhetorical yes-no questions implicate the speaker's
expectation towards the answer in the strongest possible form. That is, given a rhetorical
yes-no question p?, the speaker's assessment of the probability of :p is 1.6 Thus, speaker's
There are some apparent rhetorical positive yes-no questions that do not express the negative assertion.
The question in (380b) and the rhetorical yes-no question in (380c) can mean the same thing: namely, the
6
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expectation towards :p is asserted as the speaker's belief.

6.5.2 Wh-questions
Ordinary wh-questions also have implications in terms of speaker's expectations towards
the answer. Ordinary negative wh-questions implicate that the speaker expects that the
set of individuals who satisfy the question is smaller than the set of individuals who do not
satisfy the question.
(382) a. Who didn't nish the paper?
b. Speaker's expectation: Most people nished the paper.
In general, a positive wh-question has no implications as to the speaker's expectations
with respect to the answer. However, sometimes it has the implication that the speaker
expects that the set of individuals who satisfy the question is smaller than the set of individuals who do not satisfy the question.
(383) a. Who nished the paper?
b. Speaker's expectation: Most people did not nish the paper.
Assume that the speaker believes that most people didn't nish the paper, and wants to
know who indeed nished the paper. In such a context, the speaker would utter (383a),
rather than (382a).
Pope is indeed Catholic. However, the usage of these questions is di erent. As can be seen by the following
discourse segments, the two questions cannot be used interchangeably. While (380b) can be an answer to the
ordinary question in (380a), (380c) cannot. Moreover, while (381b) can be an appropriate reply to (381a),
(381c) cannot.
(380) a. A: Is Clinton a liberal?
b. B: Is the Pope Catholic?
c. # B: Isn't the Pope Catholic?
(381) a. A: The Pope has not been acting like himself lately.
b. B: No matter what, isn't the Pope Catholic?
c. # B: No matter what, is the Pope Catholic?
The question in (380b), although without negation, expresses a positive assertion. While the analysis given
here predicts that such cases must have negation (as in (380c)), the above examples show that the positive
assertion of (380b) is distinct from the one in (380c) and must be dealt with exceptionally.
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A wh-question Whx[Px]? contributes an open proposition Px. For instance, the whquestion in (382a) contributes the open proposition x didn't nish the paper. In a context
where most people nished the paper, the probability of an arbitrary person in the domain
of context to be included in the witness set of the open proposition is low. The witness
set of an open proposition is the set of individuals that satis es that proposition. If we
assume that the probability of an arbitrary individual in the domain of context to be
included in the witness set of the given open proposition to be inversely proportional to the
informativeness of that proposition, then we can provide a similar explanation regarding the
speaker's expectation in wh-questions in terms of informativeness as for yes-no questions.
For instance, if the speaker believes that most people in the domain of context nished
the paper, then the probability of an arbitrary person in the domain of context to be
included in the witness set of the open proposition x nished the paper is high, and so
the informativeness of the open proposition is low. However, given the same context, the
probability of an arbitrary person in the domain of context to be included in the witness
set of x did not nish the paper is low, and so the informativeness of this open proposition
is high. The intuition behind this assumption is that in a situation where the speaker
already believes that most people nished the paper, the information that some individual
x did not nish the paper is more informative than the information that some individual x
nished the paper. Thus, just as in yes-no questions, when a speaker is formulating a whquestion, s/he formulates the question with an open proposition that is most informative.
This means that if a wh-question is in the form of Wh[:Px]?, then the speaker's assessment
of the probability of an arbitrary individual being included in the witness set of :Px is low.
This in turn means that the speaker believes that most individuals in the domain of context
satis es Px. In other words, the likelihood that a speaker will use a negative wh-question
Whx[:Px]? is equal to the speaker's assessment of the probability of an arbitrary individual
being included in the witness set of Px.
Returning to rhetorical wh-questions, assuming that the intonational contour serves as a
cue that a wh-question is a rhetorical question that expresses an assertion, the question we
ask is how we compute that a rhetorical wh-question expresses an assertion in which the value
of the wh-phrase is the empty set and not some other set. In principle, the semantics of whquestions makes available all the possible answers as the assertion expressed by a rhetorical
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wh-question, where the possible answers di er with respect to the possible values for the
wh-phrase. According to the pragmatics of wh-questions, given a wh-question Whx[Px]?,
the speaker believes that the probability of an arbitrary individual being included in the
witness set Px is low. Among the choices of propositions presented by the semantics of
wh-questions, the proposition that is consistent with the pragmatics of wh-questions will be
selected as the one being asserted by the rhetorical wh-question. Thus, the proposition in
which the value of the wh-phrase denotes the unit set will not be selected because it implies
that there is the highest probability of an arbitrary individual in the domain of context to
be included in the witness set, namely 1. On the other hand, propositions in which the
wh-phrase denotes one of the smaller sets can be selected because these propositions are
consistent with the pragmatics of wh-questions. Among these propositions, the proposition
in which the value of the wh-phrase denotes the empty set implies the lowest probability
of an arbitrary individual being included in the witness set, namely zero. And the fact
is that rhetorical wh-questions assert the proposition in which the value of the wh-phrase
denotes the empty set. At this point, we do not know of a way to derive this fact without
stipulation.7

6.6 Deriving the Interpretation
Now that we have motivated why rhetorical questions are interpreted as assertions of the
opposite polarity, we propose a way of deriving the interpretation.
We have assumed that yes-no questions have a covert wh-word that corresponds to
whether, presumably in [Spec, CP], just like ordinary wh-words in wh-questions. We propose
that in rhetorical yes-no questions, whether maps onto negation and takes scope over the
entire sentence. This negation is isomorphic to the negative polarity in the two algebraic
7

There are some rhetorical wh-questions whose wh-phrase does not denote an empty set.

(384)

Who fed you and gave you a proper education? (A mother to her son)

Under the rhetorical question reading, the wh-phrase in (384) denotes a singleton set, and the question
denotes a speci c answer: namely, I fed you and gave you a proper education. A possible explanation could
come from the nature of the discourse context. That is, it may be the case that the discourse context in
which such a type of rhetorical question can be used has an existential presupposition, e.g. someone fed you
and gave you a proper education. Then, the wh-phrase can no longer denote an empty set, and the smallest
possible set it can denote is a singleton set. With this kind of extension in mind, we restrict the discussion
to rhetorical wh-questions whose wh-phrase denotes an empty set.
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denotation of whether, illustrated in Figure 6.2. In (385a), whether has the negative value.
And so the question is interpreted as a negative assertion, as can be represented as (385c).
(385) a.

Did I tell you that writing a dissertation was easy?

b.

whether[Did I tell you that writing a dissertation was easy]

c.

:[I

told you that writing a dissertation was easy]

In (386a), whether is mapped onto negation. The propositional content of the question and
whether each contribute a negation, as represented in (386c). The two negations cancel out
each other, and the question is interpreted as a positive assertion, as represented in (386d).
(386) a.

Didn't I tell you that writing a dissertation was easy?

b.

whether[:(I told you that writing a dissertation was easy)]

c.

:[:(I

d.

I told you that writing a dissertation was easy

told you that writing a dissertation was easy)]

We propose that in rhetorical wh-questions, the wh-phrase maps onto a negative quanti er and it takes scope over the entire sentence. This negative quanti er is isomorphic to
the empty set in the boolean algebraic denotation of wh-words, illustrated in Figure 6.1.
In (387a), the wh-phrase is mapped onto a negative quanti er. And so the question is
interpreted as a negative assertion, as represented in (387b).
(387) a.
b.

What has John done for you?
:9x[John

has done x for you]

In (388a), the wh-phrase maps onto a negative quanti er. The negative quanti er and the
propositional content of the question each contribute a negation, as represented in (388b).
The two negations cancel out each other, and the question is given the correct interpretation
as a positive assertion, as represented in (388c).
(388) a.

What hasn't John done for you?

b.

:9x[:(John

c.

8x[John

has done x for you)]

has done x for you]
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6.7 A Proposal
We can account for the formal properties of rhetorical questions discussed in x6.2 if the wellformedness conditions apply at a level where wh-words have been mapped onto negation for
yes-no questions and negative quanti ers for wh-questions. The representation at this level
is not LF, which is the output of syntax, but more abstract than that. It is the output of
further post-LF derivation via interaction with at least a sub part of the interpretational
component.8

6.7.1 Rhetorical Questions as Assertions
The proposed analysis explains why rhetorical questions have the formal properties of assertions. At the level in which the well-formedness conditions apply, the value of whether
for rhetorical yes-no questions and the value of the wh-phrase for rhetorical wh-questions
are determined. At this level, rhetorical questions are not questions anymore. Rather, they
are assertions.

6.7.2 NPI Licensing
Under the proposed analysis, NPI licensing in rhetorical questions can be accounted for.
NPI licensing applies to the representation in which the wh-phrase is mapped onto negation.
Thus, NPIs are licensed if this representation contains a licensing negation, but not if it does
not. In other words, NPIs are licensed if rhetorical questions are interpreted as a negative
assertion, but not if they are interpreted as a positive assertion.

6.7.2.1 Rhetorical yes-no questions
Both strong and weak NPIs are licensed in rhetorical positive yes-no questions. Under the
rhetorical question reading, both (389a) and (390a) are interpreted as negative assertions.
An analysis in a similar vein is found in Linebarger (1980, 1987) in the domain of NPI licensing in general.
Bhatt (to appear) also reaches a similar conclusion in the domain of rhetorical adjunct wh-questions. Heycock
and Kroch (to appear) argue that the connectedness e ects of speci cational pseudoclefts can be explained if
well-formedness conditions such as binding and NPI licensing are stated over a partially interpreted post-LF
representation. They argue that this representation is derived via an operation which is a part of information
packaging instructions to a hearer on how to store the propositional content of the pseudocleft sentence in
the discourse model (see Prince (1981) and Vallduv (1990) on information packaging in discourse).
8
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(389) a.
b.
(390) a.
b.

Did John visit anyone?
:[John

visited anyone]

Did John lift a nger to help you?
:[John

lifted a nger to help you]

The interpretation of (389a) and (390a) can be represented as in (389b) and (390b), respectively. The weak NPI anyone in (389a) and the strong NPI lift a nger in (390a) are
licensed because they both end up in the scope of negation in the derived representations
for the rhetorical questions.
NPIs are not licensed in rhetorical negative yes-no questions (the asterisk on (391a)
applies only to the rhetorical question reading).
(391) a. * Didn't John visit anyone?
b.

:[:(John

visited anyone)]

c. * John visited anyone
Under the rhetorical question reading, (391a) is interpreted as a positive assertion because
the two negations contributed by whether and the propositional content of the question
cancel out each other. The interpretation of (391a) can be represented as in (391c). But
this representation is not well-formed because the NPI anyone is not licensed.

6.7.2.2 Rhetorical wh-questions
Just like rhetorical positive yes-no questions, rhetorical positive wh-questions license both
weak and strong NPIs. Under the rhetorical question reading, both (392a) and (393a) are
interpreted as negative assertions.
(392) a.
b.
(393) a.
b.

What has Sam ever contributed to the project?
:9x[Sam

has ever contributed x to the project]

Who lifted a nger to help Mary?
:9x[x

lifted a nger to help Mary]
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The interpretation of these questions can be represented as in (392b) and (393b). The NPIs
ever and lift a nger are licensed because they end up in the scope of negation in the derived
representations for the rhetorical questions.
Moreover, just like rhetorical negative yes-no questions, rhetorical negative wh-questions
do not license NPIs, (again, the asterisk on (394a) applies to the the rhetorical question
reading).
(394) a. * Who didn't say anything interesting at the seminar?
b.

:9x[:(x

said anything interesting at the seminar)]

c. * 8x(x said anything interesting at the seminar)
Under the rhetorical question reading, (394a) is interpreted as a positive assertion because
the two negations contributed by the wh-phrase (which is equivalent to a negative QP) and
the propositional content of the question cancel out each other. The interpretation of (394a)
can be represented as in (394c). But this representation is not well-formed because the NPI
anything is not licensed.

6.7.3 Rhetorical Questions with a Deontic Modal
Further evidence for the proposal comes from rhetorical questions with deontic modals. In
a sentence where a deontic modal c-commands negation not or a negative QP, the deontic
modal unambiguously takes scope over the negation or the negative QP. For instance, in
(395), the deontic modal must or should c-commands not. In (396), the deontic modal
c-commands nothing.
(395) a.
b.

John must not eat the cake.
 It is obligatory for John to not eat the cake.
John should not leave.
 It is obligatory for John to not leave.

(396) a.

John must say nothing.
 It is obligatory for John to say nothing.

b.

John should eat nothing.
 It is obligatory for John to eat nothing.
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In these examples, the deontic modal unambiguously takes scope over the negation, as can
be seen by the paraphrases given for each sentence.
Interestingly, rhetorical questions with a deontic modal unambiguously have the interpretation in which the deontic modal has narrow scope with respect to a negation or a
negative QP, although there is no negation or a negative QP in the surface syntax. This is
illustrated in (397) and (398).
(397) a.
b.

Must John say anything?
 It is not obligatory for John to say anything.
Should John do the homework?
 It is not obligatory for John to do the homework.

(398) a.

What must John say?
 There is nothing such that it is obligatory for John to say it.

b.

What should John do?
 There is nothing such that it is obligatory for John to do it.

Under the proposal given here, in rhetorical yes-no questions, the covert wh-phrase
whether which has the negative value is located in [Spec, CP], c-commanding the deontic
modal. Hence, it is not surprising that rhetorical yes-no questions with a deontic modal
have an interpretation in which the negation takes scope over the deontic modal. The
interpretation of the rhetorical yes-no questions in (397) can be represented as in (399).
(399) a.

:[John

must say anything]

b.

:[John

should do the homework]

Similarly, under the propsal given here, in rhetorical wh-questions, the wh-phrase, which
is equivalent to a negative QP, is in [Spec, CP], c-commanding the deontic modal. Hence,
it follows that rhetorical wh-questions with a deontic modal have an interpretation in which
the negation takes scope over the deontic modal. The interpretation of the rhetorical whquestions in (398) can be represented as in (400).
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(400) a.

:9x[John

must say x]

b.

:9x[John

should do x]

Although there is no negation in the surface syntax, the questions in (397) and (398) can
have a rhetorical question reading in which the negation takes scope over the deontic modal.
This is because the covert whether in yes-no questions and the wh-phrase in wh-questions
contribute wide scope negation under the proposed analysis.

6.7.4 Evidence from a Negative Concord Language: Italian
We have seen that wh-words in rhetorical wh-questions behave like negative quantifers.
Here, we look at some facts from the behavior of negative constituents in wh-questions in
Italian that support our analysis in general and the link between wh-words and negative
QPs in particular.
In Italian, pure sentential negation is expressed by the negative marker non.
(401)

Italian
Gianni non telefona a sua madre.
Gianni Neg telephones to his mother
`Gianni does not call his mother.'

Sentential negation can also be expressed by one or more negative constituents. In Italian,
postverbal negative constituents behave di erently from preverbal negative constituents.
Postverbal negative constituents are similar to English NPIs in that they have to be licensed
by non or a preverbal negative constituent (Zanuttini (1991), Haegeman (1995)). Both
(402a) and (402b) are well-formed because nessuno is licensed by non in (402a), and niente
is licensed by nessuno in (402b). But (402c) is not well-formed because there is no licenser
for nessuno.
(402) Italian
a.

Gianni non telefona a nessuno.
Gianni Neg telephones to nobody
`Gianni does not call anyone.'
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b.

Nessuno ha detto niente.
nobody has said nothing
`Nobody said anything.'

c. * Gianni telefona a nessuno.
Gianni telephones to nobody
On the other hand, a preverbal negative constituent, like nessuno in (403), is a fulledged negative QP, requiring no licensing negative element.
(403)

Italian
Nessuno ha visto Maria.
nobody has seen Maria
`Nobody has seen Maria.'

In ordinary information-seeking wh-questions with a postverbal negative constituent, the
negative marker non must be present in order to license the postverbal negative constituent.
(404) Italian
a.

Chi non ha baciato nessuno?
who Neg has kissed nobody
`Who has not kissed anybody?'

b. * Chi ha baciato nessuno?
who has kissed nobody
However, a rhetorical positive question with a postverbal negative constituent does not
require non. Assume that speaker A has accused speaker B of kissing Mary, and that B
denies this accusation by uttering the rhetorical question in (405b).
(405) Italian
a.

A: Hai
baciato Maria!
have-2sg kissed Maria!
`You have kissed Mary.'

b.

B: Ma chi ha baciato nessuno?
but who has kissed nobody
`But who has kissed anyone?'
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Under the proposed analysis, the wh-word chi is equivalent to a negative QP. It licenses
nessuno.9
Moreover, a rhetorical negative question that has non is interpreted as a positive assertion.
(407)

Italian
Chi non sposerebbe Maria?
who non marry
Maria
`Who would not marry Mary?'

Under the proposed analysis, chi is equivalent to a negative QP. It has true negative force.
Chi and non cancel out each other, and the question is interpreted as a positive assertion.
In summary, since the wh-phrase in a rhetorical question denotes an empty set and is
equivalent to a true negative QP, it can license postverbal negative constituents.

6.8 Compositional Semantics for Rhetorical Questions
Given the proposed analysis, the interpretation of rhetorical questions is derived compositionally. We illustrate this point by deriving the logical form of the rhetorical wh-question
in (408).
(408)

What must Sam eat t ?
i

i

At LF, the rhetorical question in (408) has the structure in (409).
In Spanish, negative constituents are subject to the same constraints as those in Italian. And just as
in Italian, a postverbal negative constituent does not require no in rhetorical positive questions, supporting
our proposal that the wh-phrase in a rhetorical question behaves as a negative QP. The example in (406) is
from Gutierrez-Rexach (1997).
9

(406) Spanish
>Que ha hecho nadie en este departamento recientemente?
what has done nobody in this department recently
`What has anybody done in this department recently?'
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(409)

CP
NP

C0

what

i

must Sam eat t

i

This LF structure undergoes a post-LF derivation where what maps onto a negative QP
that corresponds to nothing. The output of this post-LF derivation directly maps onto
semantic interpretation.
(410)

:9x(thing 0 (x) ^ 2eat0 (sam0 ; x)),

-conversion

:9x(thing 0 (x) ^ xi 2eat0 (sam0 ; xi )(x)),

_^

:9x(thing 0 (x) ^_^ xi 2eat0 (sam0 ; xi )(x)),

-elimination

-conversion

(X :9x(thing0 (x) ^_ X (x)))^ x 2eat0 (sam0 ; x ), quantify-in
i

i

X :9x(thing0 (x) ^_ X (x)) 2eat0 (sam0 ; x )
i

nothing

must Sam eat x

i

i

In short, a correct logical form of the rhetorical question What must Sam eat? can be
derived by mapping what to the intensional logical translation of nothing, and quantifying
this into the translation of Sam must eat x (in the way that the quantifying-in function in
Montague's (1973) PTQ model works). After -conversions and _^ -eliminations, the logical
form which represents the correct scope between the negation and the deontic modal is
derived.
i

6.9 Conclusion
We have shown that rhetorical questions and ordinary questions do not pattern alike with
respect to various well-formedness conditions. We have proposed a way of deriving the interpretation of rhetorical questions and addressed the question of why rhetorical questions are
interpreted as an assertion of the opposite polarity. According to our analysis, the polarity
220

reversal e ects in the interpretation of rhetorical questions fall out from the semantics of
questions and the general pragmatic principle of informativeness. We have also proposed
that the representation over which various well-formedness conditions are stated is the output of a post-LF derivation which is determined via interaction with at least a sub part of
the interpretational component. Finally, we have seen that a compositional semantics for
rhetorical questions is possible by directly mapping this post-LF representation onto the
semantic interpretation.
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Appendix A

Abbreviations
This appendix lists the abbreviations and their full names for the texts cited in chapter
3. The abbreviations are in brackets. In citations from Old English, we refer to the texts
by abbreviations speci ed in Mitchell, Ball, and Cameron (1975, 1979). In citations from
Middle English sources, we refer to the texts by abbreviations speci ed in PPCME. In
citations from Late Middle English and Early Modern English, we refer to the texts by the
abbreviations speci ed in Ellegard (1953).

A.1 Old English Texts
[AELS] AElfric's Lives of Saints. Skeat 1881-1900.
[Beo] Beowulf and the Fight at Finnsburg. Klaeber 1950.

A.2 Middle English Texts
[AELR3] Alfred of Rievaulx's de Institutione Inclusarum. Early English Text Society, 287.
Ed. J. Ayto and A. Barratt. London, 1984.
[ANCRIWII] Part II: The English Text of the Ancrene Riwle. Early English Text Society,
O.S. 267. Ed. E. J. Dobson. London, 1972.
[AYENBI] Dan Michel's Ayenbite of Inwyt or Remorse of Conscience, Vol. I. Early English
Text Society, O.S. 23. Ed. R. Morris and P. Gradon. London, 1965 (1866).
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[BOETH] Chaucer, Geo rey. Text: Boethius. The Riverside Chaucer. Third Edition.
General Editor L. D. Benson. Based on the Works of Geo rey Chaucer, edited by F.
N. Robinson. Boston: Houghton Miin Company, 1987.
[CAXPRO] Caxton, William. The Prologues and Epilogues of William Caxton. Early English Text Society, 176. Ed. W. J. B. Crotch. London, 1956 (1928).
[CMPRIV,MPASTON] Paston, Margaret. Text: Letter(s). Paston Letters and Papers of
the Fifteenth Century, Part I. Ed. N. Davis. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971.
[EARLPS] The Earliest Complete English Prose Psalter. Early English Text Society, O.S.
97. Ed. K. D. Buelbring. London, 1891.
[EDMUND] Text: the Life of St. Edmund. Middle English Religious Prose. York Medieval
Texts. Ed. N. F. Blake. London: Edward Arnold, 1972.
[HORSES] A Late Middle English Treatise on Horses. Stockholm Studies in English, XLVII.
Ed. A. C. Svinhufvud. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1978.
[KEMPE] Kempe, Margery. The Book of Margery Kempe, Vol. I. Early English Text
Society, 212. Ed. S. B. Meech and H. E. Allen. London, 1940.
[MALORY] Malory, Thomas. Text: Morte Darthur. The Works of Sir Thomas Malory.
Ed. E. Vinaver. London: Oxford University Press, 1954.
[MIRK] Mirk, John. Mirk's Festival: a Collection of Homilies, by Johannes Mirkus (John
Mirk), Part I. Early English Text Society, E.S. 96. Ed. T. Erbe. London, 1905.
[NTEST] Text: the New Testament. The New Testament in English according to the version
by John Wycli e about A. D. 1380 and revised by John purvey about A. D. 1388. Ed.
J. Forshall and F. Madden. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1879.
[PURVEY] Purvey, John. Text: the Prologue to the Bible. The Holy Bible, containing the
Old and New Testaments, with the Apocryphal Books, in the earliest English versions
made from the Latin vulgate by John Wycli e and his followers, Vol. I. Ed. J. Forshall
and F. Madden. Oxford: University Press, 1850.
[ROLLFL] Rolle, Richard. Text: The Form of Living. English Writings of Richard Rolle,
Hermit of Hampole. Ed. Hope Emily Allen. Oxford, 1931.
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[ROYAL] Middle English Sermons, edited from British Museum Ms. Royal 18 B. XXIII.
Early English Text Society, 209. Ed. W. O. Ross. London, 1940.
[SAWLES] Text: Sawles Warde. The Katherine Group, edited from Ms. Bodley 34. Bibliotheque de la Faculte de Philosophie et Lettres de l'Universite de Liege, CCXV. Ed.
S. T. R. O. d'Ardenne. Paris: Societe d'Edition \Les Belles Lettres", 1977.
[SIEGE] The Siege of Jerusalem in Prose. Memoires de la Societe Neophilologique de
Helsinki, XXXIV. Ed. A. Kurvinen. Helsinki: Societe Neophilologique, 1969.
[WYCSER] English Wyclite Sermons, Vol. I. Ed. A. Hudson. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1983.

A.3 Late Middle English and Early Modern English Texts
[161] Biblical Version. Ed. A. C. Paues. Cambridge. 1902.
[190] St. Bartholomew's Church in London. Ed. N. Moore. Early English Text Society 163.
1923.
[243] Works of Sir Thomas Malory. Ed. E. Vinaver. Oxford. 1947.
[302] Atkynson, William . De Imitatione Christi. 1502. Ed. J. K. Ingram, Early English
Text Society, Ex. 63. 1893.
[304] Valentine and Orson. 1505 Ed. A. Dickson. Early English Text Society 204. 1936.
[305] Fisher, John . English Works. 1509-1521. Ed. J. E. B. Mayor. Early English Text
Society, Ex. 27. 1876.
[308] Whittinton, Robert. Vulgaria. 1519. Ed. B. White. Early English Text Society, 187.
1931.
[310] Tindale, William. The Four Gospels. 1525. Ed. J. Bosworth. The Gothic and
Anglo-Saxon Gospels. London. 1865.
[323] Latimer, Hugh. Letters. ca. 1525-1555. Ed. G. E. Corrie. Remains of Bishop Latimer.
Parker Society 10. 1845.
[324] Gardiner, Stephen. Letters. 1527-1555. Ed. J. A. Muler. The Letters of Stephen
Gardiner. Cambridge. 1933.
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[326] Palsgrave, John. Acolastus. 1540. Ed. P. L. Carver. Early English Text Society, 202.
1935.
[338] Wilson, Thomas. Rhetorique. 1553. Ed. G. H. Mair. Tudor and Stuart Library.
Oxford. 1909.
[344] Palace of Pleasure. 1566. Ed. Haworth. An Elizabethan Story Book. London. 1928.
[347] Northbrooke, John. Treatise against Dicing. 1577. Ed. J. P. C. Shakespeare Society
14. 1843.
[350] Mulcaster, Richard. Elementarie. 1582. Ed. E. T. Campagnac. Tudor and Stuart
Library. London. 1925.
[356] Queen Elizabeth. Boethius. 1593. Ed. C. Pemberton. Early English Text Society,
113. 1899.
[358] Deloney, Thomas. Jack of Newbury; The Gentle Craft. 1597-98. Ed. F. O. Mann.
Oxford. 1912.
[360] Ben Jonson's Plays. 1598-1609. Ed. W. Bang. Ben Jonsons Dramen, in Materialien

zur Kunde des Alteren
Englischen Dramas, Vol. VII:1-2. 1905-8.
[361] Chapman, George. Plays. 1606-1612. Ed. T. M. Parrot. London. 1914.
[363] John Webster and Thomas Dekker. Westward Ho; Northward Ho. 1607. Ed. Alex
Dyce. The Works of John Webster. London. 1857.
[364] Dekker, Thomas. Seven Deadly Sins of London. 1606. Ed. E. Arber. English Scholars'
Library 7. 1879.
[372] Browne, Thomas. Religio Medici. 1635. Ed. Geo. Keynes. Nelson Classics. 1940.
[373] Cowley, Abraham. The Guardian; Oliver Cromwell; Essays in Prose. Ed. A. R.
Waller. The English Writings of Abraham Cowley, Vol. 2. Cambridge English Classics. 1906.
[379] Swift, Jonathan. Journal to Stella. 1710. Ed. Harold Williams. Oxford. 1948.
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